scholarly journals Multi-Dimensional Incentive Mechanism in Mobile Crowdsourcing with Moral Hazard

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 604-616 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanru Zhang ◽  
Yunan Gu ◽  
Miao Pan ◽  
Nguyen H. Tran ◽  
Zaher Dawy ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Mobile Crowdsourcing

Incentive mechanism for a sustainable public distribution system

2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sri Vanamalla Venkataraman ◽  
Faiz Hamid
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Distribution System ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Bureaucratic Corruption ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Public Distribution System ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Level Of Effort

Purpose Government distributing rationed goods through a public distribution system often do not reach the deserving citizens primarily due to the practice of corruption. This paper aims to design an incentive mechanism to curtail such corrupt practices. Design/methodology/approach The incentive mechanism is developed in a principal-agent framework where the information asymmetry is in the form of moral hazard. Findings The mechanism designed through this study sufficiently penalizes the agent who receives bribe and incentivizes if desired level of effort is applied. Originality/value The paper contributes to the existing literature by developing an incentive mechanism to prevent bureaucratic corruption. Appropriate wages are also quantified in this study.

scholarly journals Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism under Moral Hazard

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Zhao ◽  
Minghu Wu ◽  
Wei Xiong ◽  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Optimization Problems ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Spatial Diversity ◽  
Spectrum Efficiency ◽  
Cooperative Relay ◽  
Relay Nodes ◽  
Relay Incentive

Cooperative relay can effectively improve spectrum efficiency by exploiting the spatial diversity in the wireless networks. However, wireless nodes may acquire different network information with various users’ location and mobility, channels’ conditions, and other factors, which results in asymmetric information between the source and the relay nodes (RNs). In this paper, the relay incentive mechanism between relay nodes and the source is investigated under the asymmetric information. By modelling multiuser cooperative relay as a labour market, a contract model with moral hazard for relay incentive is proposed. To effectively incentivize the potential RNs to participate in cooperative relay, the optimization problems are formulated to maximize the source’s utility while meeting the feasible conditions under both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios. Numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed contract design scheme for cooperative relay.

scholarly journals Multistrategy Repeated Game-Based Mobile Crowdsourcing Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Edge Computing in Internet of Things

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Chuanxiu Chi ◽  
Yingjie Wang ◽  
Yingshu Li ◽  
Xiangrong Tong
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Edge Computing ◽  
Quality Data ◽  
Mobile Edge Computing ◽  
High Quality ◽  
Mobile Crowdsourcing

With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) era, various application requirements have put forward higher requirements for data transmission bandwidth and real-time data processing. Mobile edge computing (MEC) can greatly alleviate the pressure on network bandwidth and improve the response speed by effectively using the device resources of mobile edge. Research on mobile crowdsourcing in edge computing has become a hot spot. Hence, we studied resource utilization issues between edge mobile devices, namely, crowdsourcing scenarios in mobile edge computing. We aimed to design an incentive mechanism to ensure the long-term participation of users and high quality of tasks. This paper designs a long-term incentive mechanism based on game theory. The long-term incentive mechanism is to encourage participants to provide long-term and continuous quality data for mobile crowdsourcing systems. The multistrategy repeated game-based incentive mechanism (MSRG incentive mechanism) is proposed to guide participants to provide long-term participation and high-quality data. The proposed mechanism regards the interaction between the worker and the requester as a repeated game and obtains a long-term incentive based on the historical information and discount factor. In addition, the evolutionary game theory and the Wright-Fisher model in biology are used to analyze the evolution of participants’ strategies. The optimal discount factor is found within the range of discount factors based on repeated games. Finally, simulation experiments verify the existing crowdsourcing dilemma and the effectiveness of the incentive mechanism. The results show that the proposed MSRG incentive mechanism has a long-term incentive effect for participants in mobile crowdsourcing systems.

scholarly journals An Optimization and Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism to Maximize Social Welfare for Mobile Crowdsourcing

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 414-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yingjie Wang ◽  
Zhipeng Cai ◽  
Zhi-Hui Zhan ◽  
Yue-Jiao Gong ◽  
Xiangrong Tong
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Mobile Crowdsourcing

Reputation-Based Dynamic Contract Incentive Mechanism in Mobile Crowdsourcing Network

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Minghu Wu ◽  
Qixuan Wan ◽  
Xuan Zheng ◽  
Yuhan Jiang ◽  
Nan Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Impact Factors ◽  
Optimization Strategy ◽  
Crowd Sourcing ◽  
Process Data ◽  
Mobile Crowdsourcing ◽  
Dynamic Contract ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Mobile crowdsourcing network is a promising technology utilizing the mobile ter- minal’s sensing and computing capabilities to collect and process data. However, because the mobile users (MUs) have selfish characteristics, the MUs only aim at maximizing their benefits. Therefore, how to design an appropriate long-term incentive mechanism for the service provider (SP) in dynamic environments is an urgent problem. In this work, we investigate the reputation-based dynamic contract for mobile crowdsourcing network. A two-period dynamic contract is first investi- gated to deal with the asymmetric information problem in the long-term crowd- sourcing tasks. Reputation strategy is introduced to attract the MUs to complete the long-term tasks. The incentives of the contract and the implicit incentives of the reputation strategy are used together to encourage MUs to complete the long-term crowdsourcing tasks. The optimization strategy is formulated by adjust- ing the reputation coefficient to maximize the SP’s utility. The impact of MUs’ risk attitude and reputation impact factors on the incentive mechanism is studied through experiments. Numerical simulation results demonstrate that the optimal reputation-based contract design scheme is efficient in the Mobile crowdsourcing networks.

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