Analyst following, information asymmetry and debt-equity choice -empirical evidence from the emerging capital market of China

Author(s):  
Gong Yifei
2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. p45
Author(s):  
Vasantha Rao Chigurupati

This paper examines the hitherto unexplored effect of lease intensity on hedging. Using a sample of 218 small and large non-financial firms drawn from 2006 to 2010, we find that firms leasing more of their Property, Plant and Equipment (PPE) use less financial derivatives, consistent with the theoretical predictions of Rampini and Viswanathan (2010). Further, using broad market microstructure based measures of information asymmetry, we offer empirical evidence consistent with theory that firms with higher information asymmetry hedge more. These results are robust to several alternative measurements of key variables, different regression specifications, estimation techniques and corrections for endogeneity.


Author(s):  
Nils-Christian Bobenhausen ◽  
Astrid Juliane Salzmann

AbstractEquity rights offerings and their respective announcement effects have been studied extensively in the literature. Our study expands upon these studies and focuses on those announcement effects and the relation between the discount of an equity rights offering and the announcement effect. Previous theoretical and empirical analyses show that firms can signal their quality via the discount in an equity rights offering and demonstrate a negative relation between the discount and the announcement effect. We argue that this link is only relevant in environments where signalling is possible and necessary. These are financial markets with a particularly low level of capital market transparency, i.e. high information asymmetry. We calculate announcement effects for an international sample of equity rights offerings and show that the negative effect of the discount on announcement effects can only be observed in environments with a low capital market transparency. Hence, our study estimates announcement effects across several different countries and is thus among the first to analyse signalling considerations for equity rights offerings in different transparency environments.


2018 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Devos ◽  
Erik Devos ◽  
Seow Eng Ong ◽  
Andrew C. Spieler

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Fery Friyo Handoko ◽  
Mu'minatus Sholichah

Abstract This research examine the capital market reaction on earnings management.  Agency conflict represented by information asymetry caused earnings management.  Managers have incentive to play accounting method and estimate to gain certain amount of earnings.  Hereafter, investor have interest regarding their invesment decision.  They rely on accounting information that represented in financial statement.Based on premise in Signalling Theory, we then hypothesized that investor would response any information addressed to them.Sample and population that used to test hypothesis taken from listed manufacturing company during 2015-2017.  We documenting data from financial statement items.  We obtain 40 manufacturing company that comply to purposive sampling requirement.  We use simple regression to do data analysis.  We found the empirical evidence that market reac the earnings management indication.  There is empirical fact that cummulative abnormal return decreas when determinate by discretionarry accruals.  This research conclude that market reacting the earnings management indication generally.


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