The Pricing Strategy for the Dual Channel Supply Chain with Pre-Sale Service

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zehua Yang ◽  
Jihong Zhang ◽  
Xi Chen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

scholarly journals The Impact of Price Comparison Service on Pricing Strategy in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Xu ◽  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Bin Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Price Comparison ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Recently, price comparison service (PCS) websites are more and more popular due to its features in facilitating transparent price and promoting rational purchase decision. Motivated by the industrial practices, in this study, we examine the pricing strategies of retailers and supplier in a dual-channel supply chain influenced by the signals of PCS. We categorize and discuss three situations according to the signal availability of PCS, under which the optimal pricing strategies are derived. Finally, we conduct a numerical study and find that in fact the retailers and supplier are all more willing to avoid the existence of PCS with the objective of profit maximization. When both of retailers are affected by the PCS, the supplier is more willing to reduce the availability of price information. Important managerial insights are discussed.

Pricing Strategy in Dual-Channel Supply Chains with Loss-Averse Consumers

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950027
Author(s):  
Chengli Liu ◽  
C. K. M. Lee ◽  
K. H. Leung
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Basic Product ◽  
Luxury Goods ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

In this paper, loss-averse consumer behavior during purchase decision-making process in the dual-channel supply chain is modeled. Loss-averse consumers prefer avoiding losses to gain utility with respect to their reference point while purchasing the product. Two product categories are classified: (1) basic product and (2) luxury goods which have lower and higher reference utility to consumers, respectively. The research objective is to determine the optimal price strategy in dual-channel supply chains and discuss the decision behind loss-averse consumers. To model consumers’ valuation of a product, prospect theory is adopted to calculate the demands of each channel. Then, the optimal pricing strategy and the corresponding profits are found out in a Stackelberg game manner. The results encourage manufacturers of basic goods to engage in dual-channel strategy. Effect of “double marginalization” is reduced if consumers are loss-averse in the dual-channel supply chain. Furthermore, the direct channel online contributes larger demand to the manufacturer. However, manufacturers of luxury goods are not suggested for dual-channel strategy because the demand for direct channel online is negligible and the demand for the retail channel remains unchanged. Nevertheless, retailers cannot obtain benefit from dual-channel and as a result, the profit of basic goods retailers will be reduced.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lufeng Dai ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Xiaoguang Liu ◽  
Lai Wei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.

scholarly journals A Cross-Channel Return Policy in a Green Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Spillover Effect

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 2171
Author(s):  
Huanyong Zhang ◽  
Huiyuan Xu ◽  
Xujin Pu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Spillover Effect ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Green Products ◽  
Return Policy ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Willingness To Buy ◽  
Differential Pricing ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

With the advent of the era of “New Retail”, many manufacturers and retailers have begun to provide cross-channel return services to increase competitiveness. Our study takes return policy into a green dual-channel supply chain, wherein a manufacturer creates and sells green products simultaneously. We investigate the pricing and greening strategies for the supply chain players in the cases of providing and not providing cross-channel return service by employing the Stackelberg model under the hypothesis of a consistent pricing strategy. By comparing the equilibrium results of two cases, we find that the retailer will cooperate with the manufacturer to employ the cross-channel return policy when the spillover effect is greater than a threshold. Additionally, the green level of products is higher than before. The threshold decreases with consumers’ sensitivity to green products, which implies that the manufacturer is motivated to conduct marketing programs to enhance consumers’ willingness to buy green products. Moreover, we propose a contract to coordinate the supply chain. Finally, we discuss the scenarios if the supply chain implements a differential pricing strategy. Interestingly, the green level and the profits of the whole supply chain are greater than that under a consistent pricing strategy. However, the profits of the retailer are lower than profits in the other scenario, which is not beneficial to creating a stable green supply chain.

scholarly journals Strategic Provision of Trade Credit in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Qin Wan ◽  
Yu Huang ◽  
Cuiting Yu ◽  
Meili Lu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Brick And Mortar ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Competitive Pricing

This study focuses on a a dual-channel supply chain that consists of a capital-constrained brick-and-mortar retailer and a manufacturer, where a manufacturer can simultaneously sell products through a traditional retail channel and a direct online channel. Supplementary pricing strategy and competitive pricing strategy are simulated in our model, and we find that the former one is the better choice for the manufacturer when the retailer suffers capital constraints. In our analysis, the capital constraint on retailer could mitigate the price competition between two channels, and it may be beneficial to the manufacturer under certain conditions. Our findings show that the manufacturer should strategically provide trade credit to retailers rather than unconditionally provide it. We present two trade-credit strategies (trade credit with positive interest rate and trade credit with zero interest rate) and suggest that the manufacturer should choose an appropriate trade-credit strategy according to the initial capital of the retailer. To guide the manufacturer when and how to provide trade credit, we conduct several numerical simulations based on our results and further plot out a graph to direct the manufacturer to an appropriate strategy of trade credit.

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