scholarly journals Strategic Provision of Trade Credit in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Qin Wan ◽  
Yu Huang ◽  
Cuiting Yu ◽  
Meili Lu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Trade Credit ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Brick And Mortar ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
Competitive Pricing

This study focuses on a a dual-channel supply chain that consists of a capital-constrained brick-and-mortar retailer and a manufacturer, where a manufacturer can simultaneously sell products through a traditional retail channel and a direct online channel. Supplementary pricing strategy and competitive pricing strategy are simulated in our model, and we find that the former one is the better choice for the manufacturer when the retailer suffers capital constraints. In our analysis, the capital constraint on retailer could mitigate the price competition between two channels, and it may be beneficial to the manufacturer under certain conditions. Our findings show that the manufacturer should strategically provide trade credit to retailers rather than unconditionally provide it. We present two trade-credit strategies (trade credit with positive interest rate and trade credit with zero interest rate) and suggest that the manufacturer should choose an appropriate trade-credit strategy according to the initial capital of the retailer. To guide the manufacturer when and how to provide trade credit, we conduct several numerical simulations based on our results and further plot out a graph to direct the manufacturer to an appropriate strategy of trade credit.

Pricing and Distribution Strategies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 23-37
Author(s):  
Guangye Xu ◽  
Hanguang Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Distribution Strategy ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Brick And Mortar ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
New Distribution

Internet has revolutionized distribution channels. Online orders are forwarded to the brick-and-mortar store to make the fulfillment, which is a new distribution strategy in a dual-channel supply chain. However, there is little research on the value of using such distribution strategy in dual-channel setting. To fill this gap, this article considers a manufacturer marketing a product through a dual-channel supply chain, comprised of an online channel and an offline retail channel. We develop a game theory model to investigate the pricing decisions and the distribution strategies, as well as to examine the impacts of the new distribution strategy on price competition and the dual-channel supply chain member's profits. By comparing the results of the traditional distribution strategy and the new distribution strategy, we find that the new distribution strategy can soften price competition when the proportion of the revenue generated by the direct channel is high enough, while if the proportion is low enough, it may intensify price competition. We also find that the supply chain members can achieve a win-win situation when the wholesale price is higher, and the proportion is greater under the new distribution strategy.

scholarly journals The Impact of Price Comparison Service on Pricing Strategy in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain

2013 ◽  
Vol 2013 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qi Xu ◽  
Zheng Liu ◽  
Bin Shen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Numerical Study ◽  
Profit Maximization ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Price Comparison ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Recently, price comparison service (PCS) websites are more and more popular due to its features in facilitating transparent price and promoting rational purchase decision. Motivated by the industrial practices, in this study, we examine the pricing strategies of retailers and supplier in a dual-channel supply chain influenced by the signals of PCS. We categorize and discuss three situations according to the signal availability of PCS, under which the optimal pricing strategies are derived. Finally, we conduct a numerical study and find that in fact the retailers and supplier are all more willing to avoid the existence of PCS with the objective of profit maximization. When both of retailers are affected by the PCS, the supplier is more willing to reduce the availability of price information. Important managerial insights are discussed.

scholarly journals Model Three-Level Dual-Channel Supply Chain pada Sistem Sentralisasi dengan Memertimbangkan Waktu Tunggu Pengiriman

d'CARTESIAN ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 72
Author(s):  
Shinta Nur Pratiwi Ramadhani ◽  
Ririn Setiyowati ◽  
Titin Sri Martini
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Lead Time ◽  
Nonlinear Function ◽  
Optimal Solution ◽  
Global Market ◽  
Centralize System ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

AbstrakEra pasar global telah mengubah kebiasaan konsumen dalam membeli produk, sehingga konsumen dapat membeli produk melalui media online. Oleh karena itu, produsen mengembangkan media penjualannya melalui media online dan offline. Pada penelitian ini dikembangkan model three-level dual-channel supply chain dengan memertimbangkan waktu tunggu pengiriman pada penjualan melalui media online yang dilakukan oleh produsen serta mengembangkan media penjualan distributor sehingga distributor dapat menjual produk secara langsung ke konsumen. Konstruksi model bertujuan untuk mengoptimalkan keuntungan gabungan produsen, distributor, dan pengecer dengan sistem sentralisasi. Fungsi keuntungan gabungan merupakan fungsi nonlinear tanpa kendala dengan tiga variabel keputusan yaitu harga jual produsen pada media online, harga jual distributor langsung ke konsumen, dan harga jual pengecer ke konsumen. Selanjutnya, ditentukan solusi optimal model berdasarkan syarat perlu dan syarat cukup untuk fungsi multivariabel tanpa kendala. Berdasarkan simulasi numerik dan analisis sensitivitas dapat dilihat pengaruh faktor waktu tunggu pengiriman terhadap fungsi keuntungan gabungan yang optimal. Ditunjukkan bahwa lamanya waktu tunggu pengiriman sangat berpengaruh pada besarnya keuntungan optimal gabungan produsen, distributor, dan pengecer.Kata Kunci: Sentralisasi, Three-Level, Waktu TungguAbstractThe global market era changes the consumer behavior to shop the product, so the consumer can buy through online channel. Therefore, the producer develop the selling channel to sell their products through online channel and offline channel. In this research, we develop the three-level dual-channel supply chain by notice delivery lead time in the online channel used by the producer and develop selling channel from distributors so distributors can sell their product to consumer with direct selling. We construct the model with profit maximization motive of the system that consists producer, distributors, and retailer in the centralize system. The total profit function is nonlinear function without constrains with three decision variables. Furthermore, we determine the optimal solution of the model based on necessary and sufficient condition. Based on numerical simulations and sensitivity analysis we analyze the effect of delivery lead time strongly influences the optimal total profit system.Keywords: Centralize, Lead Time, Three-Level

scholarly journals Managing a Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Fairness and Channel Preference

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Xianjin Du ◽  
Weijie Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Supply Chain Design ◽  
Operational Strategies ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Preference ◽  
Online Channel ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer sells the product via an offline retailer or online store. The manufacturer sets the wholesale and online price, and the retailer decides the retail price with the retailer’s fairness preference and consumer’s online channel preference. Through investigating the combined impacts of fairness preference and channel preference on the enterprises’ operational strategies, this paper obtains some meaningful results. If a manufacturer thinks over the fairness preference, he decreases the wholesale price to mitigate a loss of retailer and benefit the supply chain design. The manufacturer intends to set up the online channel with a lower acceptance as the fairness preference grows. However, the gains from enhanced online channel acceptance cannot compensate for the manufacturer’s loss by the fairness effect that benefits the retailer. Moreover, the manufacturer cannot neglect the retailer’s fairness preference generating a “lose-lose” case for both members.

Pricing Strategy in Dual-Channel Supply Chains with Loss-Averse Consumers

2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950027
Author(s):  
Chengli Liu ◽  
C. K. M. Lee ◽  
K. H. Leung
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Basic Product ◽  
Luxury Goods ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Channel Strategy ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain

In this paper, loss-averse consumer behavior during purchase decision-making process in the dual-channel supply chain is modeled. Loss-averse consumers prefer avoiding losses to gain utility with respect to their reference point while purchasing the product. Two product categories are classified: (1) basic product and (2) luxury goods which have lower and higher reference utility to consumers, respectively. The research objective is to determine the optimal price strategy in dual-channel supply chains and discuss the decision behind loss-averse consumers. To model consumers’ valuation of a product, prospect theory is adopted to calculate the demands of each channel. Then, the optimal pricing strategy and the corresponding profits are found out in a Stackelberg game manner. The results encourage manufacturers of basic goods to engage in dual-channel strategy. Effect of “double marginalization” is reduced if consumers are loss-averse in the dual-channel supply chain. Furthermore, the direct channel online contributes larger demand to the manufacturer. However, manufacturers of luxury goods are not suggested for dual-channel strategy because the demand for direct channel online is negligible and the demand for the retail channel remains unchanged. Nevertheless, retailers cannot obtain benefit from dual-channel and as a result, the profit of basic goods retailers will be reduced.

scholarly journals Pricing Strategies in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with a Fair Caring Retailer

Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lufeng Dai ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Xiaoguang Liu ◽  
Lai Wei
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Channel Competition ◽  
Dual Channel ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Dual Channel Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact

Manufacturers add online direct channels that inevitably engage in channel competition with offline retail channels. Since price is an important factor in consumers' choice of purchasing channel, pricing strategy has become a popular topic for research on dual-channel competition and coordination. In contrast to previous research on pricing strategies based on the full rationality of members, we focus on the impact of retailers' fairness concerns on pricing strategies. In this study, the hybrid dual-channel supply chain consists of one manufacturer with a direct channel who acts as the leader and a retailer who acts as the follower. First, we use the Stackelberg game approach to determine the equilibrium pricing strategy for a fair caring retailer. Simultaneously, we consider a centralized dual-channel supply chain as the benchmark for a comparative analysis of the efficiency of a decentralized supply chain. Furthermore, we study pricing strategies when the retailer has fairness concerns and determine the complete equilibrium solutions for different ranges of the parameters representing cross-price sensitivity and fairness. Finally, through numerical experiments, the pricing strategies, the profit and utility of the manufacturer and retailer, and the channel efficiency of the supply chain are compared and analysed for two scenarios. We find that fairness concerns reduce the manufacturer's profits, while for the most part, the retailers’ profit can be improved; however, the supply chain cannot achieve complete coordination.

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