Disclose or Exploit? A Game-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Decision Making in Cyber-Warfare

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 3779-3790 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haipeng Chen ◽  
Qian Han ◽  
Sushil Jajodia ◽  
Roy Lindelauf ◽  
V. S. Subrahmanian ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Strategic Decision Making ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Cyber Warfare ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Virtual Enterprise Coalition Strategy with Game Theoretic Multiagent Paradigm

2011 ◽  
pp. 263-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshiya Kaihara ◽  
Susumu Fujii
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Computer Simulation ◽  
Virtual Enterprise ◽  
Basic Research ◽  
Negotiation Process ◽  
Computer Simulation Model ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Manufacturing Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Nowadays, virtual enterprise (VE) is a crucial paradigm of business management in an agile environment. VE exists in both service and manufacturing organizations, although the complexity of each enterprise in a VE may vary greatly from industry to industry. Obviously, there is a need for a mechanism through which these different functions can be integrated together transparently. In this contribution, we focus on the negotiation process in VE formulation as a basic research to clarify its effective management in terms of partner search. Each enterprise in VE is defined as an agent with multiutilities, and a framework of multiagent programming with game theoretic approach is newly proposed as a negotiation algorithm among the agents. Each unit is defined as an agent in our VE model, and their decision making is formulated as a game theoretic methodology. We develop a computer simulation model to form VEs through multiple negotiations among several potential members in the negotiation domain, and finally clarify the formulation dynamism with the negotiation process.

The impacts of adaptive attacking and defending strategies on mitigation of intentional threats

Kybernetes ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 39 (5) ◽  
pp. 825-837 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing Zhang ◽  
Shifei Shen ◽  
Rui Yang
Keyword(s):  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Stochastic Game ◽  
Adaptive Strategies ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Disclosure Policy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to focus on resource allocation and information disclosure policy for defending multiple targets against intentional attacks. The intentional attacks, like terrorism events, probably cause great losses and fatalities. Attackers and defenders usually make decisions based on incomplete information. Adaptive attacking and defending strategies are considered, to study how both sides make more effective decisions according to previous fights.Design/methodology/approachA stochastic game‐theoretic approach is proposed for modeling attacker‐defender conflicts. Attackers and defenders are supposed both to be strategic decision makers and partially aware of adversary's information. Adaptive strategies are compared with different inflexible strategies in a fortification‐patrol problem, where the fortification affects the security vulnerability of targets and the patrol indicates the defensive signal.FindingsThe result shows that the intentional risk would be elevated by adaptive attack strategies. An inflexible defending strategy probably fails when facing uncertainties of adversary. It is shown that the optimal response of defenders is to adjust defending strategies by learning from previous games and assessing behaviors of adversaries to minimize the expected loss.Originality/valueThis paper explores how adaptive strategies affect attacker‐defender conflicts. The key issue is defense allocation and information disclosure policy for mitigation of intentional threats. Attackers and defenders can adjust their strategies by learning from previous fights, and the strategic adjustment of both sides may be asynchronous.

scholarly journals Horizontally Differentiated Store Brands: Production Outsourcing to National Brand Manufacturers

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Shindo ◽  
Nobuo Matsubayashi
Keyword(s):  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Store Brands ◽  
National Brand ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Dominant Retailer ◽  
Degree Of Differentiation ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

We study a retailer's strategic decision with regard to outsourcing the production of such types of store brands (SBs) to national brand (NB) manufacturers. The wholesale price of NB is assumed to be set by the manufacturer, while that of the SB is assumed to be set by the retailer. When a retailer outsources SB production to an NB manufacturer, the NB manufacturer might suffer from cannibalization due to offering both the SB and the NB, implying that a strategic interaction between the retailer and manufacturer is an important issue. Based on this motivation, we mainly focus on the strategy of a dominant retailer in such a situation and investigate it with a game-theoretic approach. We show that the optimal strategy for the SB retailer sensitively depends on the degree of differentiation between the SB and the NB. In particular, if both products are less differentiated, the retailer benefits from offering only the SB, and, in this case, the retailer should offer its wholesale price, after the manufacturer sets the NB wholesale price. Furthermore, it is shown that the optimal strategies of the retailer are socially efficient, if and only if the SB and the NB are sufficiently differentiated.

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