Economic effect of separation between cash flow rights and controlling rights of ultimate shareholders—Evidence from private-listed companies in China

MSIE 2011 ◽  
2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhu Naiping ◽  
Chen Na ◽  
Zhu Li
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Economic Effect ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Cash Flow Rights

scholarly journals Corporate ownership in Spain

2007 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-331 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domingo Javier Santana-Martin ◽  
Inmaculada Aguiar-Diaz
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
The Other ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Control Threshold ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Pyramid Structures ◽  
Ultimate Owners

In this paper we analyse the structure of ownership in non-financial Spanish listed companies in the period 1996-2002, focussing on the control chain methodology. The results obtained show that the main shareholder’s control threshold stands at about 29% of the voting rights and that in 2002 families were the ultimate owners in 52.7% of the firms. On the other hand, the use of pyramid structures continues to increase. In 2002, 29.1% of the companies were controlled in this way, which means that the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights for this year was 0.89

scholarly journals Corporate governance and performance: Evidence from Chinese private listed companies based on cash flow rights and control rights

2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hu Dan Semba ◽  
Haiyan Zheng
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Negative Influence ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

This paper investigates the relationship between control rights, cash flow rights, and firm performance across a sample of 276 China’s private listed companies (CPC) from 2003 to 2008. This paper finds that the performance of firms with pyramid ownership structures (POS) is lower than that of firms with direct controlling ownership structures (DOS). The separation of control rights and cash flow rights, which is the main characteristic of POS, is negatively related to the firm performance. Furthermore, in order to reduce the negative influence of control rights, this paper proposes the following countermeasures: cash flow rights should be increased because it has a positive effect on the firm performance; the supervisory powers of shareholders meeting (SM) should be strengthened because it helps improve firm performance and overrule invalid decisions taken by independent directors in China. This is proved by the findings that show a positive correlation between the attendance rate at shareholders’ meetings and firm performance; moreover, there is no positive relationship between independent directors and firm performance.

Where Did All the Dollars Go? The Effect of Cash Flows on Capital and Asset Structure

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 1259-1294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sudipto Dasgupta ◽  
Thomas H. Noe ◽  
Zhen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Economic Effect ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Goods Market ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Debt Market ◽  
Short And Long Term

AbstractThis paper documents the short- and long-term balance sheet effect of cash flows. We show that cash savings in the short run and debt reduction in both the short and the long run account for a substantial fraction of cash flow use. Although, in the long run, investment exhibits substantial sensitivity to cash flows, investment does not absorb the entire cash flow shock. In fact, the tighter the financial constraints, the smaller the fraction of cash flow absorbed by investment and the more by leverage reduction. Firms stage their response to increases in cash flow, delaying investment while building up cash stocks and reducing leverage. These results suggest that much of the short-run economic effect of cash flow shocks to the corporate sector may be channeled into the corporate debt market rather than the capital goods market, especially when financing constraints tighten.

Do Negative Corporate Social Responsibility Events Signal Financial Misreporting? — Empirical Finding from Taiwan

2021 ◽  
Vol 24 (01) ◽  
pp. 2150004
Author(s):  
Ching-Lung Chen ◽  
Hann-Pyng Wang ◽  
Hung-Shu Fan ◽  
Shiu-Chieh Chiu
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Social Responsibility ◽  
Social Responsibility ◽  
Cash Flow ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Empirical Finding ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
Corporate Social

This study examines whether negative corporate social responsibility events (NCSRs) signal potential firm misreporting and pending financial reporting restatements. Without formal opinions on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting in Taiwan, we hypothesize NCSRs can represent and/or signal a firm’s internal control weakness, which may in turn result in poor financial reporting. Note that the concern with controlling owners expropriating wealth through ineffective internal controls is given important weight by investors and regulators. We further examine whether the signaling function of NCSRs is more pronounced in contexts with a serious agency problem, such as is found in the high divergence of control and cash flow rights case (denoted as high excess control rights) in Taiwan. Empirical results indicate that, as conjectured, incidence of NCSRs is positively associated with the likelihood of reporting restatements. Further evidence reveals that this result is particularly pronounced in the high divergence of control and cash-flow rights subsample test. We demonstrate several diagnostic tests and show the results are robust in various specifications.

scholarly journals Evolution of ownership and control in Italian IPO firms

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-333 ◽  
Author(s):  
Silvia Rigamonti
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Cash Flow Rights ◽  
And Control

This article examines the evolution of ownership of cash flow rights and control of voting rights of firms that went public in Italy over the period 1985-2005. At the IPO, the ownership structure does not evolve towards a dispersed one. Even 10 years after the flotation, the initial ultimate shareholder retains the majority of voting rights. Though control is valuable, original owners do not systematically set up structures that dissociate cash flow from voting rights.

scholarly journals Kidas Model, Cash Flow, and Size Case of Palestine

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 48
Author(s):  
Tamer Bahjat Sabri
Keyword(s):  
Cash Flow ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
T Test ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
S Model

This paper examines the nature of interaction between Kida’s model, the cash flows (operating, investing, financing) and the size. It covers the period between 2013 and 2014 based on annual financial statement of Palestinian listed companies in Palestine Stock Exchange. In order to test the hypotheses of the study, the researcher used independent samples T-test. The results show that we accept all null hypotheses, so Kida’s model does not distinguish between high and low cash flow (operating, investing, financing) and the size. Other results show that the model is unable sometimes to predict the failure of companies.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document