Majority Party Leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1977-96: Speakers, Committee Assignments, and Institutional Context

2001 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-582
Author(s):  
John Lyman Mason
1974 ◽  
Vol 68 (4) ◽  
pp. 1593-1604 ◽  
Author(s):  
Louis P. Westefield

In this paper one party leadership strategy with respect to the committee system of the House is examined. Building on several relatively clear concepts such as compliance, quality of assignment, expectation, scarcity, and exchange, a very elementary, yet explicit, theory is constructed. It is shown that the leaders pursue a strategy of accommodation. The leaders increase the number of positions on those committees prized by the members in order to guarantee a steady supply of resources to gain leverage with the members. But a steady increase in the supply of positions reduces the scarcity of positions and hence their value to the leaders. Thus, a consequence of the strategy is the need periodically to reorganize or make adjustments in the committee system.


1967 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 675-693 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert L. Peabody

Long periods of one-party domination, increased average tenure in office for Representatives, and the institutionalization of patterns of succession to the Speakership, have all contributed to a tendency toward leadership stability in the 20th-century House of Representatives. The election of Sam Rayburn (D., Texas) and John McCormack (D., Mass.) to the offices of Speaker and Majority Leader in 1940, of Joseph Martin (R., Mass.) to the office of Minority Leader in 1939, and of Leslie Arends (R., Ill.) to the position of Republican Whip in 1943, mark the beginnings of the longest tenures in these four positions for any incumbents in the history of Congress. When changes in top leadership occur—as with the overthrow of Minority Leader Charles A. Halleck by Republican Representative Gerald R. Ford, Jr., in 1965, or the succession of Majority Leader McCormack to the office of the Speaker in 1962 following the death of Rayburn—the consequences are considerable. In the case of revolt, individual careers are made and broken. The organization and policy orientations of a congressional party may be extensively altered. While orderly succession has less dramatic impact, it too has a significant effect on “who gets what, when and how.” Some members move closer to the seats of power and others fall out of favor. Key committee assignments, and hence the development of entire legislative careers, are likely to ride or fall on the outcomes.


Author(s):  
Jeffery A. Jenkins ◽  
Charles Stewart

This book investigates the history of organizational politics in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1789 to the present. It argues that the history of how speakership elections developed was driven by a desire to establish an organizational cartel in the House. It examines the centrality of the party caucus for the organization of the House, and more specifically how the majority party came to own the chief House officers, especially the Speaker. It also discusses two themes about Congress and its role in the American political system: the construction of mass political parties in the early nineteenth century and the role that political parties play in guiding the agenda of Congress today. This chapter provides an overview of the data and methods used by the book as well as the chapters that follow.


2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 724-747
Author(s):  
Neilan S. Chaturvedi

Harry Reid is often lauded by fellow Democrats as one of the most powerful Senate Majority leaders in modern history. One tactic that he used to usher in legislation was a parliamentary procedure known as “Filling the Amendment Tree.” Amendment trees are diagrams that demonstrate the amendment process for legislation, but Reid often limited the number of amendments that could be offered on a piece of legislation using this procedure. From the majority’s perspective, this procedure helps usher in legislation and protects vulnerable moderates from having to vote on controversial legislation. Still, others argue that the restrictive procedure limited the ability of moderate Democrats to distinguish themselves from their party leadership, making them vulnerable to attacks. In this article, I find that filling the amendment tree did not limit moderate Democrats from proposing amendments. In fact, although moderate Republicans shied away from the process of filing amendments in protest, there was no statistical relationship between ideology and the number of amendments filed for Democrats. Still, upon examination of voting data, the use of the procedure homogenized the voting records of moderate Democrats in the 112th and 113th Congresses. Furthermore, it forced moderate Republicans to vote more often with the Democrats in each of the Congresses in which Reid employed the procedure.


2018 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 58-85
Author(s):  
Philip D. Waggoner

Legislators are elected to be the voice of their constituents in government. Implicit in this electoral connection is the responsiveness of legislators to the preferences of constituents. Many past approaches only examine successful legislative behavior blessed by the majority party, not all legislative behavior, thereby limiting inference generalizability. I seek to overcome this limitation by considering bill sponsorship as an outlet in which all members are free to engage. Testing expectations on bill sponsorship in the 109th and 110th Congresses, I find that legislators are responsive, though only on “safely-owned” issues. I compare these findings to roll call voting on the same issues in the same Congresses and find a different pattern, suggesting legislators leverage bill sponsorship differently than roll call voting as they signal legislative priorities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 166-187
Author(s):  
Jeffery A. Jenkins ◽  
Charles Stewart

This article revisits Nelson Polsby's classic article “The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives” fifty years after its publication, to examine whether the empirical trends that Polsby identified have continued. This empirical exploration allows us to place Polsby's findings in broader historical context and to assess whether the House has continued along the “institutionalization course”—using metrics that quantify the degree to which the House has erected impermeable boundaries with other institutions, created a complex institution, and adopted universalistic decision-making criteria. We empirically document that careerism plateaued right at the point Polsby wrote “Institutionalization,” and that the extension of the careerism trend has affected Democrats more than Republicans. The House remains complex, but lateral movement between the committee and party leadership systems began to reestablish itself a decade after “Institutionalization” was published. Finally, the seniority system as a mechanism for selecting committee chairs—the primary measure of universalistic decision-making criteria—has been almost thoroughly demolished. Thus, most of the trends Polsby identified have moderated, but have not been overturned. We conclude by considering the larger set of interpretive issues that our empirical investigation poses.


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