scholarly journals Effects of Financial Incentives on the Breakdown of Mutual Trust

2002 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-297 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Parco ◽  
Amnon Rapoport ◽  
William E. Stein
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Mutual Trust ◽  
Interactive Decision Making ◽  
Patterns Of Behavior

Disagreements between psychologists and economists about the need for and size of financial incentives continue to be hotly discussed. We examine the effects of financial incentives in a class of interactive decision-making situations, called centipede games, in which mutual trust is essential for cooperation. Invoking backward induction, the Nash equilibrium solution for these games is counterintuitive. Our previous research showed that when the number of players in the centipede game is increased from two to three, the game is iterated in time, the players are rematched, and the stakes are unusually high, behavior approaches equilibrium play. Results from the present study show that reducing the size of the stakes elicits dramatically different patterns of behavior. We argue that when mutual trust is involved, the magnitude of financial incentives can induce a considerable difference.

Lane Change Decision Analysis Based on Drivers' Perception-Judgment and Game Theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 361-363 ◽  
pp. 1875-1879 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jin Shuan Peng ◽  
Ying Shi Guo ◽  
Yi Ming Shao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Information Source ◽  
Driving Safety ◽  
External Information ◽  
Lane Change ◽  
Safety Level ◽  
Lane Changing

To clearly understand the mechanism of drivers lane-changing decision, based on drivers perception of external information, integrated cognitive judgment and game theory, the decision-making model was established, then the structure and operating mechanism of the model were detailedly analyzed. By introducing game theory-related knowledge, the non-cooperative mixed strategy game between the object vehicle and the following vehicle in the target lane was further discussed. Then, the benefits and Nash equilibrium solution of the participants in the game were deeply researched. Analysis shows that lane-changing decision is composed of information perception and three judgment-decision processes, the factors which would affect decision-making level include information source characteristics, the ability of drivers perception and comprehensive cognitive judgment, driving behavior characteristics and so on. The Nash equilibrium solution of the lane change game is determined by driving safety level, journey time and importance degree of the revenues.

scholarly journals The influence of emotion regulation on social interactive decision-making.

Emotion ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (6) ◽  
pp. 815-821 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mascha van't Wout ◽  
Luke J. Chang ◽  
Alan G. Sanfey
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Emotion Regulation ◽  
Interactive Decision Making

Dynamics of Trust in Automation and Interactive Decision Making during Driving Simulation Tasks

2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 786-790
Author(s):  
Lucero Rodriguez Rodriguez ◽  
Carlos Bustamante Orellana ◽  
Jayci Landfair ◽  
Corey Magaldino ◽  
Mustafa Demir ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Automated System ◽  
Automated Driving ◽  
Safety And Efficacy ◽  
High Performing ◽  
Interactive Decision Making ◽  
Driving Task ◽  
Preliminary Study ◽  
Self Driving Cars ◽  
The Impact

As technological advancements and lowered costs make self-driving cars available to more people, it becomes important to understand the dynamics of human-automation interactions for safety and efficacy. We used a dynamical approach to examine data from a previous study on simulated driving with an automated driving assistant. To maximize effect size in this preliminary study, we focused the current analysis on the two lowest and two highest-performing participants. Our visual comparisons were the utilization of the automated system and the impact of perturbations. Low-performing participants toggled and maintained reliance either on automation or themselves for longer periods of time. Decision making of high-performing participants was using the automation briefly and consistently throughout the driving task. Participants who displayed an early understanding of automation capabilities opted for tactical use. Further exploration of individual differences and automation usage styles will help to understand the optimal human-automation-team dynamic and increase safety and efficacy.

Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Ejaz ◽  
Stephen Joe ◽  
Chaitanya Joshi
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Risk Analysis ◽  
Equilibrium Solution ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Reserve Price ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Sealed Bid Auctions

In this paper, we use the adversarial risk analysis (ARA) methodology to model first-price sealed-bid auctions under quite realistic assumptions. We extend prior work to find ARA solutions for mirror equilibrium and Bayes Nash equilibrium solution concepts, not only for risk-neutral but also for risk-averse and risk-seeking bidders. We also consider bidders having different wealth and assume that the auctioned item has a reserve price.

A probabilistic model for interactive decision-making

1999 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 289-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierfrancesco Reverberi ◽  
Maurizio Talamo
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Probabilistic Model ◽  
Interactive Decision Making

scholarly journals Dinamicke igre ulaska na trziste

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (165) ◽  
pp. 121-144
Author(s):  
Bozo Stojanovic
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Reasonable Solution ◽  
Multiple Nash Equilibria ◽  
Entry Games

Market processes can be analyzed by means of dynamic games. In a number of dynamic games multiple Nash equilibria appear. These equilibria often involve no credible threats the implementation of which is not in the interests of the players making them. The concept of sub game perfect equilibrium rules out these situations by stating that a reasonable solution to a game cannot involve players believing and acting upon noncredible threats or promises. A simple way of finding the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game is by using the principle of backward induction. To explain how this equilibrium concept is applied, we analyze the dynamic entry games.

scholarly journals Strategies to increase downloads of COVID–19 exposure notification apps: A discrete choice experiment

PLoS ONE ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (11) ◽  
pp. e0258945
Author(s):  
Jemima A. Frimpong ◽  
Stéphane Helleringer
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Discrete Choice Experiment ◽  
Discrete Choice ◽  
Financial Incentives ◽  
Choice Experiment ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Contact Tracing ◽  
Reference Scenario ◽  
Pragmatic Trials ◽  
The Us

Exposure notification apps have been developed to assist in notifying individuals of recent exposures to SARS-CoV-2. However, in several countries, such apps have had limited uptake. We assessed whether strategies to increase downloads of exposure notification apps should emphasize improving the accuracy of the apps in recording contacts and exposures, strengthening privacy protections and/or offering financial incentives to potential users. In a discrete choice experiment with potential app users in the US, financial incentives were more than twice as important in decision-making about app downloads, than privacy protections, and app accuracy. The probability that a potential user would download an exposure notification app increased by 40% when offered a $100 reward to download (relative to a reference scenario in which the app is free). Financial incentives might help exposure notification apps reach uptake levels that improve the effectiveness of contact tracing programs and ultimately enhance efforts to control SARS-CoV-2. Rapid, pragmatic trials of financial incentives for app downloads in real-life settings are warranted.

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