Children's understanding of embarrassment: Integrating mental time travel and mental state information

Mental time travel (MTT) is defined as projecting the self into the past and the future. Despite growing evidence of the similarities of remembering past and imagining future events, dominant theories conceive of these as distinct capacities. I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process – constructive episodic simulation – and demonstrate that the ‘simulation system’ meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system. Irrespective of whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation system: (1) acts on the same information, drawing on elements of experience ranging from fine-grained perceptual details to coarser-grained conceptual information and schemas about the world; (2) is governed by the same rules of operation, including associative processes that facilitate construction of a schematic scaffold, the event representation itself, and the dynamic interplay between the two (cf. predictive coding); and (3) is subserved by the same brain system. I also propose that by forming associations between schemas, the simulation system constructs multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation is mapped by the hippocampus. Finally, I suggest that simulation is a general capacity that underpins other domains of cognition, such as the perception of ongoing experience. This proposal has some important implications for the construct of ‘MTT’, suggesting that ‘time’ and ‘travel’ may not be defining, or even essential, features. Rather, it is the ‘mental’ rendering of experience that is the most fundamental function of this simulation system, enabling humans to re-experience the past, pre-experience the future, and also comprehend the complexities of the present.

Get full-text (via PubEx)

An Evolutionary Perspective on Mental Time Travel

The Oxford Handbook of Psychology of Time Travel and Temporality ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190256685.013.12 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Thomas Suddendorf

Keyword(s):

Episodic Memory ◽

Deliberate Practice ◽

Time Travel ◽

Mental Time Travel ◽

Evolutionary Perspective ◽

Scenario Building ◽

Memory Traces ◽

Fitness Consequences ◽

Nonhuman Animals ◽

Archeological Evidence

This article examines the nature and evolution of mental time travel. Evidence for capacities in other animals is reviewed and evaluated in terms of which components of the human faculty appear to be shared and which are unique. While some nonhuman animals store episodic memory traces and can display a range of future-directed capacities, they do not appear to share the open-ended ability to construct mental scenarios, to embed them into larger narratives, nor to reflect and communicate on what they entail. Nested scenario building and the urge to exchange mental experiences seem to set human minds apart in this context as in many others. The article ends with a discussion of the archeological evidence for mental time travel, focusing on deliberate practice as an example of its tremendous fitness consequences.

Get full-text (via PubEx)

Mental time travel: A practical business and personal research tool for looking ahead

Futures ◽

10.1016/j.futures.2007.06.006 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 40 (1) ◽

pp. 17-24 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

Oliver W. Markley

Keyword(s):

Time Travel ◽

Research Tool ◽

Mental Time Travel ◽

Personal Research

Get full-text (via PubEx)

An adaptive function of mental time travel: Motivating farsighted decisions

Behavioral and Brain Sciences ◽

10.1017/s0140525x1700125x ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 41 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Roland G. Benoit ◽

Ruud M. W. J. Berkers ◽

Philipp C. Paulus

Keyword(s):

Episodic Memory ◽

Memory System ◽

Time Travel ◽

Mental Time Travel ◽

Adaptive Function ◽

Central Function ◽

Phenomenological Experience

AbstractThe episodic memory system allows us to experience the emotions of past, counterfactual, and prospective events. We outline how this phenomenological experience can convey motivational incentives for farsighted decisions. In this way, we challenge important arguments for Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) conclusion that future-oriented mental time travel is unlikely to be a central function of episodic memory.

Get full-text (via PubEx)