Interaction between the introduction strategy of the third‐party online channel and the choice of online sales format

This chapter examines the position of third party beneficiaries in Chinese law. Article 64 of the Chinese Contract Law states that where a contract for the benefit of a third party is breached, the debtor is liable to the creditor. The author regards this as leaving unanswered the question of whether the thirdparty has a right of direct action against the debtor. One view regards the third party as having the right to sue for the benefit although this right was ultimately excluded from the law. Another view, supported by the Supreme People’s Court, is that Article 64 does not provide a right of action for a third party and merely prescribes performance in ‘incidental’ third party contracts. The third view is that there is a third party right of action in cases of ‘genuine’ third party contracts but courts are unlikely to recognize a third party action where the contract merely purports to confer a benefit on the third party.

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Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties Under the Taiwan Civil Code

10.1093/oso/9780198808114.003.0016 ◽

2018 ◽

Author(s):

Sheng-Lin JAN

Keyword(s):

Civil Code ◽

Third Parties ◽

Third Party ◽

The Third ◽

Legal Relationship ◽

The Third Party ◽

Privity Of Contract

This chapter discusses the position of third party beneficiaries in Taiwan law where the principle of privity of contract is well established. Article 269 of the Taiwan Civil Code confers a right on the third party to sue for performance as long as the parties have at least impliedly agreed. This should be distinguished from a ‘spurious contract’ for the benefit of third parties where there is no agreement to permit the third party to claim. Both the aggrieved party and the third party beneficiary can sue on the contract, but only for its own loss. The debtor can only set off on a counterclaim arising from its legal relationship with the third party. Where the third party coerces the debtor into the contract, the contract can be avoided, but where the third party induces the debtor to contract with the creditor by misrepresentation, the debtor can only avoid the contract if the creditor knows or ought to have known of the misrepresentation.

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Attitudes toward Extrarelational Sex as a Function of Participant's and Third Party's Gender

Psychological Reports ◽

10.2466/pr0.95.3.965-968 ◽

2004 ◽

Vol 95 (3) ◽

pp. 965-968

Author(s):

Elizabeth Qaqiesh ◽

Pamela C. Regan

Keyword(s):

Romantic Partner ◽

Third Party ◽

Individual Male ◽

The Third ◽

The Third Party ◽

And Gender

An experiment was conducted to examine whether attitudes toward extrarelational sex, i.e., “swinging,” differed as a function of participant's gender and gender of the third party, i.e., the “swinging” partner. Participants were asked to imagine that their current romantic partner had expressed an interest in “swinging” with another individual (male or female, randomly assigned). Analysis yielded several significant differences by participants' gender. Specifically, men expressed greater interest than did women in joining a swinger's club, reported a higher likelihood than did women of actually joining such a club, and believed more than women that their sex life with their partner would improve after joining a swinger's club. Participants also preferred a female more than a male swinging partner, although this comparison was not statistically significant.

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Game Theory-Based Analysis of Local Governments’ Behavioral Dissimilation in the Third-Party Soil Pollution Control under Chinese-Style Fiscal Decentralization

Land ◽

10.3390/land10040389 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 10 (4) ◽

pp. 389

Author(s):

Caihua Zhou

Keyword(s):

Local Government ◽

Soil Pollution ◽

Pollution Control ◽

Local Governments ◽

Central Government ◽

Fiscal Decentralization ◽

Third Party ◽

The Third ◽

Party Control ◽

The Third Party

The participation of a third party of the environmental service enterprise theoretically increases the level and efficiency of soil pollution control in China. However, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on the behaviors of participants, especially the local government. First, this paper conducts a positioning analysis on participants of the third-party soil pollution control in China and discusses the behavioral dissimilation of the local government under fiscal decentralization. Second, taking the government’s third-party soil pollution control as a case, a two-party game model of the central government and the local government is established around the principal-agent relationship, and a tripartite game model of the central government, the local government, and the third-party enterprise is designed around the collusion between the local government and the third-party enterprise. The results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization may lead to the behavioral dissimilation of local governments, that is, they may choose not to implement or passively implement the third-party control, and choose to conspire with third-party enterprises. Improving the benefits from implementing the third-party control of local governments and third-party enterprises, enhancing the central government’s supervision probability and capacity, and strengthening the central government’s punishment for behavioral dissimilation are conducive to the implementation of the third-party soil pollution control. Finally, this study puts forward policy suggestions on dividing the administrative powers between the central and local government in third-party control, building appraisal systems for the local government’s environmental protection performance, constructing environmental regulation mechanisms involving the government, market and society, and formulating the incentive and restraint policies for the participants in the third-party soil pollution control.

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