Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power
2006 ◽
Vol 7
(4)
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pp. 463-470
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Keyword(s):
Abstract We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent’s outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent’s bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game.
2014 ◽
Vol 108
◽
pp. 261-272
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Keyword(s):
2018 ◽
Vol 2018
◽
pp. 1-9
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Keyword(s):
2018 ◽
Vol 29
(9)
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pp. e3449
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Keyword(s):
1981 ◽
Vol 10
(3-4)
◽
pp. 163-193
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2016 ◽
Vol 11
(1)
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pp. 110-123
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):