The Tariff and the Lobbyist: Political Institutions, Interest Group Politics, and U.S. Trade Policy

2008 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sean D. Ehrlich
1988 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
David A. Lake

Trade policy is commonly seen as a product of domestic interest group politics. Despite the obvious economic distortions introduced by trade barriers, protectionism recurs, we are often told, because producers organize more readily than consumers and dominate the political process. In this “demand side” explanation of protection, the state is seen as the empty receptacle of societal bargaining with no independent voice or role.


Author(s):  
Michael T. Heaney ◽  
James M. Strickland

Interest groups often serve as intermediaries or brokers between formal decision-making institutions and organized subgroups of society. Due to this positioning, key functions of interest groups can be understood in network terms. This chapter addresses five questions about interest groups to which network analysis offers answers: (1) What are the origins of interest groups?; (2) How do they develop, maintain, and change their identities over time?; (3) Under what conditions do groups work together, and how?; (4) How do interest groups relate to other political institutions?; and (5) What influence do they have on politics generally? The discussion highlights various effects of networks on interest group politics, including how new groups are born out of preexisting networks, how they use connections to access information and influence policy, and how they maintain long-term relationships with policymakers. Future research could benefit from greater attention to multiplexity, content analysis, and longitudinal network analysis.


1993 ◽  
Vol 108 (1) ◽  
pp. 182
Author(s):  
John T. Tierney ◽  
Lawrence S. Rothenberg

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 1089-1119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucian A. Bebchuk ◽  
Zvika Neeman

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document