scholarly journals The Importance of Personal Relationships in Kantian Moral Theory: A Reply to Care Ethics

Hypatia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilea Bramer

Care ethicists have long insisted that Kantian moral theory fails to capture the partiality that ought to be present in our personal relationships. In her most recent book, Virginia Held claims that, unlike impartial moral theories, care ethics guides us in how we should act toward friends and family. Because these actions are performed out of care, they have moral value for a care ethicist. The same actions, Held claims, would not have moral worth for a Kantian because of the requirement of impartiality. Although Kantian moral theory is an impartial theory, I argue that the categorical imperative in the Formulation of Humanity as an End and the duty of respect require that we give special treatment to friends and family because of their relationships with us. Therefore, this treatment does have moral value for a Kantian.

Author(s):  
Benjamin Hale

This chapter argues that reasons are underdetermined and often left out of value-based discussions of nature. The chapter offers a rough sketch of Kantian moral theory – particularly the first two formulations of the Categorical Imperative – to suggest that the primary charge of environmentalism ought to be that of encouraging deeper justification of actions. It utilizes the Endangered Species Act, the argument from ecosystem services, and the case of a stolen kidney to suggest that cost-benefit analysis and related methodologies are insufficient for addressing the broad ethical considerations of environmentalists.


2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 248-273
Author(s):  
JP Messina ◽  
David Wiens

Contractarians aim to derive moral principles from the dictates of instrumental rationality alone. It is well-known that contractarian moral theories struggle to identify normative principles that are both uniquely rational and morally compelling. Michael Moehler’s recent book, Minimal Morality, seeks to avoid these difficulties by developing a novel ‘two-level’ social contract theory, which restricts the scope of contractarian morality to cases of deep and persistent moral disagreement. Yet Moehler remains ambitious, arguing that a restricted version of Kant’s categorical imperative is a uniquely rational principle of conflict resolution. We develop a formal model of Moehler’s informal game-theoretic argument, which reconstructs a valid argument for Moehler’s conclusion. This model, in turn, enables us to expose how a successful argument for Moehler’s contractarian principle rests on assumptions that can only be justified by subtle yet significant departures from the standard conception of rationality. We thus extend our understanding of familiar contractarian difficulties by showing how they arise even if we restrict the scope of contractarian morality to a domain where its application seems both promising and necessary.


Dialogue ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-40 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter E. Schaller

One of the central features of Kant's moral theory is the sharp distinction he draws between the moral Tightness (legality) of actions and their moral worth or goodness (morality). As we know from the first pages of the Groundwork, the rightness of an action is determined by the conformity of the agent's maxim to the categorical imperative; the moral goodness or worth of an action is determined by the agent's motives, by whether the agent acted from the motive of duty or from some other (non-moral) empirical motive. Morally good actions must be morally right, according to Kant, whereas morally right actions are not necessarily morally good.


2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (6) ◽  
pp. 812-830
Author(s):  
Nicholas Smyth

AbstractFour decades ago, Bernard Williams accused Kantian moral theory of providing agents with ‘one thought too many’. The general consensus among contemporary Kantians is that this objection has been decisively answered. In this paper, I reconstruct the problem, showing that Williams was not principally concerned with how agents are to think in emergency situations, but rather with how moral theories are to be integrated into recognizably human lives. I show that various Kantian responses to Williams provide inadequate materials for solving this ‘integration problem’, and that they are correspondingly ill-positioned to account for the authority of morality, as Williams suspected all along.


Dialogue ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-214
Author(s):  
Graeme Hunter

A paper which succeeds in being erudite, yet lively, and which tells an amusing tale without digressing from its theme, deserves great admiration. Such is Professor George's discussion of Kant and liberalism. He first points out briefly that in fact Kant exercised small influence on liberal thought in the nineteenth century. The bulk of his paper is devoted to the question of whether Kant was a liberal at all and to justifying his unconventional negative answer. In the course of so doing he presents the diverting tale of the ingenuous young aristocrat who solicits Kant's opinion as to whether one's wife should be inoculated against the pox. But the diversion is pertinent. Kant's two answers to the question reveal two different ways in which the Kantian moral theory, sententiously expressed in the so-called “categorical imperative”, might be incompatible with liberal opinion.


Author(s):  
John Murphy ◽  
José Zagal

Videogames have the potential to create ethical experiences and encourage ethical reflection. Usually, this potential is understood in the context of the dominant moral theories: utilitarianism and Kantianism. However, it has been argued that a complete moral theory must also include the concept of an ethics of care. This paper utilizes the ethics of care as an alternative lens for examining the ethical frameworks and experiences offered by videogames. The authors illustrate how this perspective can provide insights by examining Little King’s Story and Animal Crossing: City Folk. Little King’s Story’s fictive context, gameplay, and asymmetrical power relationships encourage the player to care for the citizens of his or her kingdom. In Animal Crossing: City Folk, the player is a member of a community that encourages him or her to care for his or her neighbors as part of a larger interconnected social ecosystem. Both games encourage players feeling an emotional attachment to the game’s characters, and the value placed in these relationships becomes the motivation for further ethical player behavior. The conclusion outlines future research questions and discusses some challenges and limitations of a care ethics perspective.


Author(s):  
John Murphy ◽  
José Zagal

Videogames have the potential to create ethical experiences and encourage ethical reflection. Usually, this potential is understood in the context of the dominant moral theories: utilitarianism and Kantianism. However, it has been argued that a complete moral theory must also include the concept of an ethics of care. This paper utilizes the ethics of care as an alternative lens for examining the ethical frameworks and experiences offered by videogames. The authors illustrate how this perspective can provide insights by examining Little King’s Story and Animal Crossing: City Folk. Little King’s Story’s fictive context, gameplay, and asymmetrical power relationships encourage the player to care for the citizens of his or her kingdom. In Animal Crossing: City Folk, the player is a member of a community that encourages him or her to care for his or her neighbors as part of a larger interconnected social ecosystem. Both games encourage players feeling an emotional attachment to the game’s characters, and the value placed in these relationships becomes the motivation for further ethical player behavior. The conclusion outlines future research questions and discusses some challenges and limitations of a care ethics perspective.


Author(s):  
Garrett Cullity

Three things often recognized as central to morality are concern for others’ welfare, respect for their self-expression, and cooperation in worthwhile collective activity. When philosophers have proposed theories of the substance of morality, they have typically looked to one of these three sources to provide a single, fundamental principle of morality—or they have tried to formulate a master-principle for morality that combines these three ideas in some way. This book views them instead as three independently important foundations of morality. It sets out a plural-foundation moral theory with affinities to that of W. D. Ross. There are major differences: the account of the foundations of morality differs from Ross’s, and there is a more elaborate explanation of how the rest of morality derives from them. However, the overall aim is similar. This is to illuminate the structure of morality by showing how its complex content is generated from a relatively simple set of underlying elements—the complexity results from the various ways in which one part of morality can derive from another, and the various ways in which the derived parts of morality can interact. Plural-foundation moral theories are sometimes criticized for having nothing helpful to say about cases in which their fundamental norms conflict. Responding to this, the book concludes with three detailed applications of the theory: to the questions surrounding paternalism, the use of others as means, and our moral responsibilities as consumers.


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