This article interrogates the mobilization of the Albanian national question in Albania in 2012. The two interrelated questions of the article are why the nationalist card is not used consistently and why it failed to trigger a policy debate, or lead to policy changes. The main argument of the article is that, more than a policy alternative, “national unification” is a discursive practice performing two functions: Externally, it signals sovereignty and subjectivity to the international community in Albania, primarily the European Union (EU) and the United States, and as such it is used for political leverage, particularly at critical moments. Internally, it aims at constructing national cohesion, while drawing identity lines between the main political parties. This is particularly the case in moments of political instability, juncture or pressure, as before elections. However, its limited ability to inform policy and mobilize political action results not only from the demobilizing power of international actors, for example, the EU and the United States, but also the dominant position that a specific discourse of “good Albanian nationalism” holds in the political debate in post-communist Albania.
A natural experiment of the consequences of concentrating former prisoners in the same neighborhoods
