Kant. By Roger Scruton. Oxford Paperbacks. OUP. 1982. 99 pp. £1.25. Kant on Pure Reason. Edited by Ralph C. S. Walker. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. OUP. 1982. 201 pp. Paperback. £3.95. Kant and the Transcendental Object: A Hermeneutic Study. By J. N. Fi

2008 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-203
Author(s):  
David Whewell
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Object A ◽  
Transcendental Object ◽  
Roger Scruton

scholarly journals LA ANGUSTIA, MÁS ACÁ DEL CONOCIMIENTO

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (30) ◽  
pp. 132-143
Author(s):  
Maximiliano Ariel Maximiliano
Keyword(s):  
Jacques Lacan ◽  
Fundamental Difference ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Object A ◽  
Conditions Of Possibility

ResumenEn el presente artículo nos proponemos abordar un aspecto escasamente trabajado en la bibliografía lacaniana, a saber, la recepción de la Crítica de la razón pura –especialmente, “La estética trascendental”-– en el seminario La angustia de Jacques Lacan. Efectivamente, los comentadores de la obra de Lacan se han centrado casi de manera exclusiva en la recepción de la filosofía práctica de Kant que ha realizado el psicoanalista francés, dejando de lado la importancia de la Crítica de la razón pura para delimitar al objeto a. En este punto, será necesario evocar la distinción fundamental entre objetividad y objetalidad para distinguir, así, el deseo a la base de las condiciones de posibilidad del conocimiento al deseo.Palabras claves: objetividad, objetalidad, epistemología, Kant, objeto a. AbstractThis paper aims at addressing one aspect barely studied of the Lacanian bibliography, i.e., the reception of the Critique of Pure Reason –especially, the “Transcendental Aesthetic”– in Jacques Lacan's seminary on Anxiety. Indeed, commentators of Lacan's work have almost exclusively focused on his reception of Kant's practical philosophy, putting aside the importance of the Critique of Pure Reason to delimit the object a. In this point, it will be necessary to recall the fundamental difference between objectivity and objectality in order to distinguish the desire on the base of the conditions of possibility from knowledge to desire.Keywords: objectivity, objectality, epistemology, Kant, object a. Résumé Cet article aborde un aspect peu étudié de l'œuvre lacanienne, à savoir, la réception de la Critique de la raison pure - notamment “L'esthétique transcendantale "– dans le séminaire L'angoisse de Jacques Lacan. En effet, les commentateurs de l'œuvre de Lacan se sont focalisés presque exclusivement sur la réception de la philosophie pratique de Kant de la part du psychanalyste français, en oubliant l'importance de la Critique de la raison pure pour délimiter l'objet a. Sur ce point, il est nécessaire d'évoquer la distinction fondamentale entre objectivité et objectalité, pour différencier ainsi le désir à la base des conditions de possibilité de la connaissance au désir.Mots-clés : objectivité, objectalité, épistémologie, Kant, objet a. 

scholarly journals THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF I. KANT

2020 ◽  
pp. 46-51
Author(s):  
З. Г. Эфендиева
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Object ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

Цель данной статьи - определить специфику кантовского трансцендентального субъекта в современном научном познании. Для этого производится, во-первых, выявление и раскрытие сущности основного значения понятия «трансцендентальный субъект» в философии Канта. Во-вторых, определяется релевантность понятия трансцендентального субъекта, как оно заявлено в теоретической философии И. Канта, тому или иному историко-философскому значению понятия «субъект». В печатных сочинениях мыслителя данное понятие употребляется, по всей видимости, только в «Критике чистого разума», достаточно редко встречается оно и в черновиках к первой «Критике», где составляет пару с понятием «трансцендентальный объект». Новизна проведенного при этом исследования заключается в демонстрации неочевидности распространенной гносеологической трактовки кантовского трансцендентального субъекта. В результате исследования заключается, что можно выявить следующие версии трактовки трансцендентального субъекта: онтологическую и гносеологическую. Определено, что трансцендентальный субъект, в тех выражениях, как о нем пишет И. Кант, более всего близок к онтологической трактовке и по отношению к области гносеологии представляется будто бы излишним. The purpose of this article is to determine the specifics of Kant’s transcendental subject in modern scientific knowledge. For this purpose, first of all, the identification and disclosure of the essence of the main meaning of the concept “transcendental subject” in Kant’s philosophy is made. Secondly, the relevance of the concept of a transcendental subject, as stated in the theoretical philosophy of I. Kant, to a particular historical and philosophical meaning of the concept of “subject”is determined. In the printed works of the thinker, this concept is used, apparently, only in the “Critique of pure reason”, and it is quite rare to find it in the drafts to the first “Critique”, where it is paired with the concept of”transcendental object”. The novelty of this research consists in demonstrating that the widespread epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental subject is not obvious. As a result of the research, it is possible to identify the following versions of the interpretation of the transcendental subject: ontological and epistemological. It is determined that the transcendental subject, in the terms that I. Kant writes about It, is closest to the ontological interpretation and in relation to the field of epistemology seems to be superfluous.

Kant and the Transcendental Object: A Hermeneutic Study.

1983 ◽  
Vol 92 (3) ◽  
pp. 422
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Potter ◽  
J. N. Findlay
Keyword(s):  
Object A ◽  
Transcendental Object

Reconstruction of Objects from their Projections Using Orthogonal Functions

1973 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 268-269
Author(s):  
Elrnar Zeitler
Keyword(s):  
Unit Area ◽  
Three Dimensional ◽  
One Dimension ◽  
Spatial Density ◽  
Dimensional Representation ◽  
Orthogonal Functions ◽  
Object A ◽  
Plane Normal ◽  
Dimensional Object ◽  
Spatial Density Distribution

Considering any finite three-dimensional object, a “projection” is here defined as a two-dimensional representation of the object's mass per unit area on a plane normal to a given projection axis, here taken as they-axis. Since the object can be seen as being built from parallel, thin slices, the relation between object structure and its projection can be reduced by one dimension. It is assumed that an electron microscope equipped with a tilting stage records the projectionWhere the object has a spatial density distribution p(r,ϕ) within a limiting radius taken to be unity, and the stage is tilted by an angle 9 with respect to the x-axis of the recording plane.

Aristotle's Formal Identity of Intellect and Object: A Solution to the Problem of Modal Epistemology

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 84-107
Author(s):  
Robert C. Koons
Keyword(s):  
Human Mind ◽  
Modal Epistemology ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Object A ◽  
Formal Identity ◽  
Identity Thesis ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mental Objects ◽  
Aristotelian Metaphysics

In De Anima Book III, Aristotle subscribed to a theory of formal identity between the human mind and the extra-mental objects of our understanding. This has been one of the most controversial features of Aristotelian metaphysics of the mind. I offer here a defense of the Formal Identity Thesis, based on specifically epistemological arguments about our knowledge of necessary or essential truths.

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