Being Realistic about Kant’s Idealism (Translated by M. Rouba)

This paper deals with the question of whether Kant's transcendental idealism allows for an explanation of the a posteriori aspects of mental content by the properties of empirical objects. I first show that a phenomenalist interpretation has severe problems with assuming that we perceive an object as being red or as being cubical partly because the perceived object is red and cubical, and then present an interpretation that allows us to save the realistic intuition behind these claims. According to this interpretation, Kantian phenomenal properties are understood as response-dependent properties of extra-mental objects that also have to have some response-independent (in-itself-) properties. I show that this interpretation is well supported by Kant's remarks about the transcendental object in the A-edition of the first Critique and that it also makes intelligible why Kant took explanations of mental content by means of empirical properties to imply an explanation by means of noumenal properties without thereby violating his own doctrine of noumenal ignorance. This not only allows us to establish a realistic reading of Kant idealism but also to discern the true kernel in Adickes’ infamous talk about Kant's theory of double affection.

Vasubandhu. [“The Great Compassion and the Perfections of All Buddhas”]. A Fragment of the Seventh Part of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

The paper presents a commented translation of the fragment Jāna-nirdeśa (The doctrine of knowledge) from the seventh part of the exegetic compendium Abhidharmakośabhāya ascribed to the eminent medieval Buddhist thinker Vasubandhu (4th5th centuries AD). The fragment can be used as a historical source for the study of evolution of the image of the Buddha in post-Canonical treatises where the real Śakyamuni was invested with the attributes of a transcendental object of religious cult. The text explicates the conceptual differences between the great compassion (mahākāruā), treated as the Buddhas attribute, and compassion (kāruā) as a characteristic trait of enlightened ascetics (śravakas and pratyekabuddhas) and explains the postulate of identity of all buddhas perfections (the perfection of religious merits and knowledge, the perfection of the Dharmic body, the perfection of serving all sentient beings). This is the first translation based on the Sanskrit edition by P. Pradhan (Pradhan 1967: 414416).

THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF I. KANT

Цель данной статьи - определить специфику кантовского трансцендентального субъекта в современном научном познании. Для этого производится, во-первых, выявление и раскрытие сущности основного значения понятия «трансцендентальный субъект» в философии Канта. Во-вторых, определяется релевантность понятия трансцендентального субъекта, как оно заявлено в теоретической философии И. Канта, тому или иному историко-философскому значению понятия «субъект». В печатных сочинениях мыслителя данное понятие употребляется, по всей видимости, только в «Критике чистого разума», достаточно редко встречается оно и в черновиках к первой «Критике», где составляет пару с понятием «трансцендентальный объект». Новизна проведенного при этом исследования заключается в демонстрации неочевидности распространенной гносеологической трактовки кантовского трансцендентального субъекта. В результате исследования заключается, что можно выявить следующие версии трактовки трансцендентального субъекта: онтологическую и гносеологическую. Определено, что трансцендентальный субъект, в тех выражениях, как о нем пишет И. Кант, более всего близок к онтологической трактовке и по отношению к области гносеологии представляется будто бы излишним. The purpose of this article is to determine the specifics of Kant’s transcendental subject in modern scientific knowledge. For this purpose, first of all, the identification and disclosure of the essence of the main meaning of the concept “transcendental subject” in Kant’s philosophy is made. Secondly, the relevance of the concept of a transcendental subject, as stated in the theoretical philosophy of I. Kant, to a particular historical and philosophical meaning of the concept of “subject”is determined. In the printed works of the thinker, this concept is used, apparently, only in the “Critique of pure reason”, and it is quite rare to find it in the drafts to the first “Critique”, where it is paired with the concept of”transcendental object”. The novelty of this research consists in demonstrating that the widespread epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental subject is not obvious. As a result of the research, it is possible to identify the following versions of the interpretation of the transcendental subject: ontological and epistemological. It is determined that the transcendental subject, in the terms that I. Kant writes about It, is closest to the ontological interpretation and in relation to the field of epistemology seems to be superfluous.

INTENTIONALITY OF NUMINOUS

On the basis of the phenomenological concept of the sacrednuminous R. Otto, the development of the meanings of numinous in modern culture in the context of a pandemic is considered. The specificity of the sacred with its foundation in the numinous, as presented by R. Otto, is studied as a methodology for comprehending the empiricism of a pandemic. An appeal to the empirical cut leads to the identification of transformations in the phenomenological status of the numinous. It is noted that the religious experience of a person at the beginning of the 20th century and the religious experience of the modern man has certain differences associated with the development of secular culture. R. Otto’s thought about the reality of the numinous, understood as the Divine expression of the will of an incomprehensible transcendental object, whose intentions largely determine human life, are presented in correlation with the intentionality of the challenge thrown to humanity by the pandemic. At the same time, a certain reduction of the components of the experience of the numinous by the modern man is noted.

The Paradox of Kant’s Transcendental Subject in German Philosophy in the Late Eighteenth Century

The study of the “first wave” of reactions to the Critique of Pure Reason in Germany from the second half of the 1780s until the beginning of the nineteenth century reveals the paradoxical status of the Kantian transcendental subject. While the existence of the transcendental subject, whatever the term means, is not open to question since it arises from the very essence of critical philosophy, the fundamental status of the subject is sometimes questioned in this period. Although the meaning of the concept of transcendental subject seems obvious today (the subject of cognition, bearer of transcendental conditions of experience) it lends itself to various interpretations in the late eighteenth century. To achieve my goal I have undertaken a textological analysis of the works of the earliest opponents and followers of the Kantian critique and a reconstruction of the conceptual field in the midst of which the transcendental subject has been planted. Among others I draw on the works of J. S. Beck, J. A. Eberhard, J. G. Hamann, F. H. Jacobi, S. Maimon, K. L. Reinhold, G. E. Schulze and A. Weishaupt. The authors of the period are grouped depending on the common themes and questions that prompted them to turn to the concept of the transcendental subject, even though the results of their reflections did not always coincide. These authors think of the transcendental subject in its relationship to the transcendental object, or as “something = х”, and in terms of the relationship of representation to the object. It is characterised sometimes as something absolutely hollow, and sometimes as the fullness of true reality. The status ascribed to the transcendental subject is sometimes that of a thing-in-itself and sometimes that of a “mere” idea. Finally, Kant’s transcendental subject was sometimes seen as something to be overcome and sometimes as an infinite challenge to understanding.