scholarly journals THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF I. KANT

2020 ◽  
pp. 46-51
Author(s):  
З. Г. Эфендиева
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Transcendental Object ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

Цель данной статьи - определить специфику кантовского трансцендентального субъекта в современном научном познании. Для этого производится, во-первых, выявление и раскрытие сущности основного значения понятия «трансцендентальный субъект» в философии Канта. Во-вторых, определяется релевантность понятия трансцендентального субъекта, как оно заявлено в теоретической философии И. Канта, тому или иному историко-философскому значению понятия «субъект». В печатных сочинениях мыслителя данное понятие употребляется, по всей видимости, только в «Критике чистого разума», достаточно редко встречается оно и в черновиках к первой «Критике», где составляет пару с понятием «трансцендентальный объект». Новизна проведенного при этом исследования заключается в демонстрации неочевидности распространенной гносеологической трактовки кантовского трансцендентального субъекта. В результате исследования заключается, что можно выявить следующие версии трактовки трансцендентального субъекта: онтологическую и гносеологическую. Определено, что трансцендентальный субъект, в тех выражениях, как о нем пишет И. Кант, более всего близок к онтологической трактовке и по отношению к области гносеологии представляется будто бы излишним. The purpose of this article is to determine the specifics of Kant’s transcendental subject in modern scientific knowledge. For this purpose, first of all, the identification and disclosure of the essence of the main meaning of the concept “transcendental subject” in Kant’s philosophy is made. Secondly, the relevance of the concept of a transcendental subject, as stated in the theoretical philosophy of I. Kant, to a particular historical and philosophical meaning of the concept of “subject”is determined. In the printed works of the thinker, this concept is used, apparently, only in the “Critique of pure reason”, and it is quite rare to find it in the drafts to the first “Critique”, where it is paired with the concept of”transcendental object”. The novelty of this research consists in demonstrating that the widespread epistemological interpretation of Kant’s transcendental subject is not obvious. As a result of the research, it is possible to identify the following versions of the interpretation of the transcendental subject: ontological and epistemological. It is determined that the transcendental subject, in the terms that I. Kant writes about It, is closest to the ontological interpretation and in relation to the field of epistemology seems to be superfluous.

Some Persistent Presumptions of Hegelian Anti-Subjectivism

2019 ◽  
pp. 139-152
Author(s):  
Karl Ameriks
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Recent Criticism ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical System ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

This chapter responds primarily to a recent criticism of Kant by Stephen Houlgate. Like many other recent Hegelian accounts, Houlgate’s severe critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy contends that, in contrast to Hegel, Kant’s Critical system, especially because of its doctrine of transcendental idealism, presupposes a subjectivist and therefore inadequate position. On the basis of a moderate interpretation of Kant’s idealism and his general Critical procedure, the chapter defends Kant from the charge of subjectivism, and also gives an account of how subjectivist interpretations in general can arise from a series of understandable misunderstandings of difficult passages in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

scholarly journals Of empty thoughts and blind intuitions Kant's answer to McDowell

2010 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 65-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Günter Zöller
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
The Real ◽  
Myth Of The Given ◽  
Passive Data ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Senses ◽  
The Given ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell's neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden.2 The focus is on Kant's twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitions to conceptual determination is not due some pre-existing, absolute conceptuality of the real but to the "work of the subject."3 On a more programmatic level, this paper seeks to demonstrate the limitations of a selective appropriation of Kant and the philosophical potential of a more comprehensive and thorough consideration of his work. Section 1 addresses the unique balance in Kant's philosophy between the work on particular problems and the orientation toward a systematic whole. Section 2 outlines McDowell's take on the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept in the context of the Kant readings by Sellars and Strawson. Section 3 exposes McDowell's relapse into the Myth of the Given. Section 4 proposes a reading of Kant's theoretical philosophy as an epistemology of metaphysical cognition. Section 5 details Kant's original account of sensible intuition in the Inaugural-Dissertation of 1770. Section 6 presents the transition from the manifold of the senses to the synthesis in the imagination and the unification through the categories in the Critique of pure reason (1781 and 1787). Section 7 addresses Kant's formalism in epistemology and metaphysics.

Identity, Appearances, and Things in Themselves

Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 421-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ermanno Bencivenga
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Possible World ◽  
Possible World Semantics ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

In his lucid and perceptive essay, “Recent Work on Kant's Theoretical Philosophy”, Karl Ameriks signals Kant's distinction between appearances and things in themselves as one of the (two) “central issues” of the Critique of Pure Reason. The reason why the issue is central (and complicated) is that Kant appears to say contradictory things on the matter. At times he says (or implies) that appearances are the same as things in themselves, and at other times he says (or implies) that they are different. Some interpreters have tried to make sense of these contradictions by claiming that “although for Kant there are not two objects involved, there are still two transcendental and intelligible aspects or points of view that are called for by his doctrine of things in themselves and appearances”. However, it is not immediately clear what kind of an animal an aspect or a point of view is, what kind of operation it is to “look at” an object from such different points of view, and what kind of results this operation is supposed to give. In the present paper, I make a fresh proposal. I propose to interpret Kant's conflicting claims on the relation between things in themselves and appearances in terms of the contemporary framework of possible-world semantics.

Kant’s Account of Intuition

1991 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorne Falkenstein
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Cognitive Capacities ◽  
Singular Representation ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

Kant supposed that we possess two distinct cognitive capacities, which he referred to as ‘intuition’ (Anschauung) and ‘understanding’ or ‘intellect’ (Verstand). This ‘two-faculty account of cognition’ lies at the foundation of his theoretical philosophy, and almost everything he has to say in the Critique of Pure Reason presupposes it. But it is also problematic. At the outset of the Critique Kant simply assumes the validity of the distinction, without in any way attempting to justify it. And one looks in vain through the Kantian corpus for any explanation that might legitimate it. To make matters worse, Kant does not always draw the distinction in the same way. Most notoriously, he presents two quite different accounts of intuition, defining it in some places as ‘singular representation’ (A713=B741; Logic §6), in others as ‘immediate cognition’ (A19=B33).

Beck, Jacob Sigismund (1761–1840)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eckart Forster
Keyword(s):  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
The Third ◽  
Thing In Itself ◽  
Kantian Philosophy ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

Beck played a brief but important role in the development of post-Kantian philosophy. A former student of Kant, he published at his teacher’s instigation three volumes of ‘Explanatory Abstracts’ of Kant’s major writings. In the third volume Beck presented what he regarded as the ‘Only Possible Standpoint’ from which Critical Philosophy had to be judged if misunderstandings of Kant’s work were to be avoided. His ‘Doctrine of the Standpoint’ involved a ‘reversal’ of the method of the Critique of Pure Reason and the elimination of the ‘thing-in-itself’ from Kant’s theoretical philosophy.

scholarly journals An Overlooked Argument for the Categories: Kant’s Interlude of Justification in the Prolegomena

2018 ◽  
Vol 63 (3) ◽  
pp. 878
Author(s):  
Adriano Perin
Keyword(s):  
Synthetic Methods ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Western Philosophical Tradition ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

The deduction of the categories lies undoubtedly at the very heart of Kant's theoretical philosophy and, for this reason, it is one of items in the philosophical canon that is greatly discussed and least agreed upon. In the modern and contemporary Western philosophical tradition as well as in Kant’s literature, the loci classici for its consideration are the 1781 and 1787 editions of the Critique of pure reason. In this paper, I aim at presenting and discussing an argument that Kant advances in the Prolegomena and which is virtually ignored in the approach of the deduction of the categories. At first, an inquiry into the distinction between analytic and synthetic methods is carried out. After that, the difference between judgments of perception and judgments of experience is taken into account. Finally, the Prolegomena’s argument for the categories is brought into discussion. *** Um Argumento Negligenciado para as Categorias: O Interlúdio Kantiano de Justificação nos Prolegômenos ***É indiscutível que a dedução das categorias compreende o núcleo da filosofia teórica kantiana. Por esse motivo, tal empreendimento figura entre os elementos do cânone filosófico que recebem maior discussão e menos consenso. Os loci classici para a sua consideração, tanto na tradição filosófica ocidental moderna e contemporânea quanto na literatura kantiana, são as edições de 1781 e 1787 da Crítica da razão pura. Neste trabalho, objetivo apresentar e discutir um argumento que Kant desenvolve nos Prolegômenos e que é praticamente ignorado na abordagem da dedução das categorias. Inicialmente, empreende-se uma investigação sobre a distinção entre os métodos analítico e sintético. Na sequência, considera-se a distinção entre juízos de percepção e juízos de experiência. Por último, discute-se o argumento para as categorias que é dado nos Prolegômenos.Palavras-chave: Método Analítico. Método Sintético. Juízos de Percepção. Juízos de Experiência. Dedução das Categorias.

Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Watkins
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Current Situation ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Philosophical Thought ◽  
Present Context ◽  
Systematic Importance ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

The historical and systematic importance of Kant’s philosophy can hardly be exaggerated. The revolutionary contribution it made to earlier modern philosophy, the influence it had on the subsequent course of philosophical thought, and the significance it has for an understanding of our current situation are unparalleled. Given its importance, it is not surprising that scholarship on Kant’s philosophy has also been extremely rich, with attention being paid both to specific sections of Kant’s famous Critique of Pure Reason and to the systematic topics that are treated therein. While Kant’s practical philosophy and aesthetics are revolutionary in their own right, the focus in the present context is on Kant’s theoretical philosophy, which is expressed primarily, though not exclusively, in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Analysis in the Critique of Pure Reason

2007 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Melissa McBay Merritt
Keyword(s):  
Categorical Imperative ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
Pure Reason ◽  
Critique Of Pure Reason ◽  
Critical Philosophy ◽  
No Innovation ◽  
Principal Task ◽  
Theoretical Philosophy

It is widely supposed that the principal task of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is to carry out some kind of analysis of experience. Commentators as profoundly at odds on fundamental points of interpretation as P. F. Strawson and Patricia Kitcher share this supposition. In a letter to J. S. Beck, Kant seems to endorse this view himself, referring to some unspecified stretch of the Critique as an ‘analysis of experience in general’. The idea that the Critique is engaged in an analysis of experience accords well with an attractive conception of Critical philosophy as making something explicit that is generally only implicit in our cognitive lives. After all, the categorical imperative is no innovation of Kant's practical philosophy, but rather is meant to be revealed as the animating principle of ‘ordinary moral rational cognition’. Likewise, the principles revealed in Kant's theoretical philosophy should be nothing other than the principles that necessarily animate ordinary empirical cognition; and Kant says that experience is, or is a mode of, empirical cognition. For this reason, it is undeniably compelling to think of the Critique as offering some kind of analysis of experience.

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