COMPARING THE EVOLVING INDEPENDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN RESERVE BANK

2005 ◽  
Vol 70 (6) ◽  
pp. 955-981 ◽  
Author(s):  
G.M. Wessels
Policy Papers ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (60) ◽  
Author(s):  

This paper proposes modifications to the method of collecting exchange rates for the calculation of the value of the SDR for the purposes of Rule O-2(a). The value of the SDR in terms of the U.S. dollar is determined daily as the sum of the equivalents in U. S. dollar values of the amounts of the currencies that comprise the SDR valuation basket (as provided in Rule O-1), calculated on the basis of exchange rates established in accordance with procedures decided from time to time by the Fund.1 The current procedures are set out in Decision No. 6709-(80/189) S, as amended by Decision No. 12157-(00/24) S, March 9, 2000 (see Annex), which specifies the method for collecting exchange rates for this purpose. Under these procedures, the relevant currency amounts are converted into U.S. dollars using daily exchange rates that are provided to the Fund by the Bank of England (BoE). If rates cannot be obtained from the BoE, they are provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and, if not available there, by the European Central Bank (ECB). The BoE, FRBNY, and ECB intend to rely on a new, more robust methodology to provide exchange rates to the Fund after November 1, 2016, and the proposed modifications reflect these changes.


2005 ◽  
Vol 35 (139) ◽  
pp. 287-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Étienne Balibar

The problem of a European Constitution is discussed at a fundamental level. In which way, can we speak about such a Constitution? Thearticle argues against the “postnational souveranism”, legitimating state against citizens. A new kind of citizenship is favoured based on extended social rights. The constitution now proposed contrarily makes the European Central Bank and its neoliberal policy to central and nearly unchangeable institution.


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