scholarly journals Basic Positive Duties of Justice and Narveson's Libertarian Challenge

2006 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Gilabert
Keyword(s):  
Think India ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 535-546
Author(s):  
ABHISHEK CHOUDHARY

The paper analyses the concerns arising from a moral perspective in the context of a renewed arms race in South Asia. It challenges the idea that possession of nuclear power could in any way contribute to any sort of balance. The emulation of so-called great powers and expecting that balance would arrive as it did in the case of the US and the erstwhile-USSR during cold war is detrimental to the temporal and spatial uniqueness of South Asia. Deterrence, based on rational choice theory, does not apply to the South Asian context due to ambiguity owing to mutual mistrust especially in the case of India and Pakistan. Also, it no longer only sates that are sole actors in the international arena. One cannot expect the non-state actors to behave in a rational manner. Furthermore, the idea of ‘credible minimum deterrence’ itself is questionable as it is a flexible posture adjusted to relative prowess and ambiguity in policy further aggravates the situation. The paper argues from a consequentialist notion of ethics and argues that the principles of harm and equity ought be part of nuclear decision-making. Another aspect that the paper uncovers relates to the ‘reification’ of nuclear power. Using a neo-Marxist framework and concept of Lukács, the paper argues that it is no longer the state as a repository of power that decides the trajectory of nuclear development. Rather the nuclear technology has started to dictate the way states are looking at regional and international relations. This inverted relationship has been created due to neglect of any ethical toolkit. The paper thus proposes an ethical toolkit that focuses on the negative duties of not to harm and also the positive duties to create conditions that would avoid harm being done to people.


2005 ◽  
Vol 8 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 91-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colm O'cinneide

The imposition since 1998 of a variety of positive equality duties upon public authorities has attracted comparatively little academic attention. However, these duties are a central part of current government equality initiatives, increasingly constitute a major part of the work of the UK's equality commissions, and have been described as an essential part of a new ‘fourth generation’ of equality legislation. It now appears likely that a positive duty to promote gender equality will soon be imposed upon public authorities, which will complement similar race and disability duties. Will the introduction of this positive gender equality duty add to, detract or complement existing statutory provisions? Given the danger that ‘soft law’ initiatives may undermine existing anti-discrimination controls, will the duty provide a clear steer to public authorities, or will it lack teeth, substance and direction, and possibly even prove counter-productive? Such positive duties are designed to compensate for the limitations of existing anti-discrimination law, by requiring the taking of positive steps to promote equality and eliminate discrimination, rather than just compelling a reactive compliance with the letter of the (equality) law. The justifications in principle for the introduction of such duties are strong: for the first time, the introduction of a positive gender duty will impose a clear legislative obligation upon public authorities to adopt a substantive equality approach and to take proactive action to redress patterns of disadvantage linked to gender discrimination. Serious concerns do however exist as to the extent to which such duties can be enforced, and the danger that they will simply encourage greater bureaucratic activity at the expense of real change. The proposed gender duty, as with the other duties that have been introduced, is no panacea. Nevertheless, it does constitute a good start, can serve a useful function by empowering public authorities to take positive action, and if effectively used will be a very valuable point of pressure to push for better things.


2009 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anita Mackay

<p>Despite more than 20 years of sexual harassment being unlawful, it is still a persistent problem in Australian workplaces and one which is grossly under-reported. The law is this area should seek both to redress the harm<br />suffered by the victim and to reduce the power imbalance between males and females. The effectiveness of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 in achieving these objectives was reviewed by a Senate Committee in 2008.<br />One of its recommendations was for positive duties to be imposed on employers to eliminate sexual harassment. This article outlines how this recommendation might be implemented, and taken further, by shifting the<br />onus away from the victim and onto the more powerful players in any sexual harassment scenario – the harasser, the employer and the community in the relevant workplace.</p>


2005 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rowan Cruft

In World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge presents a range of attractive policy proposals—limiting the international resource and borrowing privileges, decentralizing sovereignty, and introducing a “global resources dividend”—aimed at remedying the poverty and suffering generated by the global economic order. These proposals could be motivated as a response to positive duties to assist the global poor, or they could be justified on consequentialist grounds as likely to promote collective welfare. Perhaps they could even be justified on virtue-theoretic grounds as proposals that a just or benevolent person would endorse. But Pogge presents them as a response to the violation of negative duties; this makes the need for such remedial policies especially morally urgent—on a par with the obligations of killers to take measures to stop killing.In this essay, I focus on the claim that responsibility for world poverty should be conceived in terms of a violation of negative duties. I follow Pogge in distinguishing two questions (p. 134): What kind of duties (positive or purely negative?) would we be subject to in a just global society where everyone fulfilled their duty and there was no significant risk of injustice? And what kind of duties (positive or purely negative?) do we face given that our global society falls short of the just society?I tackle these questions in reverse order below. I argue, in contrast to Pogge, that positive duties are relevant to our answers to both questions.


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