The Kingdom of Ends as an Ideal and a Constraint on Moral Legislation

In this broadly Kantian account of deliberation about moral principles, human dignity is not a metaphysical ground for the norms that we associate with it. Rather it is a comprehensive status defined by the basic moral principles and values, such as the requirements of justifiability to all and treating humanity as an end in itself. The essay comments on the sense in which dignity is an elevated though inclusive status, in contrast to a conventional status, and an inner worth, in contrast to a derivative value. Human dignity has an important role in practical deliberations, but its specific requirements must be determined and justified by the theory in which it is embedded. Many have discussed the constraints and limits required to respect the dignity of every human person, but this essay emphasizes that this also calls for certain positive attitudes and ideals beyond these negative duties.

Criminal-executive characteristics and social-legal conditionality of negative duties of convicts sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a fixed term.

The article deals with criminal-executive characteristics and social-legal conditionality of negative duties of convicts sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a fixed term. It is noted that the social-legal significance of duties of convicts sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a fixed term is that they are means of forming the moral and legal consciousness of convicts, strengthening law and order, discipline and organization during serving a punishment. The essence of the legal duties of convicts is to require the necessary conduct from the point of view of the state, government and the law. This behavior of convicts is obligatory, indisputable and ensured by measures of state coercion. Such measures of state coercion include the establishment of the possibility of bringing convicts for failure to comply with their duties to legal liability of various types (disciplinary, material, criminal). The analysis of the legal nature of the legal duties of convicts testified to their two-element content (structure), namely: first, it is the need to take certain actions (positive duties); secondly, the need to refrain from performing statutory actions (negative duties). The article establishes that the activity of the colony staff to control the observance of negative duties by convicts has not only a criminal-executive, but also a criminological aspect and is aimed not only at achieving the purpose of punishment and criminal-executive legislation, but also at preventing convicts from committing offenses (including criminal ones) while serving punishments. The social-legal conditionality of the imposition of legal duties on convicts sentenced to deprivation of liberty is given, the main function of which is a special-preventing (criminological). It is noted that one of the main differences between the duties of convicts and their rights is that failure to comply the first ones has undesirable consequences for a person – the fact of bringing convicts to legal liability, which is differentiated by disciplinary, material, criminal.

The Vices of Hatred and of Disrespect

The vices of hatred—envy, ingratitude, and Schadenfreude—corresponding to the virtues of beneficence, gratitude, and sympathetic participation are discussed in the first half of this chapter. Particular attention is paid to their psychological source. The second half of the chapter discusses duties of respect toward others that Kant explains are all negative: duties to avoid arrogance, backbiting, and derision. Attention is also paid to Kant’s views on contempt and whether they imply that all cases of holding someone in contempt are morally prohibited. The chapter also discusses Kant’s chapter on duties to others regarding their condition, where he briefly explains how differences in age, sex, and social rank of others can affect how the various duties of virtue, expressed as virtue rules, affect the application of those rules to particular circumstances.

Global Justice and the Role of Stakeholding

Most research in global justice considers international distributive justice from a perspective of what duties, if any, affluent states have towards people in severe poverty. The debate usually focuses on whether positive or negative duties are most relevant and how they should be applied. This article challenges this orthodoxy by defending stakeholder theory as a promising new approach overcoming limitations in current debates through promotion of the virtue of stakeholders having a say where they have a stake.

To Assist or Not to Assist? Assessing the Potential Moral Costs of Humanitarian Intervention in Nature

In light of the extent of wild animal suffering, some philosophers have adopted the view that we should cautiously assist wild animals on a large scale. Recently, their view has come under criticism. According to one objection, even cautious intervention is unjustified because fallibility is allegedly intractable. By contrast, a second objection states that we should abandon caution and intentionally destroy habitat in order to prevent wild animals from reproducing. In my paper, I argue that intentional habitat destruction is wrong because negative duties are more stringent than positive duties. However, I also argue that the possible benefits of ecological damage, combined with the excusability of unintended, unforeseeable harm, suggest that fallibility should not paralyse us.

Global Justice and Stakeholding

The orthodox position in global justice is to consider questions about international distributive justice from a perspective of what duties, if any, affluent states have towards people in severe poverty. The debate has focused on whether positive or negative duties are most relevant and how they should be applied. This article challenges this orthodoxy by defending stakeholder theory as a promising new approach overcoming limitations in current debates through promotion of the virtue of stakeholders having a say where they have a stake.

‘If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change’: Rethinking order and justice in international society

This article argues that conceptualising the ethical/moral possibilities of international society can be enhanced by utilising the distinction between positive and negative duties rather than order versus justice. The main argument of the article targets the traditional pluralist account and claims that within this account far greater moves towards justice are possible, which can be seen through the lens of order versus justice. More specifically, it argues that a pluralist international society need not be indifferent to global injustices such as poverty, if the range of negative duties is expanded.

Why Business?

Chapter 9 brings the threads of the previous chapters together to develop an integrated picture of honorable business. It first argues that there is such a thing as honorable business, and it articulates its core elements, linking them to the conception of moral agency, hierarchy of moral value, and code of business ethics developed in earlier chapters. It also describes what dishonorable business is. It articulates the “negative” duties of business—the “don’ts—as well as its positive obligations—the “dos”—and argues that the “don’ts” require our attention first, but that the “dos” nevertheless can generate obligations as well. Chapter 9 suggests that honorable business not only provides material prosperity but also enables and encourages proper moral relations among people based on the mutual respect that our inherent dignity requires. Seen in the proper light, this conception of honorable business could actually be a moral calling.

Rights as Security

The right to security of person is widely recognized but little understood. Courts, legislatures, scholars, and others disagree about how the right to security of person should be defined. This book investigates the meaning of the right to security of person through an analysis of its constituent parts: security and the person. Applying an original conceptual analysis of ‘security’, it is argued that the right to security of person imposes both positive and negative duties. Also, to identify the interests to be protected by the right, we need a theory of personhood or well-being such as Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach’. It is accepted that any existing legal rights to security of person must be artificially delineated in order not to overstep the boundaries of other rights. In recognition of the naturally broad meaning of the right to security of person, it is proposed that human rights law as a whole should be seen as a mechanism to further security of person: rights as security.