Self‐consciousness in autism: A third‐person perspective on the self

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Arnaud
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective

scholarly journals MASCULINITY AS AN IDENTITY AND AS A CLUSTER OF TRAITS

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Renata Zieminska
Keyword(s):  
Gender Identity ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Male Gender ◽  
The Self ◽  
Simple Idea ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Binary Model ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective

The paper presents the concept of masculinity within the non-binary and multilayered model of gender/sex traits. Within that model, masculinity is not a simple idea, but rather is fragmented into many traits in diverse clusters. The experience of transgender men and men with intersex traits suggests that self-determined male gender identity is a mega trait that is sufficient for being a man. However, masculinity is not only psychological, as the content of the psychological feeling of being a man refers to social norms about how men should be and behave. And male coded traits are described as traits that frequently occur within the group of people identifying as men. Therefore, I claim that there are two interdependent ideas in the concept of masculinity: the self-determined male gender identity (first-person perspective) and a cluster of traits coded as male (third-person perspective). Within non-binary model the interplay between the two interdependent ideas allows to include borderline masculinities.

Neural Representations of Self versus Other: Visual-Spatial Perspective Taking and Agency in a Virtual Ball-tossing Game

2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 898-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole David ◽  
Bettina H. Bewernick ◽  
Michael X. Cohen ◽  
Albert Newen ◽  
Silke Lux ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Neural Substrates ◽  
The Self ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Visual Spatial ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Posterior Parietal ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Spatial Perspective Taking

Human self-consciousness relies on the ability to distinguish between oneself and others. We sought to explore the neural correlates involved in self-other representations by investigating two critical processes: perspective taking and agency. Although recent research has shed light on the neural processes underlying these phenomena, little is known about how they overlap or interact at the neural level. In a two-factorial functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, participants played a ball-tossing game with two virtual characters (“avatars”). During an active/agency (ACT) task, subjects threw a ball to one of the avatars by pressing a button. During a passive/nonagency (PAS) task, they indicated which of the other avatars threw the ball. Both tasks were performed from a first-person perspective (1PP), in which subjects interacted from their own perspective, and a third-person perspective (3PP), in which subjects interacted from the perspective of an avatar with another location in space. fMRI analyses revealed overlapping activity in medial prefrontal regions associated with representations of one's own perspective and actions (1PP and ACT), and overlapping activity in temporal-occipital, premotor, and inferior frontal, as well as posterior parietal regions associated with representation of others' perspectives and actions (3PP and PAS). These findings provide evidence for distinct neural substrates underlying representations of the self and others and provide support for the idea that the medial prefrontal cortex crucially contributes to a neural basis of the self. The lack of a statistically significant interaction suggests that perspective taking and agency represent independent constituents of self-consciousness.

Exploring the Behavioral, Experiential, and Conceptual Dimensions of the Self

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 180-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Weger ◽  
Andreas Meyer ◽  
Johannes Wagemann
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
The Core ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Behavioral Expression ◽  
Geometrical Shapes ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Current Article ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Level Of Experience

Abstract. The self has become a prominent field of research in psychology but despite its eminent first-person character, it is typically studied from a third-person perspective. Such a third-person approach is well suited to enquire into the behavioral expression of the sense of selfhood but it does not capture the core experience – the so-called qualia nature – of the self. In the current article we illuminate the challenges that a predominant third-person approach poses to an understanding of the self. We outline two levels of analysis that can complement and enrich a third-person, behavior-focused view, namely the level of experience and the level of conceptual insight. Both these additional levels are accessible via a first-person mode of enquiry and can reveal a degree of richness about the self that reaches beyond a third-person approach. We here provide a methodological justification for such a qualitative mode of enquiry, as well as a synopsis of findings from our own first-person research which involved introspective reports of the authors’ experiences during meditation on geometrical shapes, words, and short phrases.

The Self-Awareness of the Mind: Phenomenal World and the Mind Beyond

Diogenes ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (2) ◽  
pp. 16-25
Author(s):  
Ja-Kyoung Han
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Phenomenal World ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
The World ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Third Person ◽  
Conceptual Language

What we regard as real are the objects of the phenomenal world which we perceive. We regard those that we see objectively, as in the third person perspective, as real. What then is the mind that perceives the world? Is it possible for us to realize the very mind that perceives the world? This article discusses the existence of the world perceived by the mind in order to deal with the existence of the mind which perceives the world and the knowability of the mind. Phenomenal world is a perceptual world which is a fictitious world constructed by our conceptual language system. And the base of the fictitious phenomenal world, the object itself, is emptiness. The emptiness is the emptiness of the mind that perceives and constructs the world. Thus, the awareness of the emptiness of the world is the self-awareness of the mind. Since the emptiness of my mind is the same emptiness of all other beings, the mind is the capacity to sympathize with the whole world, the universal mind, One-mind. Every man is aware of oneself as One-mind. “Gong-juk-young-ji” or the “original enlightenment” of Buddhism is the self-awareness of the mind as emptiness.

scholarly journals The Seven Selves of Dementia

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iris Bomilcar ◽  
Elodie Bertrand ◽  
Robin G. Morris ◽  
Daniel C. Mograbi
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Self Identity ◽  
Making Sense ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
External Objects ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Psychosocial Influences ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Embodied Self

The self is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, encompassing a variety of cognitive processes and psychosocial influences. Considering this, there is a multiplicity of “selves,” the current review suggesting that seven fundamental self-processes can be identified that further our understanding of the experience of dementia. These include (1) an embodied self, manifest as corporeal awareness; (2) an agentic self, related to being an agent and influencing life circumstances; (3) an implicit self, linked to non-conscious self-processing; (4) a critical self, which defines the core of self-identity; (5) a surrogate self, based on third-person perspective information; (6) an extended self, including external objects or existences that are incorporated into the self; and, finally, (7) an emergent self, a property of the self-processes that give rise to the sense of a unified self. These are discussed in relation to self-awareness and their use in making sense of the experience of dementia.

Causal determinism and a totally global fatalism from the third-person perspective

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoyang Yu
Keyword(s):  
Human Brain ◽  
Human Language ◽  
Causal Determinism ◽  
The Third ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Neural Substrate ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Physical Laws ◽  
The Third Person

The human brain and the human language are precisely constructed together by evolution/genes, so that in the objective world, a human brain can tell a story to another brain in human language which describes an imagined multiplayer game; in this story, one player of the game represents the human brain itself. It’s possible that the human kind doesn’t really have a subjective world (doesn’t really have conscious experience). An individual has no control even over her choices. Her choices are controlled by the neural substrate. The neural substrate is controlled by the physical laws. So, her choices are controlled by the physical laws. So, she is powerless to do anything other than what she actually does. This is the view of fatalism. Specifically, this is the view of a totally global fatalism, where people have no control even over their choices, from the third-person perspective. And I just argued for fatalism by appeal to causal determinism. Psychologically, a third-person perspective and a new, dedicated personality state are required to bear the totally global fatalism, to avoid severe cognitive dissonance with our default first-person perspective and our original personality state.

scholarly journals Awareness is in the Eye of the Observer: Preserved Third-Person Awareness of Deficit in Anosognosia for Hemiplegia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahba Besharati ◽  
Paul Jenkinson ◽  
Michael Kopelman ◽  
Mark Solms ◽  
Valentina Moro ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
First Person ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Right Hemisphere Damage ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Anosognosia For Hemiplegia

In recent decades, the research traditions of (first-person) embodied cognition and of (third-person) social cognition have approached the study of self-awareness with relative independence. However, neurological disorders of self-awareness offer a unifying perspective to empirically investigate the contribution of embodiment and social cognition to self-awareness. This study focused on a neuropsychological disorder of bodily self-awareness following right-hemisphere damage, namely anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). A previous neuropsychological study has shown AHP patients, relative to neurological controls, to have a specific deficit in third-person, allocentric inferences in a story-based, mentalisation task. However, no study has tested directly whether verbal awareness of motor deficits is influenced by either perspective-taking or centrism, and if these deficits in social cognition are correlated with damage to anatomical areas previously linked to mentalising, including the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri and related limbic white matter connections. Accordingly, two novel experiments were conducted with right-hemisphere stroke patients with (n = 17) and without AHP (n = 17) that targeted either their own (egocentric, experiment 1) or another stooge patient’s (experiment 2) motor abilities from a first-or-third person (allocentric in Experiment 2) perspective. In both experiments, neurological controls showed no significant difference between perspectives, suggesting that perspective-taking deficits are not a general consequence of right-hemisphere damage. More specifically, experiment 1 found AHP patients were more aware of their own motor paralysis when asked from a third compared to a first-person perspective, using both group level and individual level analysis. In experiment 2, AHP patients were less accurate than controls in making allocentric, third-person perspective judgements about the stooge patient, but with only a trend towards significance and with no within-group, difference between perspectives. Deficits in egocentric and allocentric third-person perspective taking were associated with lesions in the middle frontal gyrus, superior temporal and supramarginal gyri, with white matter disconnections more predominate in deficits in allocentricity. This study confirms previous clinical and empirical investigations on the selectivity of first-person motor awareness deficits in anosognosia for hemiplegia and experimentally demonstrates for the first time that verbal egocentric 3PP-taking can positively influence 1PP body awareness.

scholarly journals Exploring the Effects of Visual Perspective on the ERP Components of Empathy for Pain

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl Michael Orquiola Galang ◽  
Sukhvinder S. Obhi ◽  
Michael Jenkins
Keyword(s):  
Mean Amplitude ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Visual Perspective ◽  
First Person ◽  
Affective Component ◽  
Cognitive Components ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Empathy For Pain ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective

Previous neurophysiological research suggests that there are event-related potential (ERP) components are associated with empathy for pain: early affective component (N2) and two late cognitive components (P3/LPP). The current study investigated whether and how the visual perspective from which a painful event is observed affects these ERP components. Participants viewed images of hands in pain vs. not in pain from a first-person or third-person perspective. We found that visual perspective influences both the early and late components. In the early component (N2), there was a larger mean amplitude during observation of pain vs no-pain exclusively when images were shown from a first-person perspective. We suggest that this effect may be driven by misattributing the on-screen hand to oneself. For the late component (P3), we found a larger effect of pain on mean amplitudes in response to third-person relative to first-person images. We speculate that the P3 may reflect a later process that enables effective recognition of others’ pain in the absence of misattribution. We discuss our results in relation to self- vs other-related processing by questioning whether these ERP components are truly indexing empathy (an other-directed process) or a simple misattribution of another’s pain as one’s own (a self-directed process).

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