Neural Representations of Self versus Other: Visual-Spatial Perspective Taking and Agency in a Virtual Ball-tossing Game

2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 898-910 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole David ◽  
Bettina H. Bewernick ◽  
Michael X. Cohen ◽  
Albert Newen ◽  
Silke Lux ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Neural Substrates ◽  
The Self ◽  
Neural Basis ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Visual Spatial ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Posterior Parietal ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Spatial Perspective Taking

Human self-consciousness relies on the ability to distinguish between oneself and others. We sought to explore the neural correlates involved in self-other representations by investigating two critical processes: perspective taking and agency. Although recent research has shed light on the neural processes underlying these phenomena, little is known about how they overlap or interact at the neural level. In a two-factorial functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiment, participants played a ball-tossing game with two virtual characters (“avatars”). During an active/agency (ACT) task, subjects threw a ball to one of the avatars by pressing a button. During a passive/nonagency (PAS) task, they indicated which of the other avatars threw the ball. Both tasks were performed from a first-person perspective (1PP), in which subjects interacted from their own perspective, and a third-person perspective (3PP), in which subjects interacted from the perspective of an avatar with another location in space. fMRI analyses revealed overlapping activity in medial prefrontal regions associated with representations of one's own perspective and actions (1PP and ACT), and overlapping activity in temporal-occipital, premotor, and inferior frontal, as well as posterior parietal regions associated with representation of others' perspectives and actions (3PP and PAS). These findings provide evidence for distinct neural substrates underlying representations of the self and others and provide support for the idea that the medial prefrontal cortex crucially contributes to a neural basis of the self. The lack of a statistically significant interaction suggests that perspective taking and agency represent independent constituents of self-consciousness.

scholarly journals Awareness is in the Eye of the Observer: Preserved Third-Person Awareness of Deficit in Anosognosia for Hemiplegia

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sahba Besharati ◽  
Paul Jenkinson ◽  
Michael Kopelman ◽  
Mark Solms ◽  
Valentina Moro ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
First Person ◽  
Self Awareness ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Right Hemisphere Damage ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Anosognosia For Hemiplegia

In recent decades, the research traditions of (first-person) embodied cognition and of (third-person) social cognition have approached the study of self-awareness with relative independence. However, neurological disorders of self-awareness offer a unifying perspective to empirically investigate the contribution of embodiment and social cognition to self-awareness. This study focused on a neuropsychological disorder of bodily self-awareness following right-hemisphere damage, namely anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP). A previous neuropsychological study has shown AHP patients, relative to neurological controls, to have a specific deficit in third-person, allocentric inferences in a story-based, mentalisation task. However, no study has tested directly whether verbal awareness of motor deficits is influenced by either perspective-taking or centrism, and if these deficits in social cognition are correlated with damage to anatomical areas previously linked to mentalising, including the supramarginal and superior temporal gyri and related limbic white matter connections. Accordingly, two novel experiments were conducted with right-hemisphere stroke patients with (n = 17) and without AHP (n = 17) that targeted either their own (egocentric, experiment 1) or another stooge patient’s (experiment 2) motor abilities from a first-or-third person (allocentric in Experiment 2) perspective. In both experiments, neurological controls showed no significant difference between perspectives, suggesting that perspective-taking deficits are not a general consequence of right-hemisphere damage. More specifically, experiment 1 found AHP patients were more aware of their own motor paralysis when asked from a third compared to a first-person perspective, using both group level and individual level analysis. In experiment 2, AHP patients were less accurate than controls in making allocentric, third-person perspective judgements about the stooge patient, but with only a trend towards significance and with no within-group, difference between perspectives. Deficits in egocentric and allocentric third-person perspective taking were associated with lesions in the middle frontal gyrus, superior temporal and supramarginal gyri, with white matter disconnections more predominate in deficits in allocentricity. This study confirms previous clinical and empirical investigations on the selectivity of first-person motor awareness deficits in anosognosia for hemiplegia and experimentally demonstrates for the first time that verbal egocentric 3PP-taking can positively influence 1PP body awareness.

scholarly journals MASCULINITY AS AN IDENTITY AND AS A CLUSTER OF TRAITS

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
Renata Zieminska
Keyword(s):  
Gender Identity ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Male Gender ◽  
The Self ◽  
Simple Idea ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Binary Model ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective

The paper presents the concept of masculinity within the non-binary and multilayered model of gender/sex traits. Within that model, masculinity is not a simple idea, but rather is fragmented into many traits in diverse clusters. The experience of transgender men and men with intersex traits suggests that self-determined male gender identity is a mega trait that is sufficient for being a man. However, masculinity is not only psychological, as the content of the psychological feeling of being a man refers to social norms about how men should be and behave. And male coded traits are described as traits that frequently occur within the group of people identifying as men. Therefore, I claim that there are two interdependent ideas in the concept of masculinity: the self-determined male gender identity (first-person perspective) and a cluster of traits coded as male (third-person perspective). Within non-binary model the interplay between the two interdependent ideas allows to include borderline masculinities.

Personal life-history

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giovanni Stanghellini
Keyword(s):  
Life History ◽  
Life Events ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Personal Life ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective

This chapter describes the process of progressive decentring of two partners taking part in a dialogue. Phenomenological unfolding is the taking of a third-person perspective on one’s own experiences. The hermeneutic moment consists in position-taking and perspective-taking with respect to one’s own experiences and their meanings. It requires the capacity to distance oneself from one’s own habits in interpreting and understanding the ‘facts’ of one’s own life, and to make of these very habits the object for reflection and for understanding. The psychodynamic moment consists in positing both phenomenological unfolding and hermeneutic analysis in a larger historical context, according great importance to the role of life events, of tradition and prejudice in the development of any form of habitus in interpreting one’s experiences, and of limit-situations in jeopardizing one’s defensive ‘housings’ and showing their vulnerability. This means acknowledging and accepting contingency as the necessity of one’s own story.

Distinct Regions of the Medial Prefrontal Cortex Are Associated with Self-referential Processing and Perspective Taking

2007 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 935-944 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arnaud D'Argembeau ◽  
Perrine Ruby ◽  
Fabienne Collette ◽  
Christian Degueldre ◽  
Evelyne Balteau ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Medial Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Imaging Study ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
The Self ◽  
The Other ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Referential Processing ◽  
Third Person Perspective

The medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) appears to play a prominent role in two fundamental aspects of social cognition, that is, self-referential processing and perspective taking. However, it is currently unclear whether the same or different regions of the MPFC mediate these two interdependent processes. This functional magnetic resonance imaging study sought to clarify the issue by manipulating both dimensions in a factorial design. Participants judged the extent to which trait adjectives described their own personality (e.g., “Are you sociable?”) or the personality of a close friend (e.g., “Is Caroline sociable?”) and were also asked to put themselves in the place of their friend (i.e., to take a third-person perspective) and estimate how this person would judge the adjectives, with the target of the judgments again being either the self (e.g., “According to Caroline, are you sociable?”) or the other person (e.g., “According to Caroline, is she sociable?”). We found that self-referential processing (i.e., judgments targeting the self vs. the other person) yielded activation in the ventral and dorsal anterior MPFC, whereas perspective taking (i.e., adopting the other person's perspective, rather than one's own, when making judgments) resulted in activation in the posterior dorsal MPFC; the interaction between the two dimensions yielded activation in the left dorsal MPFC. These findings show that self-referential processing and perspective taking recruit distinct regions of the MPFC and suggest that the left dorsal MPFC may be involved in decoupling one's own from other people's perspectives on the self.

Reduced activation of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex during self-referential processing in individuals at ultra-high risk for psychosis

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 528-538
Author(s):  
Hye Yoon Park ◽  
Kyoungri Park ◽  
Eunchong Seo ◽  
Se Jun Koo ◽  
Minji Bang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Neural Activity ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Referential Processing ◽  
Ultra High Risk ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person Perspective

Objective: Defects in self-referential processing and perspective-taking are core characteristics that may underlie psychotic symptoms and impaired social cognition in schizophrenia. Here, we investigated the neural correlates of self-referential processing regardless of the perspective taken and third-person perspective-taking regardless of the target person to judge relevance in individuals at ultra-high risk for psychosis. We also explored relationships between alterations in neural activity and neurocognitive function and basic self (‘ ipseity’) disorder. Methods: Twenty-two ultra-high-risk individuals and 28 healthy controls completed a functional magnetic resonance imaging task. While being scanned, participants were asked to take a first-person perspective or to put themselves in their close relative’s place thereby adopting a third-person perspective during judgments of the relevance of personality trait adjectives to one’s self and a close relative. Results: For self-referential (vs other-referential) processing, ultra-high-risk individuals showed less neural activity in the left ventromedial prefrontal cortex/medial orbitofrontal cortex, which was correlated with poor working memory performance. When taking a third-person perspective (vs first-person perspective), ultra-high-risk individuals showed more activity in the middle occipital gyrus. Conclusion: Taken together, our findings suggest that ultra-high-risk individuals already show aberrant neural activity during self-referential processing which may possibly be related to engagement of working memory resources.

Is it always me first? Effects of self-tagging on third-person perspective-taking.

2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 1100-1117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradley Mattan ◽  
Kimberly A. Quinn ◽  
Ian A. Apperly ◽  
Jie Sui ◽  
Pia Rotshtein
Keyword(s):  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective

scholarly journals Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking Performance in People with High Narcissistic Traits

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sima Ebrahimian ◽  
Bradley Mattan ◽  
Mazaher Rezaei
Keyword(s):  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Visual Perspective ◽  
First Person ◽  
The Third ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
First Person Perspective ◽  
Level 1 ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Third Person

Abstract Background: Lack of empathy is one of the main characteristics of narcissists. However, it is not clear whether there is a similar deficit in other facets of mentalizing, such as perspective-taking.Method: In this study, we measured the taking visual perspectives ascribed to different targets (e.g., first-person self, third-person self-avatar, and third-person stranger avatar). Our study focused on separate groups of individuals with high and low self-reported narcissistic traits. Results: Participants reporting high Narcissism scores showed higher accuracy in a third-person perspective-taking task than did their low-Narcissism counterparts. However, when the first-person perspective was incongruent with the third-person (first person vs. self- tagged avatar), the accuracy of their responses decreased.Conclusions: The discrepancy between the two types of perspective taking of people with high narcissism can probably mean that the narcissistic people perfectly identify / empathize with one object (person, avatar, character, etc.) and therefore their perspective-taking is disrupted when they need to identify with more than one object that represent their self-attributed perspectives.

scholarly journals Corticospinal Excitability During a Perspective Taking Task as Measured by TMS-induced Motor Evoked Potentials

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Brenya ◽  
Katherine Chavarria ◽  
Elizabeth Murray ◽  
Karen Kelly ◽  
Anjel Friest ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Evoked Potentials ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Right Hemisphere ◽  
Motor Evoked Potentials ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Cortical Activation ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
The Right

Only by understanding the ability to take third-person perspective can we begin to elucidate the neural processes responsible for one’s inimitable conscious experience. The current study examined differences in hemispheric laterality during a first-person perspective (1PP) and third-person perspective (3PP) taking task, when using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS). Participants were asked to take either the 1PP or 3PP when identifying the number of spheres in a virtual scene. During this task, single-pulse TMS was delivered to the motor cortex of both the left and right hemispheres of 10 healthy volunteers. Measures of TMS-induced motor-evoked potentials (MEPs) of the contralateral abductor pollicis brevis (APB) were employed as an indicator of lateralized cortical activation. The data suggest that the right hemisphere is more important in discriminating between 1PP and 3PP. These data add a novel method for determining perspective taking and add to the literature supporting the role of the right hemisphere in meta representation.

Exploring the Behavioral, Experiential, and Conceptual Dimensions of the Self

2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 180-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrich Weger ◽  
Andreas Meyer ◽  
Johannes Wagemann
Keyword(s):  
The Self ◽  
First Person ◽  
The Core ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Behavioral Expression ◽  
Geometrical Shapes ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Current Article ◽  
Third Person Perspective ◽  
Level Of Experience

Abstract. The self has become a prominent field of research in psychology but despite its eminent first-person character, it is typically studied from a third-person perspective. Such a third-person approach is well suited to enquire into the behavioral expression of the sense of selfhood but it does not capture the core experience – the so-called qualia nature – of the self. In the current article we illuminate the challenges that a predominant third-person approach poses to an understanding of the self. We outline two levels of analysis that can complement and enrich a third-person, behavior-focused view, namely the level of experience and the level of conceptual insight. Both these additional levels are accessible via a first-person mode of enquiry and can reveal a degree of richness about the self that reaches beyond a third-person approach. We here provide a methodological justification for such a qualitative mode of enquiry, as well as a synopsis of findings from our own first-person research which involved introspective reports of the authors’ experiences during meditation on geometrical shapes, words, and short phrases.

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