In search of scientific objectivity: Is there such a property for paediatric concussion?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Ramsay
Episteme ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Alexander Reutlinger

Abstract Building on Nozick's invariantism about objectivity, I propose to define scientific objectivity in terms of counterfactual independence. I will argue that such a counterfactual independence account is (a) able to overcome the decisive shortcomings of Nozick's original invariantism and (b) applicable to three paradigmatic kinds of scientific objectivity (that is, objectivity as replication, objectivity as robustness, and objectivity as Mertonian universalism).


Axiomathes ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 699-704
Author(s):  
Mario Alai

1969 ◽  
Vol 51 (4) ◽  
pp. 921-924
Author(s):  
G. Schmitt ◽  
W. Timmermann

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Peterson

ABSTRACTA central goal of modern science, objectivity, is a concept with adocumented history. Its meaning in any specific setting reflectshistorically-situated understandings of both science and self. Recently,various scientific fields have confronted growing mistrust about thereplicability of findings. Statistical techniques familiar to forensicinvestigations have been deployed to articulate a “crisis of falsepositives.” In response, epistemic activists have invoked a decidedlyeconomic understanding of scientists’ selves. This has prompted a set ofproposed reforms including regulating disclosure of “backstage” researchdetails and enhancing incentives for replication. We argue that, together,these events represent the emergence of a new formulation of objectivity.Forensic objectivity assesses the integrity of research literatures in theresults observed in collections of studies rather than in themethodological details of individual studies and, thus, positionsmeta-analysis as the ultimate arbiter of scientific objectivity. Forensicobjectivity not only presents a challenge to scientific communities butalso raises new questions for the sociology of science.


Author(s):  
А. Buller

In this article the question about the influence of the natural sciences on the philosophical concepts of Arthur Schopenhauer and Vladimir Solovyov was raised. The influence of Kantian transcendental criticism on Schopenhauer's philosophy was studied. It was shown that this influence manifested itself very vividly in the Schopenhauer concept of «will to live». It was established that the ontological status of man as a «phenomenon» had an impact both on Schopenhauer's concept of death and on his ethics of compassion. It was emphasized that the natural world plays an important role in Soloviev’s philosophical concept. According to Soloviev the nature of a person is determined by three needs: «animals, mental and heart», while the ontological basis of all these three needs is life, that is, the ability to «exist». It was indicated that the moral feelings of a person justified by Soloviev – shame, conscience, pity, and reverence – are a kind of human «response» of a rational being to its natural instincts and needs. The parallels between the philosophical views of Schopenhauer and Solovyov were drawn. On the basis of this parallels it was concluded that, despite the significant differences in the worldview of these two very different thinkers in nature, their approach to philosophy was largely identical and was characterized by scientific objectivity, interdisciplinarity, the skill of argumentation, the sharpness of the mind, the desire to give reasonable answers to the «last questions» of philosophy.


2015 ◽  
pp. 129-139
Author(s):  
Rafael García Pavón

En el presente trabajo se muestra cómo en el pensamiento de Evandro Agazzi, en su más reciente obra Scientific Objectivity and its Contexts (Springer, 2014), la ciencia es una odisea del espíritu humano que se constituye en su plenitud, sin perder su característica moderna de objetividad, sólo en la reconsideración de su vínculo intrínseco y sistémico con los diversos contextos de su creación y en particular con la metafísica. La idea central de Evandro Agazzi proviene de la re-interpretación de las causas que motivaron el alejamiento de la ciencia de la metafísica en la revolución científica y ante tal reconsideración presenta un modelo de pensamiento científico vinculado a su contexto social, hermenéutico, pero sobre todo metafísico.


2021 ◽  
pp. 095935432110591
Author(s):  
Lucas B. Mazur ◽  
Louisa Richter ◽  
Paulina Manz ◽  
Helena Bartels

Despite widespread awareness of the psychological dimensions of pain, researchers often and easily slip into essentializing understandings that treat pain as a purely physiological experience that can be isolated within experimental research. This drive towards scientific objectivity, while at times of tremendous utility, can also limit our understanding of pain to reductionistic conceptualizations that in effect deny the subjective and even the psychological dimensions of pain. In other words, researchers often attempt to understand pain by means of empirical, scientific explanations, while being simultaneously aware that such an approach cannot grasp the phenomenon in its entirety. This yearning for deeper, ontological understanding in a world that admits of only empirical, scientific explanations has been called Cartesian anxiety. In the current study, it is argued that cultural psychology can help to alleviate this Cartesian anxiety by helping us to appreciate the psychological aspects of pain as dynamic processes of meaning making.


Author(s):  
Mary Tiles

One indication of the originality of Bachelard’s work is that he was famous for his writings both in the philosophy of science and on the poetic imagination. His work demonstrates his belief that the life of the masculine, work-day consciousness (animus), striving towards scientific objectivity through reasoning and the rectification of concepts, must be complemented by the life of a nocturnal, feminine consciousness (anima), seeking an expanded poetic subjectivity, as, in reverie, it creates the imaginary. In common with other scientist-philosophers writing in the first half of the twentieth century, Bachelard reflected on the upheavals wrought by the introduction of relativity theory and quantum mechanics. The views at which he arrived were, however, unlike those of his contemporaries; he argued that the new science required a new, non-Cartesian epistemology, one which accommodated discontinuities (epistemological breaks) in the development of science. It was only after he had established himself as one of France’s leading philosophers of science, by succeeding Abel Rey in the chair of history and philosophy of science at the Sorbonne, that Bachelard began to publish works on the poetic imagination. Here his trenchantly anti-theoretical stance was provocative. He rejected the role of literary critic and criticized literary criticism, focusing instead on reading images and on the creative imagination.


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