Rethinking Historical Approaches for Science Education in the Anthropocene

In this chapter, we intend to bring the urgency of our times, pointed out by discussions about the Anthropocene, to research in history, philosophy, and sociology of science in science teaching. After considering the own historicity of the Anthropocene concept, we seek, through a short historical case on botany, to build new lenses to look at Western modern science, locating other stories and other perspectives that can be told about its emergence and establishment. With this new focus, we discuss how this knowledge was shaped by the triad of colonialism, capitalism, and patriarchy, and that for this reason, we must perceive modern science through a critical lens in dialog with other forms of knowledge. This dialogue can help to build solutions for the present moment and to dissolve some of the impasses regarding the conversations around the Anthropocene. Thus, we argue that enhancing the political-historical dimension of Western modern science in science education is a fundamental task in building futures that produce different and potentially less (self)destructive multispecies relationships.

The development of science epistemology in senior science courses: A quantitative study

<p>Epistemological development is a pivotal aspect of liberal education because the ability to distinguish between knowledge and pseudo-knowledge and the ability to use the particular methods of reasoning associated with various disciplinary fields equips people to make judgements in complex issues. The present study examines the extent to which studying each of the different science disciplines in secondary years 12 and 13 supports the development of science epistemology. A further aim was to determine the relationship between epistemological development in science and the completion of inquiry-type coursework. Data were collected from 735 year 12 and 13 students from 11 schools, mainly from the Wellington region. A survey, designed for this study, comprised statements about the nature of science and scientific argumentation conceptions, two pivotal aspects of science epistemology. Using a quasi-experimental design, this quantitative study explores the extent of the development of science epistemology over a year of studying science, by comparing students’ scores in Term 1 with scores in Term 3 on the instrument. The findings showed a more advanced epistemic view among science students; however, a positive effect of science studies on epistemic development was not evident. It was concluded that a greater emphasis on authentic inquiry is essential for epistemic development and, while understanding of the philosophical assumptions underpinning scientific knowledge is important, this should arise from authentic science inquiries – or the processes of science – rather than being taught in isolation from the practice of the discipline of science. This leads to a question the extent to which an emphasis should be placed on the ontological aspects of the philosophy and the sociology of science, potentially at the expense of developing sound understanding of science epistemology.</p>

The development of science epistemology in senior science courses: A quantitative study

<p>Epistemological development is a pivotal aspect of liberal education because the ability to distinguish between knowledge and pseudo-knowledge and the ability to use the particular methods of reasoning associated with various disciplinary fields equips people to make judgements in complex issues. The present study examines the extent to which studying each of the different science disciplines in secondary years 12 and 13 supports the development of science epistemology. A further aim was to determine the relationship between epistemological development in science and the completion of inquiry-type coursework. Data were collected from 735 year 12 and 13 students from 11 schools, mainly from the Wellington region. A survey, designed for this study, comprised statements about the nature of science and scientific argumentation conceptions, two pivotal aspects of science epistemology. Using a quasi-experimental design, this quantitative study explores the extent of the development of science epistemology over a year of studying science, by comparing students’ scores in Term 1 with scores in Term 3 on the instrument. The findings showed a more advanced epistemic view among science students; however, a positive effect of science studies on epistemic development was not evident. It was concluded that a greater emphasis on authentic inquiry is essential for epistemic development and, while understanding of the philosophical assumptions underpinning scientific knowledge is important, this should arise from authentic science inquiries – or the processes of science – rather than being taught in isolation from the practice of the discipline of science. This leads to a question the extent to which an emphasis should be placed on the ontological aspects of the philosophy and the sociology of science, potentially at the expense of developing sound understanding of science epistemology.</p>

From Value to Valuation: Pragmatist and Hermeneutic Orientations for Assessing Science on the International Space Station

Based on a study of the International Space Station (ISS), this paper argues that – as a set of orientations for sociological inquiry – pragmatism and hermeneutics are confluent frameworks to examine valuation as a social process. This confluence is grounded on their common attunement to valuing as a problematic and relational process, their equally common updates with theories of institutions, and a further conceptual development regarding the temporalities of valuation. I advance the argument in four steps. First, looking at how the question about the “scientific value” of the ISS is far from settled, I show how valuation is always about something considered problematic and indeterminate. Second, characterizing the ISS at the intersection of different criteria of assessment, I stress the nature of valuation as a fundamentally perspectival and interpretive process, and show how a hermeneutic approach can complement some of the limitations of pragmatism in this regard. Third, I look at the question of institutions considering how some modes of assessment sediment more successfully than others. Fourth, I argue that, while providing insights towards it, pragmatist and hermeneutic approaches to valuation have not fully grasped its temporal nature as a process, and outline ways to open this line of inquiry. I conclude with some ideas for studies in sociology of science to re-entangle detailed case studies of scientific practice with the study of how institutions make claims of worth about the nature of science, I propose ways to extend these arguments to other studies of what I call iridescent institutions, and I make some considerations about our stance as sociologists in these valuation disputes.

Images of Science: A Reality Check

It will be argued that the dominant form of current academic science is based on ideas and concepts about science and research that date back to philosophy and sociology that was developed since the 1930s. It will be discussed how this philosophy and sociology of science has informed the ideas, myths and ideology about science held by the scientific community and still determines the popular view of science. It is even more amazing when we realize that these ideas are philosophically and sociologically untenable and since the 1970s were declared obsolete by major scholars in these same disciplines. To demonstrate this, I delve deep to discuss the distinct stages that scholars in philosophy, sociology and history of science since 1945 to 2000 have gone through to leave the analytical-positivistic philosophy behind. I will be focusing on developments of their thinking about major topics such as: how scientific knowledge is produced, the scientific method; the status of scientific knowledge and the development of our ideas about ‘truth’ and the relation of our claims to reality. It will appear that the positivistic ideas about science producing absolute truth, about ‘the unique scientific method’, its formal logical approach and its timeless foundation as a guarantee for our value-free, objective knowledge were not untenable. This is to show how thoroughly the myth has been demystified in philosophy and sociology of science. You think after these fifty pages I am kicking a dead horse? Not at all! This scientific demystification has unfortunately still not reached active scientists. In fact, the popular image of science and research is still largely based on a that Legend. This is not without consequence as will be shown in Chap. 10.1007/978-94-024-2115-6_3. These images of science have shaped and in fact distorted the organisational structures of academia and the interaction between its institutes and disciplines. It also affects the relationship of science with its stakeholders in society, its funders, the many publics private and public, and policy makers in government. In short, it determines to a large degree the growth of knowledge with major effects on society.

Science for, in and with Society: Pragmatism by Default

To rethink the relation between science and society and its current problems authoritative scholars in the US and Europe, but also around the globe, have since 1980 implicitly and increasingly explicitly gone back to the ideas of American pragmatism. Pragmatism as conceived by its founders Peirce, James and Dewey is known for its distinct philosophy/sociology of science and political theory. They argued that philosophy should not focus on theoretical esoteric problems with hair-splitting abstract debates of no interest to scientists because unrelated to their practice and problems in the real world. In a realistic philosophy of science, they did not accept foundationalism, dismissed the myth of given eternal principles, the unique ‘scientific method’, absolute truths or let alone a unifying theory. They saw science as a plural, thoroughly social activity that has to be directed to real world problems and subsequent interventions and action. ‘Truth’ in their sense was related to the potential and possible impact of the proposition when turned in to action. Knowledge claims were regarded per definition a product of the community of inquirers, fallible and through continuous testing in action were to be improved. Until 1950, this was the most influential intellectual movement in the USA, but with very little impact in Europe. Because of the dominance of the analytic positivistic approach to the philosophy of science, after 1950 it lost it standing. After the demise of analytical philosophy, in the 1980s of the previous century, there was a resurgence of pragmatism led by several so-called new or neo-pragmatists. Influential philosophers like Hillary Putnam and Philip Kitcher coming from the tradition of analytic philosophy have written about their gradual conversion to pragmatism, for which in the early days they were frowned upon by their esteemed colleagues. This new pragmatist movement gained traction first in the US, in particular through works of Bernstein, Toulmin, Rorty, Putnam and Hacking, but also gained influence in Europe, early on though the works of Apel, Habermas and later Latour.

Impact of Knowledge of Natural Sciences on ENEM Performance: Considerations about Scientific and Technological Inequality to Social Justice

This paper sets out from the perspective sociology of education and sociology of science, aiming: analyze the performance of students in nature sciences compared to other areas of knowledge in the National High School Exam; analyze the performance of candidates from public schools and private schools; present preliminary considerations that indicate how the presence of scientific laboratories in schools show some evidence of improvement in performance. The debate goes through by mobilizing the concept of scientific inequality and cultural goodwill to propose an interpretation of data that allows a comparison between the performance in natural sciences of students from several school systems by comparative analysis among public and private schools. The data selection it reports on the microdata of the National High School Exam (ENEM) — 2017 edition — which was investigated the results of students from the final year (senior year) who scores between 600 and 1000 points in natural sciences in order to compare these results with other areas of knowledge. The data show that students from public schools have proportionally more significant performance (between fields of knowledge) in hard sciences (and writing) than students from private schools. In addition, it is found in this range of score of the analysis a disproportion of representativeness of students from public schools on objection of private ones that can be interpreted as a marked characteristic of social and educational inequality in the country.

Edgar Zilsels „Sozialismus 1943“ im Kontext

In the summer of 1943 Edgar Zilsel resigned from his membership in the exile organization of Austrian Social Democrats, a political movement he had joined as a young man back in Vienna. Zilsel (1891–1944) is known as an innovative scholar bridging philosophy, history and sociology of science, and belonging to the so-called left wing of the Vienna Circle of Logical Emipricism. Details of his political convictions are less recognized. A recently detected manuscript illuminates his worldview: His resignation letter had been accompanied by a short exposition of his interpretation of socialism near the end of World War II. The article introduces Zilsel, his life and work and publishes for the first time Zilsel’s statement from 1943.

Ethic of Science: Classic Norms and Modern Deformations

The article discusses the problems of the professional ethos of science genesis and its transformation in the context of modern realities. There is a brief description of the classical norms of the scientific ethos (universalism, communalism, disinterestedness and organized skepticism), formulated by R. Merton in the late 1930s and early 1940s, in response to the sharp exacerbation of the problem of science’s autonomy in the conditions of totalitarian regimes. The key idea of Merton is especially emphasized: compliance with the norms is aimed primarily at optimizing the process of scientific production and, thereby, the most effective solution to the main goal of science – the increasing of certified knowledge volume. The concept of the ethical imperatives of a scientific profession was almost immediately criticized for being ‘idealistic’ and ‘disconnected from real life’, and by the end of the 1960s it intensified many times over. You can find the examples of critical attitude to the concept of Merton, also we described the alternative versions of the norms of scientific ethos (in the interpretation of Mitroff and Fuller). It has been established that under the conditions of academic capitalism, which implies the incorporation of market culture into the system of scientific research, a negative deformation of classical norms occurs, in practice creating barriers to the production of knowledge and disrupting the practice of communication within the scientific community. The result of this deformation is the system of relationships between scientists, described by Ziman in the framework of the concept of ‘post-academic science’. Evidence is presented that the process of degradation of norms is further intensified in the conditions of cognitive capitalism and neoliberal science. Using the example of modern Russian science, the author shows that the result of such degradation is, for example, the exacerbation of the problem of plagiarism. Methods of counteracting such practice are briefly described using the example of modern Russian science, such as the creation of a Dissernet community or a special commission to counteract falsification of scientific research within the framework of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In a theoretical sense, in the context of the philosophy and sociology of science, the concept of ‘two ethics’ proposed by B. Pruzhinin, looks productive. B. Pruzhinin singles out the specific ethos of fundamental and applied science.