Taiwan’s “Protect the Diaoyutai” Movement

Author(s):  
Alexander Bukh

Located in the nexus of two critical junctures-the “long 1960s” in the US United States and the collapse of nationalist mythology of the Kuomintang government-the Taiwanese movement for the protection of the Diaoyutai iIslands promoted a new narrative on Chinese national identity. The symbolism ascribed to the disputed islands was rather diverse, but the dominant, left-leaning part of the movement used the disputed islands to reproduce the Kuomintang- created narrative on national humiliation, while replacing the Republic of China with the People’s Republic of China as the center of Chinese national subjectivity. In post-democratization Taiwan, this narrative gained a new political meaning, becoming an integral part of the legitimation strategy deployed by pro-unification political forces.

1956 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-138 ◽  

The tenth session of the General Assembly met at UN Headquarters from September 20 to December 20, 1955. At the opening plenary meeting, Mr. José Maza (Chile) was unanimously elected President of the session. On the motion of the United States, the Assembly by a vote of 42 to 12 with 6 abstentions decided not to consider any proposals to exclude the representatives of the government of the Republic of China or to seat representatives of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China during the tenth session.


1996 ◽  
Vol 148 ◽  
pp. 1260-1283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Pierre Cabestan

Since 1949, the spectre of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has constantly dominated Taiwan's political stage. The PRC was considered until the mid-1960s by Chiang Kai-shek, then President of the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROCOT), as a part of the country to be reconquered from the Communist bandits (gongfei). And since the United States′ de-recognition in 1979 the reunification with mainland China has remained one of the key official objectives of the Nationalist regime.


Author(s):  
Alessandra Ferrer

Abstract In 2018 the government of the Republic of China (roc) on Taiwan elevated certain Chinese languages, Taiwanese Indigenous languages, and Taiwan Sign Language to the status of national languages, seemingly marking the latest stage in an evolution of language education policy away from the long-standing focus on Mandarin. This paper analyses this evolution by comparing approaches to language education policy in contemporary Taiwan with those in the People’s Republic of China (prc). It focuses on how notions of multiculturalism, deployed to legitimate policy, have taken on different meanings in these divergent political contexts. I argue that in both the prc and Taiwan, multiculturalism primarily signifies symbolic recognition of minority and non-dominant languages, involving limited redistribution of power. The continued centrality of Mandarin reflects the powerful legacy in both the roc and the prc of discourses of national identity centred around Han Chineseness, despite significant differences in the deployment of multicultural rhetoric.


2012 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 252-271
Author(s):  
Madoka Fukuda

AbstractThis article examines the substance and modification of the “One-China” principle, which the government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued in the mid 1960s. Under this principle, a country wishing to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC was required first to break off such relations with the Republic of China (ROC). In 1964 the PRC established diplomatic relations with France. This was its first ambassadorial exchange with a Western government. The PRC, in the negotiations over the establishment of diplomatic relations, attempted to achieve some consensus with France on the matter of “One-China”. The PRC, nevertheless, had to abandon these attempts, even though it demanded fewer conditions of France than of the United States (USA), Japan and other Western countries in the 1970s. The PRC had demanded adherence to the “One-China” principle since 1949. France, however, refused to accept this condition. Nevertheless, the PRC established diplomatic relations with France before the latter broke off relations with the ROC. Subsequently, the PRC abandoned the same condition in negotiations with the African governments of the Republic of Congo, Central Africa, Dahomey and Mauritania. After the negotiations with France, the PRC began to insist that the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations should clearly state that “the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China”. However, France refused to insert these words into the communiqué. Afterwards, the PRC nevertheless insisted on putting such a statement into the joint communiqués or exchanges of notes on the establishment of diplomatic relations with the African countries mentioned above. This was done in order to set precedents for making countries accede to the “One-China” principle. The “One-China” principle was, thus, gradually formed in the process of the negotiation and bargaining between the PRC and other governments.


Author(s):  
Fredy González

As the Cold War dragged on and the Republic of China failed to effect its reconquest of mainland China, not all Chinese Mexicans continued to support the Republic of China. Some defected to support the People’s Republic of China, or openly traveled to mainland China or expressed their reservations about the ROC. For this, they were exposed as subversives and surveilled by the ROC, Mexican, and US governments. This chapter illustrates how transnational causes could have local repercussions, as some Chinese Mexicans began to chafe under their relationship with the ROC.


Author(s):  
Fredy González

The Chinese Civil War and the advent of the People’s Republic of China represented a profound challenge to the international legitimacy of the Republic of China, now on Taiwan. This chapter chronicles the efforts by ROC ambassador Feng-shan Ho to cultivate a relationship with Chinese Mexicans to present a positive image of the ROC and encourage the Mexican government to maintain diplomatic relations. This especially took place during the annual pilgrimage to the Basílica de Guadalupe and the Chinese Mexican response to the 1963 Economic and Commercial Exposition of the People’s Republic of China. Chinese Mexicans, far from being tools of the Republic of China, used such instances of public diplomacy to enhance their own image.


Author(s):  
Anatoliy V. Goncharenko ◽  
Lybov G. Polyakova

The article researches the US foreign policy towards the PRC during Gerald Ford presidency in 1974-1977. It describes the reasons, course and consequences of the intensification of the US foreign policy strategy in the Chinese direction during the investigated period. There was explored the practical realization of the “Pacific Doctrine”by Washington. The role of various groups in the American establishment in the question of the formation of the Chinese White House policy has been analyzed. The specific foreign policy actions of the administration of the US president Gerald Fordon the PRC in 1974-1977 are analyzed. The chief results of the foreign policy of the administration of the President of the United States Gerald Ford (1974-1977) concerning the PRC, which resulted from the real political steps taken by the leaders of both countries, was the establishment of systematic and reliable channels of bilateral ties, expansion of economic, scientific and cultural contacts, the beginning of a systematic exchange of views on the most important issues of international relations. In the second half of the 70’s of the twentieth century this dialogue ensured the continuity of China’s policy in Washington, which was based on the concept of a “balance of power”, while China played a complementary role in the foreign policy strategy of the White House. These factors formed the “Pacific Doctrine” of G. Ford, which gave Beijing the status of an American partner in maintaining a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and consolidated a positive assessment of the place and role of the People’s Republic of China in Asian politics in the United States of America. The return of American political thought to the ideas of the combination policy occurred in the formation of US-Soviet strategic parity and awareness of the ruling circles in the United States, due to the defeat in Vietnam, the limited resources of force influence on the international situation. Started in the United States the study of China’s behavior in the international arena and its power parameters made it possible then to draw a preliminary conclusion that the People’s Republic of China can fill the place of the missing link in the “triangle” of the global scheme – a place of counterweight to the USSR; this required the removal of a US-Chinese confrontation. However, the socio-political and ideological contradictions that were pushed to the foreground on the initial stage of the Chinese policy of the administration of G. Ford and the process of normalization of bilateral relations, again made themselves felt at a later stage. Their injection was promoted by the logic of the development of bilateral US-China relations, as well as by a number of internal objective and subjective reasons, as in the People’s Republic of China (a sharp increase in the struggle for power connected with the illness and death of Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong), and in the United States (Gerald Ford made certain curtseys towards the American right-wing conservative forces and began to intensify approaches to Beijing and Moscow, and also the presidential campaign of 1976). Keywords: the USA, PRC, China, foreign policy, American-Chinese relations, “Pacific Doctrine”, Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger , Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping.


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