Avoiding Increased Trip Times and Other Operational Impacts When Implementing Positive Train Control

Implementing safety systems on railroads and transit systems to prevent collisions and the risks of excess speeds often come at the price of lengthened trip time, reduced capacity, or both. This paper will recommend a method for designing Positive Train Control (PTC) systems to avoid the degradation of operating speeds, trip times and line capacities which is a frequent by product of train-control systems. One of the more significant operational impacts of PTC is expected to be similar to the impacts of enforcing civil speed restrictions by cab signaling, which is that the safe-braking rate used for signal-system design and which is expected to be used for PTC is significantly more conservative than the service brake rate of the train equipment and the deceleration rate used by train operators. This means that the enforced braking and speed reduction for any given curve speed restriction is initiated sooner than it otherwise would be by a human train operator, resulting in trains beginning to slow and/or reaching the target speed well in advance of where they would absent enforcement. This results in increased trip time, which can decrease track capacity. Another impact of speed enforcement is that it often results in “underspeeding.” In a cab-signal (and manual-train-operation) environment, it has been well documented that train operators typically operate two or three mph below the nominal enforced speed to avoid the risk of penalty brake applications. Target and location speed enforcement under PTC is likely to foster the same behaviors unless the design is prepared to mitigate this phenomenon. While the trip-time and capacity impacts of earlier braking and train-operator underspeeding are generally marginal, that margin can be very significant in terms of incremental capacity and/or resource for recovery from minor perturbations (aka system reliability). The operational and design methodology that is discussed in this paper involves the use of a higher unbalance (cant deficiency) for calculating the safety speed of each curve that is to be enforced by PTC, while retaining the existing maximum unbalance standard and existing speed limits as “timetable speed restrictions”. Train operators will continue to be held responsible for observing the timetable speed limits, while the PTC system would stand ready to enforce the higher safety speeds and unbalance should the train operator fail to properly control his or her train. The paper will present a potential methodology for calculating safety speeds that are in excess of the normal operating speeds. The paper will also calculate using TPC software the trip-time tradeoffs for using or not using this potential concept, for which there are some significant precedents. Other operational impacts, and proposed remedies, will be discussed as well. These will include the issues of total speed enforcement versus safety-speed enforcement, the ability of a railroad’s management to perform the speed checks required by the FRA regulations under normal conditions, and the operation of trains under occasional but expected PTC failures.