A survey of current activities and technologies used to detect carbapenem resistance in bacteria isolated from companion animals at veterinary diagnostic laboratories—United States, 2020

Author(s):  
Michelle A. Waltenburg ◽  
Alicia Shugart ◽  
John Dustin Loy ◽  
Deepanker Tewari ◽  
Shuping Zhang ◽  
...  

Carbapenems are antimicrobial drugs reserved for the treatment of severe multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacterial infections. Carbapenem-resistant organisms (CROs) are an urgent public health threat and have been made reportable to public health authorities in many jurisdictions. Recent reports of CROs in companion animals and veterinary settings suggest that CROs are a One Health problem. However, standard practices of U.S. veterinary diagnostic laboratories (VDLs) to detect CROs are unknown. We assessed the capacity of VDLs to characterize carbapenem resistance in isolates from companion animals. Among 74 VDLs surveyed in 42 states, 23 laboratories (31%) from 22 states responded. Most (22/23, 96%) include ≥1 carbapenem on their primary antimicrobial susceptibility testing panel; approximately one-third (9/23, 39%) perform phenotypic carbapenemase production testing or molecular identification of carbapenemase genes. Overall, 35% (8/23) of VDLs across eight states reported they would notify public health if a CRO was detected. Most (17/21, 81%) VDLs were not aware of CRO reporting mandates; some expressed uncertainty about whether the scope of known mandates included CROs from veterinary sources. Although nearly all surveyed VDLs tested for carbapenem resistance, fewer had capacity for mechanism testing or awareness of public health reporting requirements. Addressing these gaps is critical to monitoring CRO incidence and trends in veterinary medicine, preventing spread in veterinary settings, and mounting an effective One Health response. Improved collaboration and communication between public health and veterinary medicine is critical to inform infection control practices in veterinary settings and conduct public health response when resistant isolates are detected.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
A Marco ◽  
C Gallego ◽  
V Pérez-Cáceres ◽  
RA Guerrero ◽  
M Sánchez-Roig ◽  
...  

AbstractAn outbreak of SARS-CoV2 infection in a Barcelona prison was studied after seven cases appeared in nine days. One hundred and eighty-four people (148 inmates and 36 prison staff) were evaluated by rt-PCR. Thirty-nine (24.1%) were positive: 33 inmates and six staff members. The inmates were isolated in prison module 4, which was converted into an emergency COVID unit. Two people (one inmate and one health worker) were admitted to hospital for clinical deterioration. There were no deaths. Outbreaks pose a huge risk, must be detected early, are difficult to manage, and require optimal coordination between health and prison authorities.


2021 ◽  
pp. 003335492110472
Author(s):  
Linda C. Pimentel ◽  
Alicia C. May ◽  
John K. Iskander ◽  
Ronald E. Banks ◽  
John D. Gibbins

Objectives Information on knowledge of public health professionals about health aspects of the human–animal interface, referred to as One Health, is limited. The objective of this study was to identify factors associated with animal welfare attitudes, practices, and One Health awareness among US Public Health Service (USPHS) officers to assess preparedness for public health response. Methods USPHS officers participated in an online, self-administered survey from February 15 through March 2, 2018. A total of 1133 of 6474 (17.5%) USPHS officers responded. We collected information on officers’ demographic characteristics, animal welfare attitudes and practices, volunteer and work exposure to animals, and One Health knowledge. We compared (1) One Health knowledge and animal work exposure (deployment, regular assignment, or none) and (2) animal welfare importance and animal work exposure. To adjust for demographic characteristics associated with One Health knowledge, we used multivariable logistic regression. Results One-third of nonveterinary officers reported encountering animals during deployment, and 65% reported that animal welfare was very or extremely important. We found no difference in One Health knowledge between nonveterinary officers who participated in deployments involving animals and nonveterinary officers who had no work exposure to animals (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 1.11; 95% CI, 0.71-1.75). Nonveterinary officers who participated in animal-related public health activities during regular assignment were more likely to have One Health knowledge than nonveterinary officers who had no work exposure to animals (aOR = 7.88; 95% CI, 5.36-11.59). Conclusions One Health knowledge and awareness should be further explored in the current US public health workforce to identify training needs for emergency preparedness and other collaborative opportunities.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Megan Doerr ◽  
Jennifer K Wagner

Abstract The number and size of existing research studies with massive databases and biosample repositories that could be leveraged for public health response against SARS-CoV-2 (or other infectious disease pathogens) are unparalleled in history. What risks are posed by coopting research infrastructure—not just data and samples but also participant recruitment and contact networks, communications, and coordination functions—for public health activities? The case of the Seattle Flu Study highlights the general challenges associated with utilizing research infrastructure for public health response, including the legal and ethical considerations for research data use, the return of the results of public health activities relying upon research resources to unwitting research participants, and the possible impacts of public health reporting mandates on future research participation. While research, including public health research, is essential during a pandemic, careful consideration should be given to distinguishing and balancing the ethical mandates of public health activities against the existing ethical responsibilities of biomedical researchers.


2010 ◽  
Vol 103 (9) ◽  
pp. 882-886 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roque Miramontes ◽  
Lauren Lambert ◽  
Maryam B. Haddad ◽  
Valerie Boaz ◽  
Stephen Hawkins ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (S1) ◽  
pp. 128-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca E. Ford-Paz ◽  
Catherine DeCarlo Santiago ◽  
Claire A. Coyne ◽  
Claudio Rivera ◽  
Sisi Guo ◽  
...  

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