Analysis of submissions to the EU’s public consultation on tobacco traceability and security features

BackgroundThe Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products requires all parties to establish a tobacco track and trace (T&T) system. In 2016, the European Commission held a public consultation on T&T implementation where parties were asked to respond online to 22 multiple-choice questions and were given additional opportunities to leave comments. In May 2019, the European Union’s (EU) T&T system became operational. This paper explores tobacco industry influence over and policy positions within the consultation process.MethodsWe identified consultation respondents and investigated any financial links with the tobacco industry and if these were transparent. Respondent’s answers to the consultation’s multiple-choice questions were collated to explore whether industry-linked respondents held the same policy positions as transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). Associations between policy positions and respondent’s financial link status were tested using χ2 and Cranmer’s V tests.FindingsOf the 197 consultation respondents identified, 131 (66.4%) had financial links to the industry; 29 (22.1%) were not transparent about these links. A large number of trade associations responded (87), the majority of which (74/87) had financial links to the industry. There was a clear divide in the policy preferences of respondents with and without a financial link. Collectively, respondents with a financial link supported an industry-operated T&T solution.ConclusionsThere was an extensive lobbying effort by the tobacco industry over the EU’s T&T system, with TTCs’ interests being represented repeatedly through multiple trade associations. The transparency requirements regarding consultation respondents’ affiliations with relevant stakeholders (eg, tobacco manufacturers) should be improved for future consultations.

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Analysis of submissions to the EU’s public consultation on tobacco traceability and security features

European Journal of Public Health ◽

10.1093/eurpub/ckaa165.676 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 30 (Supplement_5) ◽

Author(s):

A Gallagher ◽

K A Evans-Reeves ◽

A B Gilmore ◽

A Joshi

Keyword(s):

European Commission ◽

Tobacco Industry ◽

Public Consultation ◽

Multiple Choice Questions ◽

Consultation Process ◽

Trade Associations ◽

Policy Positions ◽

Illicit Trade ◽

Lobbying Effort ◽

T System

Abstract Background The Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires all Parties to establish a tobacco track and trace (T&T) system. In 2016, the European Commission held a public consultation on T&T implementation in which interested parties were asked to respond online to 22 multiple-choice questions and were given additional opportunities to leave comments if desired. In May 2019, the EU's T&T system became operational. This paper explores tobacco industry influence over and policy positions within the consultation process. Methods The Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires all Parties to establish a tobacco track and trace (T&T) system. In 2016, the European Commission held a public consultation on T&T implementation in which interested parties were asked to respond online to 22 multiple-choice questions and were given additional opportunities to leave comments if desired. In May 2019, the EU's T&T system became operational. This paper explores tobacco industry influence over and policy positions within the consultation process. Results Of the 197 consultation responses analysed, 131 (66.4%) had financial links to the tobacco industry. 89 respondents were trade associations, 74 of which were financially linked (33 had TTC members). 29 (22.1%) of the financially-linked respondents were not transparent about their links. There was a clear divide in the policy preferences of respondents with and without a financial link. Collectively, respondents with a financial link supported an industry-operated solution. Conclusions There was an extensive lobbying effort by the tobacco industry over the EU's T&T system, with TTCs' interests being represented repeatedly through multiple trade associations. The transparency requirements regarding consultation respondents' affiliations with relevant stakeholders (such as tobacco manufacturers) should be improved for future tobacco-related consultations. Key messages There was an extensive lobbying effort on the part of the tobacco industry Several respondents with financial links to the tobacco industry did not disclose these. Collectively, respondents with a financial link to the tobacco industry supported an industry-operated solution which would not have met the requirements of the ITP.

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Tracking and tracing the tobacco industry: potential tobacco industry influence over the EU’s system for tobacco traceability and security features

Tobacco Control ◽

10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2019-055094 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. tobaccocontrol-2019-055094 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Allen William Andrew Gallagher ◽

Anna B Gilmore ◽

Michael Eads

Keyword(s):

Tobacco Industry ◽

Data Repository ◽

The European Union ◽

Technical Standards ◽

Illicit Trade ◽

Eu Member States ◽

Philip Morris ◽

History Of ◽

Transnational Tobacco Companies ◽

T System

BackgroundSubsequent to the transnational tobacco companies’ (TTC) history of involvement in tobacco smuggling, the Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires that tobacco tracking and tracing (T&T) systems be established independent of the industry. In response, TTCs developed a T&T system, originally called Codentify, promoting it via an elaborate set of front groups to create a false impression of independence. The European Union (EU) is one of the first and largest jurisdictions to operationalise T&T. We explore how industry efforts to influence T&T have evolved.MethodsAnalysis of tobacco industry documents, policy documents, submissions to a relevant consultation and relationships between the tobacco industry and organisations proposed by it and approved by the European Commission to provide a data repository function within the EU’s T&T system.Findings17 months after TTCs sold Codentify to Inexto and Philip Morris International claimed Inexto was independent, leaked documents suggest TTCs and Inexto continued to have a financial and operational relationship. Inexto’s meetings with TTCs, engagement with EU Member States and promotion of industry-favoured technical standards suggest TTCs influenced Inexto’s activities, using the company to undermine EU T&T. The EU’s T&T system appears to be inconsistent with the ITP due to its ‘mixed’ governance and seven of eight organisations approved as data repository providers having pre-existing industry business links.ConclusionsTTC’s efforts to maximise their control and minimise external scrutiny of T&T systems seriously limit attempts to address tobacco smuggling. Countries implementing T&T should be alert to such efforts and should not replicate the EU system.

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The Politics of Global Tobacco Control

The Oxford Handbook of Global Health Politics ◽

10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190456818.013.38 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 659-683

Author(s):

Kelley Lee

Keyword(s):

Public Health ◽

Tobacco Control ◽

Tobacco Industry ◽

Control Policy ◽

World Health ◽

Health Issue ◽

Public Health Issue ◽

Illicit Trade ◽

Health Organization ◽

Transnational Tobacco Companies

This chapter examines the politics that has shifted tobacco control policy over the past three decades, from a long-neglected public health issue to a flagship global health issue supported by collective action by state and non-state actors. These efforts were spurred by the expansion of leading transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) into emerging markets, beginning in the 1960s, amid growing regulation and declining sales in traditional markets. By the 1990s tobacco use was steadily rising in the wake of the global expansion of the tobacco industry. The negotiation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) became the focus of intense political contestation between a powerful industry seeking to protect its commercial interests and an alarmed public health community. Since adoption of the FCTC in 2004, this political battle has shifted to its effective implementation in signatory states. This has included the eventual negotiation of the FCTC Protocol to Eliminate the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and continued efforts by the tobacco industry to sustain sales through a variety of political strategies.

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Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies

Tobacco Control ◽

10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054668 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 28 (e2) ◽

pp. e110-e118 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Eric Crosbie ◽

Stella Bialous ◽

Stanton A Glantz

Keyword(s):

Tobacco Industry ◽

Tobacco Products ◽

Illicit Trade ◽

Accountability System ◽

Philip Morris ◽

The Media ◽

Illicit Tobacco Trade ◽

Transnational Tobacco Companies ◽

Corporate Social ◽

Corporate Social Responsibility Reports

ObjectiveAnalyse the transnational tobacco companies’ (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol).MethodsReview of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods.ResultsFacing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments’ law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs’ claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade.ConclusionGovernments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.

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‘Both Sides of the Argument’? A critical review of existing evidence on the illicit trade in tobacco products in Canada

Tobacco Control ◽

10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054687 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 28 (e2) ◽

pp. e141-e147

Author(s):

Julia Smith ◽

Sheryl Thompson ◽

Kelley Lee

Keyword(s):

Tobacco Industry ◽

Grey Literature ◽

Evidence Base ◽

Complex Problem ◽

Primary Data ◽

Original Research ◽

Tobacco Products ◽

Illicit Trade ◽

Tobacco Control Policies ◽

Transnational Tobacco Companies

IntroductionThe illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP) is widely recognised as a substantial and complex problem in Canada. However, the independence of available data and quality of analyses remains unknown. Reliable and accurate data on the scale and causes of the problem are needed to inform effective policy responses.MethodsWe searched the scholarly and grey literature using keywords related to ITTP in Canada. We identified 26 studies published in English since 2008 that present original research drawing on primary data. We analysed these studies for their independence from the tobacco industry, methodology, findings and gaps in knowledge.ResultsThe study finds 42% of the literature reviewed has links to the tobacco industry. These studies provide insufficient methodological detail, present higher estimates of the volume of ITTP and attribute the causes to higher rates of tobacco taxation. The classification of all indigenous tobacco sales as illicit, by both industry linked and independent studies, contributes to overestimates and serves the interests of transnational tobacco companies. There is need for independent and comprehensive data on the ITTP in Canada over time, across population groups and geographies.ConclusionWhile there is evidence that the ITTP in Canada is a major and complex issue that requires effective tobacco control policies, there is a limited evidence base on which to develop such responses. This review finds industry-linked studies lack independence, employ biased methodologies and serve tobacco industry interests. Independent studies present more rigorous approaches, but primarily focus on youth and the province of Ontario.

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Illicit tobacco trade is ‘booming’: UK newspaper coverage of data funded by transnational tobacco companies

Tobacco Control ◽

10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2018-054902 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. tobaccocontrol-2018-054902 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Karen Evans-Reeves ◽

Jenny Hatchard ◽

Andy Rowell ◽

Anna B Gilmore

Keyword(s):

Media Coverage ◽

Tobacco Industry ◽

Third Parties ◽

Third Party ◽

Freedom Of Information ◽

Industry Funding ◽

Data Set ◽

Illicit Trade ◽

Illicit Tobacco Trade ◽

Transnational Tobacco Companies

BackgroundTransnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have heavily publicised their argument that standardised tobacco packaging will increase the illicit tobacco trade. Leaked Philip Morris International (PMI) documents suggest that the company may have intended to use third parties to promulgate this argument in the UK.MethodsWe examined articles in UK newspapers (1 April 2013 to 31 March 2015) from LexisNexis for presence and nature of tobacco industry data. We also examined documents released by Freedom of Information requests made to Scottish Councils for evidence of how PMI operationalised its third-party strategy.FindingsTwo-thirds of newspaper articles (63%, 99/157) mentioned a PMI consultant; 36% of which did not disclose this industry funding. Most articles mentioned counterfeit tobacco, illicit whites or both (72%, 113/157), while few (4%, 7/157) specifically mentioned tobacco industry illicit tobacco and none explained that the latter can include tobacco-company involvement. Freedom of Information documents revealed that the PMI consultant sought to build relationships with Trading Standards officers, conducted undercover test purchases (UTPs) in illicit tobacco ‘hotspots’ and may have promoted unrepresentative findings in the media. While the data set featured PMI data predominantly, other TTCs also engaged in third-party techniques to promulgate messages on illicit tobacco.InterpretationPMI engaged a third party, seemingly with the aim of securing media coverage on illicit tobacco positing that standardised packaging would worsen the problem. The predominant focus of articles which featured industry-funded data and information was on counterfeit tobacco despite official data showing tobacco-industry illicit tobacco as the most prevalent. Other jurisdictions considering the policy should anticipate that third parties will promote the illicit-trade argument.

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