scholarly journals Illicit tobacco trade is ‘booming’: UK newspaper coverage of data funded by transnational tobacco companies

2020 ◽  
pp. tobaccocontrol-2018-054902 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Evans-Reeves ◽  
Jenny Hatchard ◽  
Andy Rowell ◽  
Anna B Gilmore
Keyword(s):  
Media Coverage ◽  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Freedom Of Information ◽  
Industry Funding ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Illicit Trade ◽  
Illicit Tobacco Trade ◽  
Transnational Tobacco Companies

BackgroundTransnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have heavily publicised their argument that standardised tobacco packaging will increase the illicit tobacco trade. Leaked Philip Morris International (PMI) documents suggest that the company may have intended to use third parties to promulgate this argument in the UK.MethodsWe examined articles in UK newspapers (1 April 2013 to 31 March 2015) from LexisNexis for presence and nature of tobacco industry data. We also examined documents released by Freedom of Information requests made to Scottish Councils for evidence of how PMI operationalised its third-party strategy.FindingsTwo-thirds of newspaper articles (63%, 99/157) mentioned a PMI consultant; 36% of which did not disclose this industry funding. Most articles mentioned counterfeit tobacco, illicit whites or both (72%, 113/157), while few (4%, 7/157) specifically mentioned tobacco industry illicit tobacco and none explained that the latter can include tobacco-company involvement. Freedom of Information documents revealed that the PMI consultant sought to build relationships with Trading Standards officers, conducted undercover test purchases (UTPs) in illicit tobacco ‘hotspots’ and may have promoted unrepresentative findings in the media. While the data set featured PMI data predominantly, other TTCs also engaged in third-party techniques to promulgate messages on illicit tobacco.InterpretationPMI engaged a third party, seemingly with the aim of securing media coverage on illicit tobacco positing that standardised packaging would worsen the problem. The predominant focus of articles which featured industry-funded data and information was on counterfeit tobacco despite official data showing tobacco-industry illicit tobacco as the most prevalent. Other jurisdictions considering the policy should anticipate that third parties will promote the illicit-trade argument.

scholarly journals Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (e2) ◽  
pp. e110-e118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Crosbie ◽  
Stella Bialous ◽  
Stanton A Glantz
Keyword(s):  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Tobacco Products ◽  
Illicit Trade ◽  
Accountability System ◽  
Philip Morris ◽  
The Media ◽  
Illicit Tobacco Trade ◽  
Transnational Tobacco Companies ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
Corporate Social Responsibility Reports

ObjectiveAnalyse the transnational tobacco companies’ (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol).MethodsReview of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods.ResultsFacing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments’ law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs’ claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade.ConclusionGovernments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.

Illicit Cigarette Trade in Five South American Countries: A Gap Analysis for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (8) ◽  
pp. 1079-1086 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillermo Paraje
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Gap Analysis ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
South American ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Illicit Trade ◽  
Illicit Tobacco Trade ◽  
Latin American Countries

Abstract Introduction Because of its nature, it is very hard to measure illicit tobacco trade in any product. In the case of Latin American countries, there is scant information on the magnitude and characteristics of this cigarette trade. The goal of this article is to provide estimates on the evolution of the illicit cigarette trade in five South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Methods Gap analysis estimates for cigarette tax evasion/avoidance (a comparison on the evolution of the difference between registered cigarette sales and measured population consumption) are developed for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Nationally representative surveys, conducted regularly, are used to measure population consumption. Confidence intervals constructed by bootstrapping sample estimates are generated to statistically evaluate the evolution of the gap. Results Illicit cigarette trade has increased as a percentage of total sales in Brazil in recent years. In the case of Argentina, after a relative decrease between 2005 and 2009, it seems to have stabilized. There is no statistical evidence to argue that there has been an increase of illicit cigarette trade in Chile, Colombia, and Peru, despite substantial price increases in Chile and tax increase in both Colombia and Peru. Conclusions Using simple statistical methods, it is possible to assess the trend in illicit tobacco trade over time to better inform policy makers. Getting reliable and regular population consumption surveys can also help to track illicit tobacco trade. Claims by tobacco industry of a positive association between price/tax changes and illicit trade are unsubstantiated. Implications Evolution of illicit cigarette trade in five Latin American countries shows different trajectories, not in line with tobacco industry estimates, which highlight the importance of producing solid, independent estimates. There are inexpensive methodologies that can provide estimates of the evolution of the relative importance of illicit trade and can be used to inform policy makers.

Helpful Behavior and the Durability of Collaborative Ties

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sampsa Samila ◽  
Alexander Oettl ◽  
Sharique Hasan
Keyword(s):  
Active Agent ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Unexpected Death ◽  
Traditional Role ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Unique Data ◽  
Random Loss ◽  
Scientific Collaborations

Long-term collaborations are crucial in many creative domains. Although there is ample research on why people collaborate, our knowledge about what drives some collaborations to persist and others to decay is still emerging. In this paper, we extend theory on third-party effects and collaborative persistence to study this question. We specifically consider the role that a third party’s helpful behavior plays in shaping tie durability. We propose that when third parties facilitate helpfulness among their group, the collaboration is stronger, and it persists even in the third’s absence. In contrast, collaborations with third parties that are nonhelpful are unstable and dissolve in their absence. We use a unique data set comprising scientific collaborations among pairs of research immunologists who lost a third coauthor to unexpected death. Using this quasi-random loss as a source of exogenous variation, we separately identify the effect of third parties’ traditional role as an active agent of collaborative stability and the enduring effect of their helpful behavior—as measured by acknowledgments—on the persistence of the remaining authors’ collaboration. We find support for our hypotheses and find evidence that one mechanism driving our effect is that helpful thirds make their coauthors more helpful.

The Politics of Global Tobacco Control

2019 ◽  
pp. 659-683
Author(s):  
Kelley Lee
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Tobacco Control ◽  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Control Policy ◽  
World Health ◽  
Health Issue ◽  
Public Health Issue ◽  
Illicit Trade ◽  
Health Organization ◽  
Transnational Tobacco Companies

This chapter examines the politics that has shifted tobacco control policy over the past three decades, from a long-neglected public health issue to a flagship global health issue supported by collective action by state and non-state actors. These efforts were spurred by the expansion of leading transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) into emerging markets, beginning in the 1960s, amid growing regulation and declining sales in traditional markets. By the 1990s tobacco use was steadily rising in the wake of the global expansion of the tobacco industry. The negotiation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) became the focus of intense political contestation between a powerful industry seeking to protect its commercial interests and an alarmed public health community. Since adoption of the FCTC in 2004, this political battle has shifted to its effective implementation in signatory states. This has included the eventual negotiation of the FCTC Protocol to Eliminate the Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and continued efforts by the tobacco industry to sustain sales through a variety of political strategies.

‘Both Sides of the Argument’? A critical review of existing evidence on the illicit trade in tobacco products in Canada

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (e2) ◽  
pp. e141-e147
Author(s):  
Julia Smith ◽  
Sheryl Thompson ◽  
Kelley Lee
Keyword(s):  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Grey Literature ◽  
Evidence Base ◽  
Complex Problem ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Original Research ◽  
Tobacco Products ◽  
Illicit Trade ◽  
Tobacco Control Policies ◽  
Transnational Tobacco Companies

IntroductionThe illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP) is widely recognised as a substantial and complex problem in Canada. However, the independence of available data and quality of analyses remains unknown. Reliable and accurate data on the scale and causes of the problem are needed to inform effective policy responses.MethodsWe searched the scholarly and grey literature using keywords related to ITTP in Canada. We identified 26 studies published in English since 2008 that present original research drawing on primary data. We analysed these studies for their independence from the tobacco industry, methodology, findings and gaps in knowledge.ResultsThe study finds 42% of the literature reviewed has links to the tobacco industry. These studies provide insufficient methodological detail, present higher estimates of the volume of ITTP and attribute the causes to higher rates of tobacco taxation. The classification of all indigenous tobacco sales as illicit, by both industry linked and independent studies, contributes to overestimates and serves the interests of transnational tobacco companies. There is need for independent and comprehensive data on the ITTP in Canada over time, across population groups and geographies.ConclusionWhile there is evidence that the ITTP in Canada is a major and complex issue that requires effective tobacco control policies, there is a limited evidence base on which to develop such responses. This review finds industry-linked studies lack independence, employ biased methodologies and serve tobacco industry interests. Independent studies present more rigorous approaches, but primarily focus on youth and the province of Ontario.

Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement

2006 ◽  
Vol 58 (3) ◽  
pp. 446-477 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc L. Busch ◽  
Eric Reinhardt
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Selection Effect ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Early Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Party Support

Disputes filed at the World Trade Organization (WTO) are attracting a growing number of third parties. Most observers argue that their participation influences the institution's rulings. The authors argue that third parties undermine pretrial negotiations; their influence on rulings is conditioned by this selection effect. They test their hypotheses, along with the conventional wisdom, using a data set of WTO disputes initiated through 2002. Consistent with the authors' argument, they find that third-party participationlowersthe prospects for early settlement. Controlling for this selection effect, the evidence also suggests that third-party support increases the chances of a legal victory at the WTO.

War and Third-party Trade

2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nizan Feldman ◽  
Tal Sadeh
Keyword(s):  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Trade Policies ◽  
High Definition ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Dyadic Data ◽  
Business Partners ◽  
Fixed Effects Regression ◽  
Almost All

Few studies explain how wars affect trade with third parties. We argue that wartime trade policies should raise trade with friendly and enemy-hostile third parties but reduce trade with hostile and enemy-friendly third parties. At the same time, the private motivation of firms and households may be incompatible with national wartime trade policies and constrain the effectiveness of wartime trade policies. Our directed dyadic data set consists of almost all of the states from 1885 to 2000. Running a high definition fixed effects regression with two-way clustering of standard errors, we find that hostile third parties tended to reduce trade with a combatant state by roughly 30 percent. In addition, trade with third parties friendly to the enemy fell by a similar magnitude. In contrast, on average, war hardly affected trade with third parties because of substitution of war-ridden markets with third-party business partners.

scholarly journals Analysis of submissions to the EU’s public consultation on tobacco traceability and security features

2020 ◽  
pp. tobaccocontrol-2020-043875
Author(s):  
Allen William Andrew Gallagher ◽  
Karen Evans-Reeves ◽  
Ayush Joshi ◽  
Jenny Hatchard ◽  
Anna B Gilmore
Keyword(s):  
Tobacco Industry ◽  
Multiple Choice ◽  
Public Consultation ◽  
Multiple Choice Questions ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Trade Associations ◽  
Policy Positions ◽  
Illicit Trade ◽  
Transnational Tobacco Companies ◽  
T System

BackgroundThe Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products requires all parties to establish a tobacco track and trace (T&T) system. In 2016, the European Commission held a public consultation on T&T implementation where parties were asked to respond online to 22 multiple-choice questions and were given additional opportunities to leave comments. In May 2019, the European Union’s (EU) T&T system became operational. This paper explores tobacco industry influence over and policy positions within the consultation process.MethodsWe identified consultation respondents and investigated any financial links with the tobacco industry and if these were transparent. Respondent’s answers to the consultation’s multiple-choice questions were collated to explore whether industry-linked respondents held the same policy positions as transnational tobacco companies (TTCs). Associations between policy positions and respondent’s financial link status were tested using χ2 and Cranmer’s V tests.FindingsOf the 197 consultation respondents identified, 131 (66.4%) had financial links to the industry; 29 (22.1%) were not transparent about these links. A large number of trade associations responded (87), the majority of which (74/87) had financial links to the industry. There was a clear divide in the policy preferences of respondents with and without a financial link. Collectively, respondents with a financial link supported an industry-operated T&T solution.ConclusionsThere was an extensive lobbying effort by the tobacco industry over the EU’s T&T system, with TTCs’ interests being represented repeatedly through multiple trade associations. The transparency requirements regarding consultation respondents’ affiliations with relevant stakeholders (eg, tobacco manufacturers) should be improved for future consultations.

Policy Enforcement System for Inter-Organizational Data Sharing

2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 22-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mamoun Awad ◽  
Latifur Khan ◽  
Bhavani Thuraisingham
Keyword(s):  
Data Mining ◽  
Data Sharing ◽  
Information Loss ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Policy Enforcement ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Amount Of Information ◽  
Statistical Report ◽  
Releasing Factors

Sharing data among organizations plays an important role in security and data mining. In this paper, the authors describe a Data Sharing Miner and Analyzer (DASMA) system that simulates data sharing among N organizations. Each organization has its own enforced policy. The N organizations share their data based on trusted third party. The system collects the released data from each organization, processes it, mines it, and analyzes the results. Sharing in DASMA is based on trusted third parties. However, organizations may encode some attributes, for example. Each organization has its own policy represented in XML format. This policy states what attributes can be released, encoded, and randomized. DASMA processes the data set and collects the data, combines it, and prepares it for mining. After mining, a statistical report is produced stating the similarities between mining with data sharing and mining without sharing. The authors test, apply data sharing, enforce policy, and analyze the results of two separate datasets in different domains. The results indicate a fluctuation on the amount of information loss using different releasing factors.

Intervention in Conflicts from a Network Perspective

2012 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 314-340 ◽  
Author(s):  
Renato Corbetta ◽  
Keith A. Grant
Keyword(s):  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Dyadic Relationships ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Interstate Conflicts ◽  
Events Data ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes ◽  
Structural Theories ◽  
Hostility Scale

Whether neutral or on the side of a combatant, third-party states’ intervention in ongoing interstate conflicts is a triadic phenomenon which involves ties between a joining state and the two originators of the dispute. Existing studies on this topic have failed to fully capture the triadic nature of intervention, preferring instead to focus either on the joiner’s motivations or on the distinct dyadic relationships between joiners and the two separate combatants. Building on classic structural theories of triadic balance and on prior work by Maoz et al. (2007), in this article we address the triadic aspect of both mediation and “joining behavior”. The nature of the triadic relations among disputants and third parties influences not just the likelihood of intervention, but also the type of intervention. When triadic relations are unbalanced, third parties are more likely to intervene as intermediaries. On the contrary, when triadic relations are balanced, third parties are more likely to intervene in a partisan manner. We explore our main hypotheses by constructing a triadic data set that combines Corbetta and Dixon’s (2005) data on partisan third-party interventions and Frazier and Dixon’s (2006) data on neutral (intermediary) interventions in militarized interstate disputes with a friendship–hostility scale extracted from international events data (IDEA and COPDAB).

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