scholarly journals Memoranda of understanding: a tobacco industry strategy to undermine illicit tobacco trade policies

2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (e2) ◽  
pp. e110-e118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Crosbie ◽  
Stella Bialous ◽  
Stanton A Glantz

ObjectiveAnalyse the transnational tobacco companies’ (TTCs) memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on illicit trade and how they could undermine the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol).MethodsReview of tobacco industry documents and websites, reports, news and media items using standard snowball search methods.ResultsFacing increasing pressure from governments and the FCTC to address illicit tobacco trade during the late 1990s, TTCs entered into voluntary partnerships embodied in MoUs with governments’ law enforcement and customs agencies. One of the earliest known MoUs was between Philip Morris International and Italy in 1999. TTCs agreed among themselves to establish MoUs individually but use the Italian MoU as a basis to establish similar connections with other governments to pre-empt more stringent regulation of illicit trade. TTCs report to have signed over 100 MoUs since 1999, and promote them on their websites, in Corporate Social Responsibility reports and in the media as important partnerships to combat illicit tobacco trade. There is no evidence to support TTCs’ claims that these MoUs reduce illicit trade. The terms of these MoUs are rarely made public. MoUs are non-transparent partnerships between government agencies and TTCs, violating FCTC Article 5.3 and the Protocol. MoUs are not legally binding so do not create an accountability system or penalties for non-compliance, rendering them ineffective at controlling illicit trade.ConclusionGovernments should reject TTC partnerships through MoUs and instead ratify and implement the FCTC and the Protocol to effectively address illicit trade in tobacco products.

2021 ◽  
pp. tobaccocontrol-2020-055837
Author(s):  
Benoît Gomis ◽  
Allen William Andrew Gallagher ◽  
Andy Rowell ◽  
Anna B Gilmore

BackgroundPrevious research has outlined transnational tobacco company (TTC) efforts to undermine implementation of the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products (Protocol) and evidence of ongoing TTC complicity in the illicit tobacco trade (ITT). However, the industry’s views on the Protocol and role in its development are not well understood.MethodsSystematic searching and analysis of leaked documents—approximately 15 000 from British American Tobacco (BAT) and 35 from Philip Morris International, triangulated via searches of online resources and interviews with five stakeholders across academia, international organisations, governments, civil society and the private sector.FindingsEvidence indicates that after privately viewing the Protocol as a significant threat (2003), BAT worked to influence its content, while publicly signalling support for it (2007–2012), and was largely satisfied with the final text. BAT successfully pushed for a non-prescriptive text which enabled further country-level TTC influence during the Protocol’s implementation phase. The final text also reflected other BAT policy preferences, including preventing outright bans on duty-free sales and intermingling, and making it difficult to sanction and hold tobacco companies accountable for ongoing involvement in the ITT. TTC representatives were present during early Protocol negotiations, despite rules against this, and BAT obtained draft texts before they were public and paid at least one delegate to support its position.ConclusionsBAT’s primary interest in shaping the Protocol was to minimise its financial and legal costs for BAT while maximising potential costs to small competitors. These findings raise concern about the Protocol’s ability to control the ITT, particularly given TTCs’ intention to influence ongoing national implementation. An effective Protocol is vital to controlling both the ITT and ongoing tobacco industry involvement in it and, in turn, governments’ ability to increase tobacco taxes and thereby save lives.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (e2) ◽  
pp. e141-e147
Author(s):  
Julia Smith ◽  
Sheryl Thompson ◽  
Kelley Lee

IntroductionThe illicit trade in tobacco products (ITTP) is widely recognised as a substantial and complex problem in Canada. However, the independence of available data and quality of analyses remains unknown. Reliable and accurate data on the scale and causes of the problem are needed to inform effective policy responses.MethodsWe searched the scholarly and grey literature using keywords related to ITTP in Canada. We identified 26 studies published in English since 2008 that present original research drawing on primary data. We analysed these studies for their independence from the tobacco industry, methodology, findings and gaps in knowledge.ResultsThe study finds 42% of the literature reviewed has links to the tobacco industry. These studies provide insufficient methodological detail, present higher estimates of the volume of ITTP and attribute the causes to higher rates of tobacco taxation. The classification of all indigenous tobacco sales as illicit, by both industry linked and independent studies, contributes to overestimates and serves the interests of transnational tobacco companies. There is need for independent and comprehensive data on the ITTP in Canada over time, across population groups and geographies.ConclusionWhile there is evidence that the ITTP in Canada is a major and complex issue that requires effective tobacco control policies, there is a limited evidence base on which to develop such responses. This review finds industry-linked studies lack independence, employ biased methodologies and serve tobacco industry interests. Independent studies present more rigorous approaches, but primarily focus on youth and the province of Ontario.


2020 ◽  
pp. tobaccocontrol-2018-054902 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Evans-Reeves ◽  
Jenny Hatchard ◽  
Andy Rowell ◽  
Anna B Gilmore

BackgroundTransnational tobacco companies (TTCs) have heavily publicised their argument that standardised tobacco packaging will increase the illicit tobacco trade. Leaked Philip Morris International (PMI) documents suggest that the company may have intended to use third parties to promulgate this argument in the UK.MethodsWe examined articles in UK newspapers (1 April 2013 to 31 March 2015) from LexisNexis for presence and nature of tobacco industry data. We also examined documents released by Freedom of Information requests made to Scottish Councils for evidence of how PMI operationalised its third-party strategy.FindingsTwo-thirds of newspaper articles (63%, 99/157) mentioned a PMI consultant; 36% of which did not disclose this industry funding. Most articles mentioned counterfeit tobacco, illicit whites or both (72%, 113/157), while few (4%, 7/157) specifically mentioned tobacco industry illicit tobacco and none explained that the latter can include tobacco-company involvement. Freedom of Information documents revealed that the PMI consultant sought to build relationships with Trading Standards officers, conducted undercover test purchases (UTPs) in illicit tobacco ‘hotspots’ and may have promoted unrepresentative findings in the media. While the data set featured PMI data predominantly, other TTCs also engaged in third-party techniques to promulgate messages on illicit tobacco.InterpretationPMI engaged a third party, seemingly with the aim of securing media coverage on illicit tobacco positing that standardised packaging would worsen the problem. The predominant focus of articles which featured industry-funded data and information was on counterfeit tobacco despite official data showing tobacco-industry illicit tobacco as the most prevalent. Other jurisdictions considering the policy should anticipate that third parties will promote the illicit-trade argument.


2019 ◽  
pp. tobaccocontrol-2019-055094 ◽  
Author(s):  
Allen William Andrew Gallagher ◽  
Anna B Gilmore ◽  
Michael Eads

BackgroundSubsequent to the transnational tobacco companies’ (TTC) history of involvement in tobacco smuggling, the Illicit Trade Protocol (ITP) requires that tobacco tracking and tracing (T&T) systems be established independent of the industry. In response, TTCs developed a T&T system, originally called Codentify, promoting it via an elaborate set of front groups to create a false impression of independence. The European Union (EU) is one of the first and largest jurisdictions to operationalise T&T. We explore how industry efforts to influence T&T have evolved.MethodsAnalysis of tobacco industry documents, policy documents, submissions to a relevant consultation and relationships between the tobacco industry and organisations proposed by it and approved by the European Commission to provide a data repository function within the EU’s T&T system.Findings17 months after TTCs sold Codentify to Inexto and Philip Morris International claimed Inexto was independent, leaked documents suggest TTCs and Inexto continued to have a financial and operational relationship. Inexto’s meetings with TTCs, engagement with EU Member States and promotion of industry-favoured technical standards suggest TTCs influenced Inexto’s activities, using the company to undermine EU T&T. The EU’s T&T system appears to be inconsistent with the ITP due to its ‘mixed’ governance and seven of eight organisations approved as data repository providers having pre-existing industry business links.ConclusionsTTC’s efforts to maximise their control and minimise external scrutiny of T&T systems seriously limit attempts to address tobacco smuggling. Countries implementing T&T should be alert to such efforts and should not replicate the EU system.


Thorax ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 76 (1) ◽  
pp. 89-91 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony A Laverty ◽  
Christopher Millett ◽  
Nicholas S Hopkinson ◽  
Filippos T Filippidis

Standardised packaging of tobacco products is intended to reduce the appeal of smoking, but the tobacco industry claims this increases illicit trade. We examined the percentage of people reporting being offered illicit cigarettes before and after full implementation of standardised packaging in the UK, Ireland and France and compared this to other European Union countries. Reported ever illicit cigarette exposure fell from 19.8% to 18.1% between 2015 and 2018 in the three countries fully implementing the policy, and from 19.6% to 17.0% in control countries (p for difference=0.320). Standardised packaging does not appear to increase the availability of illicit cigarettes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (Suppl 1) ◽  
pp. s41-s47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karma McKelvey ◽  
Lucy Popova ◽  
Minji Kim ◽  
Benjamin W Chaffee ◽  
Maya Vijayaraghavan ◽  
...  

BackgroundBeginning in the 1960s in the USA and globally since 1998, tobacco companies have beenaggressively promoting heated tobacco products (HTP). In 2016, Philip Morris International (PMI) applied to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seeking authorisation to market their IQOS HTP system and flavoured ‘HeatSticks’ in the USA as a modified-risk tobacco product (MRTP).MethodsWe systematically evaluated the publicly available data PMI submitted to FDA in its MRTP application to determine whether PMI’s IQOS product meets the US Tobacco Control Act’s standard for MRTP claims. We examined whether PMI provided sufficient data showing tobacco users will not initiate with IQOS, that youth will not misperceive the MRTP-related claims being made concerning IQOS, and how youth perceive health risks associated with IQOS.ResultsPMI’s own studies failed to provide evidence that youth, including non-users and former users, will not find IQOS appealing, will not initiate use of IQOS and will not perceive these products as risk-free. Further, PMI did not refer to independent studies conducted among adolescents which could influence their conclusions. Finally, their studies suffered from design and implementation flaws and cannot be relied on to support the proffered claims.ConclusionPMI’s own data and available evidence from scientific studies conducted independent of the tobacco industry regarding how novel tobacco products are currently being marketed suggest that introduction of IQOS will result in adolescent and young adult non-users initiating tobacco use with IQOS and could also increase poly-use of IQOS along with other tobacco products.


Author(s):  
Jamshaid Iqbal ◽  
Sajjad Hussain ◽  
Khalid Khan

Corporate Social Responsibility is perceived as a major component of contemporary business policies. It is considered as a significant tool for business promotion and survival in the 21st century.  The ideas of CSR (Welfare) and the business model, tobacco companies create a contradictory concept as it kills one-half of its chain users. Tobacco companies are strictly prohibited by international and local laws from the promotion of their products. In order to cope up with such strict laws, they start social initiatives. Hence, they take help from the idea of CSR.  Through CSR they earned a soft image and entered in politics to influence public policy in their favor. This paper is an effort to discuss the real situation behind CSR initiatives of tobacco industry in Pakistan. Annual reports of Philip Morris Pakistan and Pakistan Tobacco Company are analyzed. Interviews of local companies’ owners or officials, research papers, newspaper articles and related sites have been investigated to get the conclusion. Resultantly, this paper emphasizes on the CSR regulations and centralization.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (e2) ◽  
pp. e126-e132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wayne Gao ◽  
Mattia Sanna ◽  
J Robert Branston ◽  
Hung-Yi Chiou ◽  
Yi-Hua Chen ◽  
...  

IntroductionThis study aims to analyse the non-tax-induced price increasing strategies adopted by tobacco industry in Taiwan, a high-income country with comprehensive tobacco control policies but low tobacco taxes and a declining cigarette market.MethodsUsing governmental tax, price and inflation data, we analysed cigarette sales volume, affordability, affordability elasticity of demand, market share, pricing and net revenue of the top five tobacco companies in Taiwan from 2011 to 2016 when no tax increases occurred.ResultsTotal revenue after tax grew significantly for all the major transnational tobacco companies between 2011 and 2016 at the expense of the state-owned Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Corporation. In terms of market share, Japan Tobacco (JT) was the leading company, despite experiencing a small decline, while British American Tobacco and Imperial Brands remained stable, and Philip Morris International increased from 4.7% to 7.0%. JT adopted the most effective pricing strategy by increasing the real price of its two most popular brands (Mevius and Mi-Ne) and, at the same time, doubling the sales of its cheaper and less popular brand Winston by leaving its nominal retail price unaltered.ConclusionsLow and unchanged tobacco taxes enable tobacco companies to use aggressive pricing and segmentation strategies to increase the real price of cigarettes without making them less affordable while simultaneously maintaining customers’ loyalty. It is crucial to continue monitoring the industry’s pricing strategies and to regularly increase taxes to promote public health and to prevent tobacco industry from profiting at the expense of government revenues.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Laverty ◽  
Christopher Millett ◽  
Nicholas S Hopkinson ◽  
Filippos T Filippidis

Standardised packaging of tobacco products is intended to reduce the appeal of smoking, but the tobacco industry claims this increases illicit trade. We examined the percentage of people reporting being regularly offered illicit cigarettes before and after implementation of standardised packaging in the United Kingdom, Ireland and France and compared this to other European Union countries. Reported regular illicit tobacco exposure fell from 2.7% to 2.3% between 2015 and 2018 in the three countries implementing the policy, and from 2.3% to 1.7% in control countries (p for difference=0.320). Standardised packaging does not appear to increase the availability of illicit cigarettes.


2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (8) ◽  
pp. 1079-1086 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillermo Paraje

Abstract Introduction Because of its nature, it is very hard to measure illicit tobacco trade in any product. In the case of Latin American countries, there is scant information on the magnitude and characteristics of this cigarette trade. The goal of this article is to provide estimates on the evolution of the illicit cigarette trade in five South American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Methods Gap analysis estimates for cigarette tax evasion/avoidance (a comparison on the evolution of the difference between registered cigarette sales and measured population consumption) are developed for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. Nationally representative surveys, conducted regularly, are used to measure population consumption. Confidence intervals constructed by bootstrapping sample estimates are generated to statistically evaluate the evolution of the gap. Results Illicit cigarette trade has increased as a percentage of total sales in Brazil in recent years. In the case of Argentina, after a relative decrease between 2005 and 2009, it seems to have stabilized. There is no statistical evidence to argue that there has been an increase of illicit cigarette trade in Chile, Colombia, and Peru, despite substantial price increases in Chile and tax increase in both Colombia and Peru. Conclusions Using simple statistical methods, it is possible to assess the trend in illicit tobacco trade over time to better inform policy makers. Getting reliable and regular population consumption surveys can also help to track illicit tobacco trade. Claims by tobacco industry of a positive association between price/tax changes and illicit trade are unsubstantiated. Implications Evolution of illicit cigarette trade in five Latin American countries shows different trajectories, not in line with tobacco industry estimates, which highlight the importance of producing solid, independent estimates. There are inexpensive methodologies that can provide estimates of the evolution of the relative importance of illicit trade and can be used to inform policy makers.


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