One-Round Attribute-Based Key Exchange in the Multi-Party Setting

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (06) ◽  
pp. 725-742 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yangguang Tian ◽  
Guomin Yang ◽  
Yi Mu ◽  
Shiwei Zhang ◽  
Kaitai Liang ◽  
...  

Attribute-based authenticated key exchange (AB-AKE) is a useful primitive that allows a group of users to establish a shared secret key and at the same time enables fine-grained access control. A straightforward approach to design an AB-AKE protocol is to extend a key exchange protocol using an attribute-based authentication technique. However, insider security is a challenge security issue for AB-AKE in the multi-party setting and cannot be solved using the straightforward approach. In addtion, many existing key exchange protocols for the multi-party setting (e.g., the well-known Burmester-Desmedt protocol) require multiple broadcast rounds to complete the protocol. In this paper, we propose a novel one-round attribute-based key exchange (OAKE) protocol in the multi-party setting. We define the formal security models, including session key security, insider security and user privacy, for OAKE, and prove the security of the proposed protocol under some standard assumptions in the random oracle model.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Parhat Abla

Group key exchange schemes allow group members to agree on a session key. Although there are many works on constructing group key exchange schemes, but most of them are based on algebraic problems which can be solved by quantum algorithms in polynomial time. Even if several works considered lattice based group key exchange schemes, believed to be post-quantum secure, but only in the random oracle model. In this work, we propose a group key exchange scheme based on ring learning with errors problem. On contrast to existing schemes, our scheme is proved to be secure in the standard model. To achieve this, we define and instantiate multi-party key reconciliation mechanism. Furthermore, using known compiler with lattice based signature schemes, we can achieve authenticated group key exchange with postquantum security.


Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (10) ◽  
pp. 1853
Author(s):  
José Ignacio Escribano Pablos ◽  
María Isabel González Vasco ◽  
Misael Enrique Marriaga ◽  
Ángel Luis Pérez del Pozo

A group authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocol allows a set of parties belonging to a certain designated group to agree upon a common secret key through an insecure communication network. In the last few years, many new cryptographic tools have been specifically designed to thwart attacks from adversaries which may have access to (different kinds of) quantum computation resources. However, few constructions for group key exchange have been put forward. Here, we propose a four-round GAKE which can be proven secure under widely accepted assumptions in the Quantum Random Oracle Model. Specifically, we integrate several primitives from the so-called Kyber suite of post-quantum tools in a (slightly modified) compiler from Abdalla et al. (TCC 2007). More precisely, taking as a starting point an IND-CPA encryption scheme from the Kyber portfolio, we derive, using results from Hövelmanns et al. (PKC 2020), a two-party key exchange protocol and an IND-CCA encryption scheme and prove them fit as building blocks for our compiled construction. The resulting GAKE protocol is secure under the Module-LWE assumption, and furthermore achieves authentication without the use of (expensive) post-quantum signatures.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junghyun Nam ◽  
Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo ◽  
Junghwan Kim ◽  
Hyun-Kyu Kang ◽  
Jinsoo Kim ◽  
...  

Protocols for password-only authenticated key exchange (PAKE) in the three-party setting allow two clients registered with the same authentication server to derive a common secret key from their individual password shared with the server. Existing three-party PAKE protocols were proven secure under the assumption of the existence of random oracles or in a model that does not consider insider attacks. Therefore, these protocols may turn out to be insecure when the random oracle is instantiated with a particular hash function or an insider attack is mounted against the partner client. The contribution of this paper is to present the first three-party PAKE protocol whose security is proven without any idealized assumptions in a model that captures insider attacks. The proof model we use is a variant of the indistinguishability-based model of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (2000), which is one of the most widely accepted models for security analysis of password-based key exchange protocols. We demonstrated that our protocol achieves not only the typical indistinguishability-based security of session keys but also the password security against undetectable online dictionary attacks.


2020 ◽  
Vol 62 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 287-293
Author(s):  
Felix Günther

AbstractSecure connections are at the heart of today’s Internet infrastructure, protecting the confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity of communication. Achieving these security goals is the responsibility of cryptographic schemes, more specifically two main building blocks of secure connections. First, a key exchange protocol is run to establish a shared secret key between two parties over a, potentially, insecure connection. Then, a secure channel protocol uses that shared key to securely transport the actual data to be exchanged. While security notions for classical designs of these components are well-established, recently developed and standardized major Internet security protocols like Google’s QUIC protocol and the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol version 1.3 introduce novel features for which supporting security theory is lacking.In my dissertation [20], which this article summarizes, I studied these novel and advanced design aspects, introducing enhanced security models and analyzing the security of deployed protocols. For key exchange protocols, my thesis introduces a new model for multi-stage key exchange to capture that recent designs for secure connections establish several cryptographic keys for various purposes and with differing levels of security. It further introduces a formalism for key confirmation, reflecting a long-established practical design criteria which however was lacking a comprehensive formal treatment so far. For secure channels, my thesis captures the cryptographic subtleties of streaming data transmission through a revised security model and approaches novel concepts to frequently update key material for enhanced security through a multi-key channel notion. These models are then applied to study (and confirm) the security of the QUIC and TLS 1.3 protocol designs.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth Alornyo ◽  
Kingsford Kissi Mireku ◽  
Mustapha Adamu Mohammed ◽  
Daniel Adu-Gyamfi ◽  
Michael Asante

AbstractKey-insulated encryption reduces the problem of secret key exposure in hostile setting while signcryption cryptosystem attains the benefits of digitally signing a ciphertext and public key cryptosystem. In this study, we merge the primitives of parallel key-insulation cryptosystem and signcryption with equality test to construct ID-based parallel key-insulated signcryption with a test for equality (ID-PKSET) in cloud computing. The construction prevent data forgery, data re-play attacks and reduces the leakage of secret keys in harsh environments. Our scheme attains the security property of existential unforgeable chosen message attack (EUF-CMA) and indistinquishable identity chosen ciphertext attack (IND-ID-CCA2) using random oracle model.


2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yousheng Zhou ◽  
Junfeng Zhou ◽  
Feng Wang ◽  
Feng Guo

A chaotic map-based mutual authentication scheme with strong anonymity is proposed in this paper, in which the real identity of the user is encrypted with a shared key between the user and the trusted server. Only the trusted server can determine the real identity of a user during the authentication, and any other entities including other users of the system get nothing about the user’s real identity. In addition, the shared key of encryption can be easily computed by the user and trusted server using the Chebyshev map without additional burdensome key management. Once the partnered two users are authenticated by the trusted server, they can easily proceed with the agreement of the session key. Formal security analysis demonstrates that the proposed scheme is secure under the random oracle model.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (05) ◽  
pp. 1950075
Author(s):  
Indivar Gupta ◽  
Atul Pandey ◽  
Manish Kant Dubey

The first published solution to key distribution problem is due to Diffie–Hellman, which allows two parties that have never communicated earlier, to jointly establish a shared secret key over an insecure channel. In this paper, we propose a new key exchange protocol in a non-commutative semigroup over group ring whose security relies on the hardness of Factorization with Discrete Logarithm Problem (FDLP). We have also provided its security and complexity analysis. We then propose a ElGamal cryptosystem based on FDLP using the group of invertible matrices over group rings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (5) ◽  
pp. 5526-5532

Key exchange protocols play a vital role in symmetric key cryptography. The transfer of private key through the secured medium is a challenging task because every day the intruders are evolved and the attacks are increasing constantly. The existing key exchange protocols such as Diffie-Hellman, Elgamal, and MQV, etc. are the old methods and many attacks happened on those protocols. That challenges demanding new protocol or methodology of transferring secret key between the parties. The paper proposes a new, secured, less computational overhead key exchange mechanism using short message service available in the cellular networks. GSM-SMS is a highly established secured channel and the research uses this facility to transfer the key between senders to a receiver of the symmetric key cryptosystem. The private key no need to reveal to third parties or even the receiver because the sender can directly communicate to the decryption system through the mobile SMS. After the decryption process, the secret key will be destroyed immediately. There is no possible attack during the key transfer and loss and error of the communication are very less.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Xuefei Cao ◽  
Lanjun Dang ◽  
Yingzi Luan ◽  
Wei You

In this paper, we propose a certificateless noninteractive key exchange protocol. No message exchange is required in the protocol, and this feature will facilitate the applications where the communication overhead matters, for example, the communications between the satellites and the earth. The public key certificate is removed as well as the key escrow problem using the certificateless public key cryptosystem. The security of the protocol rests on the bilinear Diffie–Hellman problem, and it could be proved in the random oracle model. Compared with previous protocols, the new protocol reduces the running time by at least 33.0%.


2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Furkan Aydin ◽  
Aydin Aysu ◽  
Mohit Tiwari ◽  
Andreas Gerstlauer ◽  
Michael Orshansky

Key exchange protocols and key encapsulation mechanisms establish secret keys to communicate digital information confidentially over public channels. Lattice-based cryptography variants of these protocols are promising alternatives given their quantum-cryptanalysis resistance and implementation efficiency. Although lattice cryptosystems can be mathematically secure, their implementations have shown side-channel vulnerabilities. But such attacks largely presume collecting multiple measurements under a fixed key, leaving the more dangerous single-trace attacks unexplored. This article demonstrates successful single-trace power side-channel attacks on lattice-based key exchange and encapsulation protocols. Our attack targets both hardware and software implementations of matrix multiplications used in lattice cryptosystems. The crux of our idea is to apply a horizontal attack that makes hypotheses on several intermediate values within a single execution all relating to the same secret, and to combine their correlations for accurately estimating the secret key. We illustrate that the design of protocols combined with the nature of lattice arithmetic enables our attack. Since a straightforward attack suffers from false positives, we demonstrate a novel extend-and-prune procedure to recover the key by following the sequence of intermediate updates during multiplication. We analyzed two protocols, Frodo and FrodoKEM , and reveal that they are vulnerable to our attack. We implement both stand-alone hardware and RISC-V based software realizations and test the effectiveness of the proposed attack by using concrete parameters of these protocols on physical platforms with real measurements. We show that the proposed attack can estimate secret keys from a single power measurement with over 99% success rate.


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