A STUDY OF A QUADRUPLE CO-EVOLUTIONARY MODEL AND ITS RECIPROCITY PHASE FOR VARIOUS PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (04) ◽  
pp. 401-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
JUN TANIMOTO
Keyword(s):  
Network Topology ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Network Evolution ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Exit Option ◽  
Updating Rule

We present and numerically investigate a quadruple co-evolutionary model for 2 × 2 Prisoner's Dilemma games which allows not only for agents to adopt strategy (Cooperation C or Defection D) and for network topology, but also for the probability of link rewiring that controls the speed of network evolution and the updating rule itself. The results of a series of simulations reveal that C agents in a coexisting phase increase their rewiring probability to avoid neighboring D agents' exploitation through the Game Exit Option. This evolutionary process leads most agents to adopt pairwise updating even though Imitation Max update adopted by all agents brings a higher payoff.

scholarly journals Punishment and Feedback Mechanism for the Evolution Game on Small-World Network Based on Varying Topology

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Yuntao Shi ◽  
Bo Liu ◽  
Xiaoliang Kou ◽  
Xiao Han
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Small World ◽  
Feedback Mechanism ◽  
Small World Network ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Updating Rule ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Evolution Game

We address the problem of the punishment and feedback mechanism for the evolution game on small-world network with varying topology. Based on the strategy updating rule, we propose a new punishment and feedback mechanism; that is, all the individuals of the network will play ann-round Prisoner’s Dilemma Game firstly and then, for the most defectors, their neighbors will punish them and break the connecting link with them and set up the new connecting link for themselves. The mechanism can make the degree of the whole network decrease. We find that the mechanism can help keep the cooperators surviving and make them avoid being wiped out by the defectors. With the mechanism being adopted, the number ofn-round Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) almost has no effect on the evolution game. Furthermore, the probability of the average connectingkand the scale of the network is related to the result of the evolution game.

ON LOCAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME WITH PARETO UPDATING RULE

2000 ◽  
Vol 11 (08) ◽  
pp. 1539-1544 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. AHMED ◽  
A. S. ELGAZZAR
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Small World ◽  
Small World Networks ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Regular Lattices ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Updating Rule ◽  
Erratic Behavior

Prisoner's Dilemma games with two and three strategies are studied. The corresponding replicator equations, their steady states and their asymptotic stability are discussed. Local Prisoner's Dilemma games are studied using Pareto optimality. As in the case with Nash updating rule, the existence of tit for tat strategy is crucial to imply cooperation even in one dimension. Pareto updating implies less erratic behavior since the steady state configurations are mostly fixed points or at most 2-cycle. Finally, Prisoner's Dilemma game is simulated on small-world networks which are closer to real systems than regular lattices. There are no significant changes compared to the results of the regular lattice.

A 2-stage strategy updating rule promotes cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (10) ◽  
pp. 108702 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiang-Sheng Fang ◽  
Ping Zhu ◽  
Run-Ran Liu ◽  
En-Yu Liu ◽  
Gui-Yi Wei
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Updating Rule

Rationality, Morality, and Exit

1992 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 418-431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktor J. Vanberg ◽  
Roger D. Congleton
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Simulation Experiment ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Alternative Programs ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Behavioral Disposition ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Tit For Tat ◽  
Exit Option

The morality and rationality issue is explored from an Axelrod-type perspective; that is, it is discussed in terms of recurrent-prisoner's-dilemma-type games and behavioral strategies or programs for playing them. We argue that intuitive notions of rationality and morality can be shown to be mutually compatible if two assumptions are made: (1) that morality is specified as a general behavioral disposition or program whose rationality is to be determined in comparison to alternative behavioral programs and (2) that the recurrent game is specified as a prisoner's dilemma game with an exit option. The results of a simulation experiment are presented, showing that a “moral program” (specified as one that never defects, but exits in response to an opponents defection) is successful in competition with a variety of alternative programs, including Tit for Tat.

Facial Likability and Smiling Enhance Cooperation, but Have No Direct Effect on Moralistic Punishment

2016 ◽  
Vol 63 (5) ◽  
pp. 263-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Mieth ◽  
Raoul Bell ◽  
Axel Buchner
Keyword(s):  
Conditional Probability ◽  
Direct Effect ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Abstract. The present study serves to test how positive and negative appearance-based expectations affect cooperation and punishment. Participants played a prisoner’s dilemma game with partners who either cooperated or defected. Then they were given a costly punishment option: They could spend money to decrease the payoffs of their partners. Aggregated over trials, participants spent more money for punishing the defection of likable-looking and smiling partners compared to punishing the defection of unlikable-looking and nonsmiling partners, but only because participants were more likely to cooperate with likable-looking and smiling partners, which provided the participants with more opportunities for moralistic punishment. When expressed as a conditional probability, moralistic punishment did not differ as a function of the partners’ facial likability. Smiling had no effect on the probability of moralistic punishment, but punishment was milder for smiling in comparison to nonsmiling partners.

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