Supply Chain Coordination Under Ramp-Type Price and Effort Induced Demand Considering Revenue Sharing Contract

2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (02) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
S. P. Sarmah
Keyword(s):  
Marginal Cost ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Distribution Channel ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Programming Technique ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Induced Demand ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Fuzzy Goal

In this paper, a revenue sharing contract is designed to coordinate a distribution channel where the demand of the product is ramp-type price and effort sensitive. It is shown that traditional revenue sharing contract does not coordinate the system. As an alternative, two new mechanisms are proposed (i) revenue sharing with coordinated effort of the retailer alone and (ii) both revenue and effort sharing contract. In addition, a crucial modification of revenue sharing fraction is also proposed. To enhance the applicability of revenue sharing contract, the contract parameters are determined by using bi-level multi-objective fuzzy goal programming technique where manufacturer sets the wholesale price greater than the marginal cost. Numerical examples are presented to illustrate all the models.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Stock- and Price-Dependent Selling Rates under Declining Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 2012 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subrata Saha ◽  
Sambhu Das ◽  
Manjusri Basu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Stackelberg Games ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Demand Rate ◽  
Time Price

We explore coordination issues of a two-echelon supply chain, consisting of a distributor and a retailer. The effect of revenue-sharing contract mechanism is examined under stock-time-price-sensitive demand rate. First, we investigate relationships between distributor and retailer under noncooperative distributor-Stackelberg games. Then we establish analytically that revenue sharing contact is able to coordinate the system and leads to the win-win outcomes. Finally, numerical examples are presented to compare results between the different models.

Research of Revenue Sharing Contract Model under the Linear Quality-Demand in Supply Chain

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 120-125
Author(s):  
Jun Hu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Quality Management ◽  
Linear Correlation ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Decision Variables

As quality management being of great importance on many companies increasingly, quality coordination has become the new one of supply chain coordination. When demand is in the linear correlation with quality in supply chain member, the traditional wholesale price has not coordinated the supply chain. In this paper, the revenue sharing contract is put forward under the linear quality demand and the coordination can be achieved through it. Also the decision variables such as price, quantity and quality are obtained.

scholarly journals Supply Chain Coordination under Inventory Inaccuracy with RFID Technology

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Quansheng Lei ◽  
Yin Zhang ◽  
Lingyu Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Economic Viability ◽  
Rfid Technology ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Dependent Demand

In this paper we consider a two-echelon supply chain under price-dependent demand market and we use RFID to eliminate the effect of inventory inaccuracy. Models are built to evaluate the economic viability and coordination conditions. We analyze two scenarios in which the supply chain is defined, the integrated one and the decentralized one, respectively. For the integrated, we compare the different supply chain revenue with and without RFID technology and then determine the optimal inventory decisions. For the decentralized, we mainly focus on the coordination mechanism by revenue sharing contract under Stackelberg game. By seeking appropriate contract parameters, the supply chain can finally be coordinated while all partners are better off. Furthermore, numerical examples are given to verify our proposition.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Coordinating Contracts for Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Price and Promotional Sensitive Demand

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 132
Author(s):  
Hooman Abdollahi ◽  
Mohammad Talooni
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Cost Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Promotional Effort ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

<p class="zhengwen"><span lang="EN-GB">In this paper three coordinating contracts in supply chain namely (i) revenue-sharing contract (ii) cost-sharing contract (iii) profit-sharing contract are proposed for two echelon supply chain coordination perspective under promotion and price sensitive demand. In our model buyer makes the promotional decision and undertakes the promotional sales effort cost. It is shown that in decentralized channel the results are sub-optimal. It is found analytically that the revenue-sharing contract coordinates pricing decision but not promotional decision for all values of the promotional effort cost. It is also found that the cost-sharing contract fails to coordinate channel. The profit-sharing contract is demonstrated to coordinate both the pricing and the promotional decisions in the channel.</span></p>

scholarly journals Three-level supply chain coordination of fresh agricultural products in the Internet of Things

2017 ◽  
Vol 117 (9) ◽  
pp. 1842-1865 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Yan ◽  
Xiao-hua Wu ◽  
Bing Ye ◽  
Yong-wang Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Internet Of Things ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract ◽  
The Internet Of Things

Purpose The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in the fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain, which can be coordinated through a revenue-sharing contract. The purpose of this paper is to make the three-level supply chain coordinate in IoT by considering the influence of FAP on market demand and costs of controlling freshness on the road. Design/methodology/approach A three-level FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT is regarded as the research object. This study improves the revenue-sharing contract, determines the optimal solution when the supply chain achieves maximum profit in three types of decision-making situations, and develops the profit distribution model based on the improved revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. Findings The improved revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT, as well as benefit all enterprises in the supply chain. Practical implications Resource utilization rate can be improved after coordinating the entire supply chain. Moreover, loss in the circulation process is reduced, and the circulation efficiency of FAPs is improved because of the application of IoT. The validity of the model is verified through a case analysis. Originality/value This study is different from other research in terms of the combination of supply chain coordination, FAPs, and radio frequency identification application in IoT.

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