COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN n-PERSON GAMES
2000 ◽
Vol 08
(05)
◽
pp. 503-523
◽
Keyword(s):
A solution of n-person games is proposed, based on the minimum deviation from statistical equilibrium subject to the constraints imposed by the group rationality and individual rationality. The new solution is compared with the Shapley value and von Neumann-Morgenstern's core of the game in the context of the 15-person game of passing and defeating resolutions in the UN Security Council involving five permanent members and ten nonpermanent members. A coalition classification, based on the minimum ramification cost induced by the characteristic function of the game, is also presented.
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
Vol 12
(4)
◽
pp. 93-111
2013 ◽
Vol 438
(11)
◽
pp. 4279-4295
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2020 ◽
Vol 13
◽
pp. 244-251
2019 ◽
Vol 7
(1)
◽
pp. 1-16
2017 ◽
Vol 19
(03)
◽
pp. 1750012
◽
2000 ◽
Vol 02
(04)
◽
pp. 249-257
◽