The Rationale for IPO Lockup Agreements: Agency or Signaling?

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (03) ◽  
pp. 1250013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fei Gao ◽  
Mazhar A. Siddiqi
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Control Agency ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Lockup Period

Most Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) feature share lockup agreements, which prohibit insiders and other pre-IPO shareholders from selling their shares for a specified period of time following IPO. We explore possible reasons why some IPO firms voluntarily agree to have a much longer lockup period than other firms. We find evidence that lockup agreements are used to control agency costs. Longer lockups are significantly related to inferior long-run returns and this relationship is stronger for firms that have less reputable underwriters. We find no evidence that lockup agreements are used to signal firm quality and we are unable to relate firm quality, as measured by long-run returns, to information asymmetry variables.

Moderating Effect of Information Asymmetry on the Signalling Role of IPO Lockup Provision

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 917-930
Author(s):  
Norliza Che Yahya ◽  
Ruzita Abdul Rahim
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Moderating Effect ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
True Value ◽  
Negative Impacts ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Lockup Period

This article examines the moderating effect of information asymmetry on the relationship between parameters of lockup provision and flipping activity of Malaysian initial public offerings (IPOs). While the main purpose of lockup provision is to promote commitment of major shareholders for the well-being of the IPO issuing companies at least throughout the lockup period, its role could also extend as a signalling device. Information asymmetry is prevalent in the context of IPOs because information on the issuing firms is normally very limited that the evaluation of the firms’ true value becomes difficult. This study postulates that the lockup provision has a greater influence on flipping activity in higher information asymmetry companies than in lower ones. Using data from 370 Malaysian IPOs issued from January 2000 to December 2012, the results of the multiple regression analyses show that both lockup ratio and lockup period have significantly negative impacts on flipping activities. Since lockup period is uniformly longer (1 year) prior to the 2008 Equity Guidelines revision, the results imply that investors have a greater tendency to flip during the post-2008 revision period when major shareholders are perceived to be less strongly accounted for their firms’ performance. The results also show that information asymmetry moderates the negative relationship between lockup provision and flipping activity, specifically, in regard to lockup period.

Initial Public Offerings in the CMU

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merritt B Fox
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Final Section ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Rating Agencies ◽  
Capital Markets Union ◽  
Preceding Discussion ◽  
Directors And Officers

This chapter begins by considering the especially severe information-asymmetry problem that plagues primary offerings of truly new securities. It then examines market-based solutions for these problems, the shortcomings of exclusive reliance on such solutions, and the rationale for having a government-designed affirmative-disclosure regime, whereby an issuer making an offering is required to answer certain questions. It also addresses the question of whether this regime should be imposed on all issuers making such offerings or only those that volunteer to be subjected to it. The remainder of the chapter considers the rationale for mandating the imposition of liability on issuers, issuer directors and officers, underwriters, dealers, and experts such as accountants or rating agencies when there have been material misstatements or material omissions of what was required to be disclosed. The final section briefly applies the preceding discussion to the efforts, as part of the Capital Markets Union, to increase the opportunities for European SMEs raise funds through public offerings.

scholarly journals An empirical study of IPO underpricing: Evidence from Chinese stock market

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 139-152 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tianxiang Xu ◽  
Yujie Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Study ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Chinese Stock Market ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
Different Characteristics

Initial public offerings, as one of the most important activities for firms, have raising massive amount of researches. Regarding China, the stock markets are experiencing a massive level of IPO underpricing, which leads to trillions of dollars leaved on the table. This study is conducted for the question why Chinese IPO are so heavily underpriced and the determinants of IPO underpricing, also the possibility of IPO be underpriced in China. We confirm again that Chinese IPOs are heavily underpriced and the average underpricing level is about 110%. Further, Chinese IPO will experience a negative short term return starting from 10 days after listing, and there are significantly different characteristics for state owned IPOs and private IPOs. This study finds that information asymmetry, proportion of state owned share and risk are the mainly determinants of IPO underpricing in China. Additionally, one of the biggest reason that Chinese initial public offering is underpriced so much is because of government participation, since we find that firms with larger proportion of government state owned shares will be more underpriced.

Stage financing and syndication in the IPO underpricing of venture-backed firms: Venture capital and IPO underpricing

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 289-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Awounou-N’dri Honorine ◽  
Dubocage Emmanuelle
Keyword(s):  
Venture Capital ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Initial Public Offerings ◽  
Capital Investment ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Public Offerings ◽  
Venture Capital Investment ◽  
Ipo Performance ◽  
The Impact

The article investigates the impact of stage financing and syndication practices on the underpricing level of venture-backed firms (VBFs) undertaking their initial public offerings (IPOs). This empirical study uses a unique hand-collected data set concerning more than 260 VBFs that went public on Euronext Paris and Alternext between 1997 and 2013. Our findings suggest a lower level of underpricing for firms backed by syndicated venture capital investment. Additionally, we find that the syndicate size is negatively associated with the level of underpricing. However, there is no evidence that stage financing has a significant impact. Syndication thus appears to be the only relevant mechanism to improve IPO performance (measured by the underpricing level), as it reduces agency costs and information asymmetry between the different stakeholders in an IPO process.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document