scholarly journals COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (01) ◽  
pp. 111-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
SERGIO CURRARINI ◽  
MARCO A. MARINI
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Form Game ◽  
Stable Coalition ◽  
Unanimity Game

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for the existence of a stable coalition structure in the "coalition unanimity" game of coalition formation, first defined by Hart and Kurz (1983) and more recently studied by Yi (1997, 2003). Our conditions are defined on the strategic form game used to derive the payoffs of the game of coalition formation. We show that if no synergies are generated by the formation of coalitions, a stable coalition structure always exists provided that players are symmetric and either the game exhibits strategic complementarity or, if strategies are substitutes, the best reply functions are contractions.

STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 (03) ◽  
pp. 1450006 ◽  
Author(s):  
YUKIHIKO FUNAKI ◽  
TAKEHIKO YAMATO
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Grand Coalition ◽  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Stable Coalition ◽  
Stability Concept

In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games.

scholarly journals Demand-aware traffic cooperation for self-organizing cognitive small-cell networks

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 155014771881728 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changhua Yao ◽  
Lei Zhu ◽  
Yongxing Jia ◽  
Lei Wang
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Main Idea ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Small Cell ◽  
Coalitional Game ◽  
Time Dimension ◽  
Small Cell Networks ◽  
Functional Value ◽  
Cell Networks ◽  
Self Organizing

This article investigates the problem of efficient spectrum access for traffic demands of self-organizing cognitive small-cell networks, using the coalitional game approach. In particular, we propose a novel spectrum and time two-dimensional Traffic Cooperation Coalitional Game model which aims to improve the network throughput. The main motivation is to complete the data traffics of users, and the main idea is to make use of spectrum resource efficiently by reducing mutual interference in the spectrum dimension and considering cooperative data transmission in the time dimension at the same time. With the approach of coalition formation, compared with the traditional binary order in most existing coalition formation algorithms, the proposed functional order indicates a more flexibly preferring action which is a functional value determined by the environment information. To solve the distributed self-organizing traffic cooperation coalition formation problem, we propose three coalition formation algorithms: the first one is the Binary Preferring Traffic Cooperation Coalition Formation Algorithm based on the traditional Binary Preferring order; the second one is the Best Selection Traffic Cooperation Coalition Formation Algorithm based on the functional Best Selection order to improve the converging speed; and the third one is the Probabilistic Decision Traffic Cooperation Coalition Formation Algorithm based on the functional Probabilistic Decision order to improve the performance of the formed coalition. The proposed three algorithms are proved to converge to Nash-stable coalition structure. Simulation results verify the theoretic analysis and the proposed approaches.

scholarly journals Coalition Formation Based Staffing Strategy Development

2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 430-435
Author(s):  
Mayuko Miyata ◽  
◽  
Shao-Chin Sung
Keyword(s):  
Staff Development ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Balance Of Power ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Strategy Development ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Staffing Strategy ◽  
Hedonic Coalition Formation ◽  
Stability Concepts

In this paper, we propose game theoretical models for developing staffing strategies, i.e., strategies which support managers’ decision making on hiring, head hunting, staff reassignment, and implementation of staff development policy in enterprises. Our staffing models are hedonic coalition formation games with newly proposed stability concepts calledinvitation based stabilities, in which players’ activities of changing their coalitions are motivated based on invitation from other coalitions. These stabilities capture behaviors of managers, employees, and contractors depending on the balance of power in business situations. We analyze the existence of stable coalition structures under invitation based stabilities, and provide several sufficient conditions with natural interpretations as staffing strategies.

scholarly journals Cooperative Games with Overlapping Coalitions

2010 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 179-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Chalkiadakis ◽  
E. Elkind ◽  
E. Markakis ◽  
M. Polukarov ◽  
N. R. Jennings
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Cooperative Games ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Coalitional Games ◽  
The Core ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Coalition Formation Process ◽  
The Social ◽  
Overlapping Coalitions

In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are associated with tasks, an agent may be involved in executing more than one task, and thus may distribute his resources among several coalitions. To tackle such scenarios, we introduce a model for cooperative games with overlapping coalitions—or overlapping coalition formation (OCF) games. We then explore the issue of stability in this setting. In particular, we introduce a notion of the core, which generalizes the corresponding notion in the traditional (non-overlapping) scenario. Then, under some quite general conditions, we characterize the elements of the core, and show that any element of the core maximizes the social welfare. We also introduce a concept of balancedness for overlapping coalitional games, and use it to characterize coalition structures that can be extended to elements of the core. Finally, we generalize the notion of convexity to our setting, and show that under some natural assumptions convex games have a non-empty core. Moreover, we introduce two alternative notions of stability in OCF that allow a wider range of deviations, and explore the relationships among the corresponding definitions of the core, as well as the classic (non-overlapping) core and the Aubin core. We illustrate the general properties of the three cores, and also study them from a computational perspective, thus obtaining additional insights into their fundamental structure.

Stable Coalition Structure of Patent Technologies

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-42
Author(s):  
Hyukseung Shin ◽  
Insuk Cheong
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Stable Coalition

COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (04) ◽  
pp. 613-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
JANA HAJDUKOVÁ
Keyword(s):  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Transferable Utility ◽  
New Models ◽  
Stability Definition ◽  
Preferences Over Sets

In this paper we give an overview of various methods used to study cooperation within a set of players. Besides the classical games with transferable utility and games without transferable utility, recently new models have been proposed: the coalition formation games. In these, each player has his own preferences over coalitions to which he could belong and the quality of a coalition structure is evaluated according to its stability. We review various definitions of stability and restrictions of preferences ensuring the existence of a partition stable with respect to a particular stability definition. Further, we stress the importance of preferences over sets of players derived from preferences over individuals and review the known algorithmic results for special types of preferences derived from the best and/or the worst player of a coalition.

Stochastic Approach for Determining Stable Coalition Structure

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (04) ◽  
pp. 1550009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elena Parilina ◽  
Artem Sedakov
Keyword(s):  
Markov Chain ◽  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Special Form ◽  
Stochastic Game ◽  
Coalition Structure ◽  
Stochastic Approach ◽  
Tu Games ◽  
Absorbing State ◽  
Stable Coalition ◽  
Definition Of

In this paper, we study TU-games with coalition structure and propose an approach for determining a stable coalition structure solving a stochastic game of a special form. Using a Nash equilibrium in this game, we draw an analogy between the stable coalition structure and an absorbing state in a Markov chain. In addition, we consider a case of restricted coalitions assuming that not all coalitions are feasible and extend the definition of the stable coalition structure to this case.

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