scholarly journals WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE

2007 ◽  
Vol 09 (03) ◽  
pp. 461-475 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAIDEEP ROY
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
The Other ◽  
Static Equilibrium ◽  
Common Interest ◽  
Rational Agents ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Speed Of Evolution

The paper studies a game of common interest played infinitely many times between two players, one being aspiration driven while the other being a myopic optimizer. It is shown that the only two long run stationary outcomes are the two static equilibrium points. Robustness of long run behavior is studied to show that whenever the optimizer is allowed to make small mistakes, players are able to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium point most of the time in the long run if the speed of evolution of aspirations is sufficiently fast. However, when only the aspiring player is allowed to make small mistakes, achieving coordination is inevitable and independent of the speed at which aspirations evolve.

Equilibrium points for three games based on the Poisson process

1993 ◽  
Vol 30 (03) ◽  
pp. 627-638
Author(s):  
M. T. Dixon
Keyword(s):  
Poisson Process ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Uniform Distribution ◽  
Arbitrary Number ◽  
Transition Matrix ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Time Limit ◽  
The Other ◽  
Player Game

An arbitrary number of competitors are presented with independent Poisson streams of offers consisting of independent and identically distributed random variables having the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The players each wish to accept a single offer before a known time limit is reached and each aim to maximize the expected value of their offer. Rejected offers may not be recalled, but they are passed on to the other players according to a known transition matrix. This paper finds equilibrium points for two such games, and demonstrates a two-player game with an equilibrium point under which the player with the faster stream of offers has a lower expected reward than his opponent.

Equilibrium points for three games based on the Poisson process

1993 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 627-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. T. Dixon
Keyword(s):  
Poisson Process ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Uniform Distribution ◽  
Arbitrary Number ◽  
Transition Matrix ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Time Limit ◽  
The Other ◽  
Player Game

An arbitrary number of competitors are presented with independent Poisson streams of offers consisting of independent and identically distributed random variables having the uniform distribution on [0, 1]. The players each wish to accept a single offer before a known time limit is reached and each aim to maximize the expected value of their offer. Rejected offers may not be recalled, but they are passed on to the other players according to a known transition matrix. This paper finds equilibrium points for two such games, and demonstrates a two-player game with an equilibrium point under which the player with the faster stream of offers has a lower expected reward than his opponent.

scholarly journals Evolution of COVID-19 Disease Using a One Prey-Two Predator Mode

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amila Sudu Ambegedara ◽  
Asini A. Konpola ◽  
Chathurika S. Gunasekara ◽  
Indika G. Udagedara
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Disease Transmission ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Optimization Method ◽  
The Other ◽  
Population Declines ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Uniqueness Of The Solution ◽  
Predator Model ◽  
The One

Mathematical modeling is used to understand the dynamics of transmission of infectious diseases such as COVID-19, SARS, Ebola, and Dengue among populations. In this work, a one prey-two predator model has been developed to understand the underlying dynamics of COVID-19 disease transmission. We considered the infected, recovered, and death populations with the fact that an infected person can be transformed into the recovered or death group assuming that the infected ones are the prey, and the other two populations are the two predators in the one prey-two predator model. It was found that the proposed model has four equilibrium points; the vanishing equilibrium point ( ), recovered and death-free equilibrium point ( ), recovered population-free equilibrium point ( ), and the death-free equilibrium point ( ). Stability analysis of the equilibrium points shows that except all the other equilibrium points are locally asymptotically stable. Global asymptotic stability of the recovered population-free equilibrium point and death-free equilibrium point are also analyzed. Moreover, the existence and uniqueness of the solution were proved. The parameters for the model are estimated from a data set that consists of the total number of infected, recovered, and dead populations worldwide in the year 2020 using the Nelder-Mead optimization method. When the time approaches infinity, the infected population converges to a constant value, the recovered population declines and reaches zero, and the death population attains a constant value. However, some modifications to the system are needed. In future work, measures such as health precautions, vaccinations are needed to be considered for the formulation of the mathematical model.

scholarly journals Dynamics of an Eco-Epidemic Predator–Prey Model Involving Fractional Derivatives with Power-Law and Mittag–Leffler Kernel

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 785
Author(s):  
Hasan S. Panigoro ◽  
Agus Suryanto ◽  
Wuryansari Muharini Kusumawinahyu ◽  
Isnani Darti
Keyword(s):  
Hopf Bifurcation ◽  
Fractional Derivative ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Power Law ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Essential Difference ◽  
Predator Prey ◽  
Predator Prey Model ◽  
Prey Model ◽  
Infected Prey

In this paper, we consider a fractional-order eco-epidemic model based on the Rosenzweig–MacArthur predator–prey model. The model is derived by assuming that the prey may be infected by a disease. In order to take the memory effect into account, we apply two fractional differential operators, namely the Caputo fractional derivative (operator with power-law kernel) and the Atangana–Baleanu fractional derivative in the Caputo (ABC) sense (operator with Mittag–Leffler kernel). We take the same order of the fractional derivative in all equations for both senses to maintain the symmetry aspect. The existence and uniqueness of solutions of both eco-epidemic models (i.e., in the Caputo sense and in ABC sense) are established. Both models have the same equilibrium points, namely the trivial (origin) equilibrium point, the extinction of infected prey and predator point, the infected prey free point, the predator-free point and the co-existence point. For a model in the Caputo sense, we also show the non-negativity and boundedness of solution, perform the local and global stability analysis and establish the conditions for the existence of Hopf bifurcation. It is found that the trivial equilibrium point is a saddle point while other equilibrium points are conditionally asymptotically stable. The numerical simulations show that the solutions of the model in the Caputo sense strongly agree with analytical results. Furthermore, it is indicated numerically that the model in the ABC sense has quite similar dynamics as the model in the Caputo sense. The essential difference between the two models is the convergence rate to reach the stable equilibrium point. When a Hopf bifurcation occurs, the bifurcation points and the diameter of the limit cycles of both models are different. Moreover, we also observe a bistability phenomenon which disappears via Hopf bifurcation.

scholarly journals Research of Trajectory Optimization Approaches in Synthesized Optimal Control

Symmetry ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 336
Author(s):  
Askhat Diveev ◽  
Elizaveta Shmalko
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Trajectory Optimization ◽  
Stable Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Control Object ◽  
Symbolic Regression ◽  
Optimal Location ◽  
Stable Equilibrium Point ◽  
Stabilization System

This article presents a study devoted to the emerging method of synthesized optimal control. This is a new type of control based on changing the position of a stable equilibrium point. The object stabilization system forces the object to move towards the equilibrium point, and by changing its position over time, it is possible to bring the object to the desired terminal state with the optimal value of the quality criterion. The implementation of such control requires the construction of two control contours. The first contour ensures the stability of the control object relative to some point in the state space. Methods of symbolic regression are applied for numerical synthesis of a stabilization system. The second contour provides optimal control of the stable equilibrium point position. The present paper provides a study of various approaches to find the optimal location of equilibrium points. A new problem statement with the search of function for optimal location of the equilibrium points in the second stage of the synthesized optimal control approach is formulated. Symbolic regression methods of solving the stated problem are discussed. In the presented numerical example, a piece-wise linear function is applied to approximate the location of equilibrium points.

scholarly journals Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Roberto Rozzi
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
The Other ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Stochastic Stability Analysis ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.

Subaltern mediators in the digital landscape

Target ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 319-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teresa Iribarren
Keyword(s):  
Cultural Capital ◽  
Web 2.0 ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Lingua Franca ◽  
Content Type ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The One ◽  
Digital Landscape

This article explores translational literary Web 2.0 practices and user-generated cultural creations on the Internet, focusing on video poetry that re-creates canonical poets’ bodies of work. It will be argued that the use of for-profit platforms like YouTube and Vimeo by indie creators and translators of video poetry favours the emergence of new translational attitudes, practices and objects that have positive but also contentious effects. One the one hand, these online mediators explore new poetic expressions and tend to make the most of the potential for dissemination of poetic heritage, providing visibility to non-hegemonic literatures. On the other hand, however, these translational digitally-born practices and creations by voluntary and subaltern mediators might reinforce the hegemonic position of large American Internet corporations at the risk of commodifying cultural capital, consolidating English as a lingua franca and perhaps, in the long run, even fostering a potentially monocultural and internationally homogeneous aesthetics.

Coördinatie tussen individuen en tussen teams: over het belang van inzicht in sociale dilemma's

2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjolein de Best-Waldhober ◽  
Carsten K.W. De Dreu ◽  
Daan van Knippenberg
Keyword(s):  
Term Structure ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Social Dilemma ◽  
The Other ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Turn Taking ◽  
Group Negotiation

Coordination between individuals and between teams: the importance of insight in social dilemmas Coordination between individuals and between teams: the importance of insight in social dilemmas Marjolein de Best-Waldhober, Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Daan van Knippenberg, Gedrag & Organisatie, Volume 17, June 2004, nr. 3, pp. 187-203. In the context of a social dilemma, in which turn taking serves collective outcomes and only in the long run self-interest and personal outcomes, we studied long-term coordination, i.e. the alternation of sacrifice to achieve maximum joint outcomes. In particular, we studied the differences between individuals and dyads (two person groups) in coordination situations. Recent studies that compared individual with group negotiation seem to lead to opposite predictions. One paradigm predicts groups will perform better, because they outweigh individuals cognitively. The other paradigm predicts individuals will perform better, because they tend to have less fear and greed than groups. Results from the current study primarily support the first explanation. Dyads were less influenced by the complexity of the situation structure than individuals, because they have a better understanding of the long term structure of the situation.

scholarly journals ENDOGENOUS BORROWING CONSTRAINTS AND WEALTH INEQUALITY

2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1413-1431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joydeep Bhattacharya ◽  
Xue Qiao ◽  
Min Wang
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Wealth Inequality ◽  
Borrowing Constraints ◽  
Initial Distribution ◽  
The Other ◽  
Capital Investments ◽  
Loan Default ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Human Capital Investments

This paper studies the evolution of wealth inequality in an economy with endogenous borrowing constraints. In the model economy, young agents need to borrow to finance human capital investments but cannot commit to repaying their loans. Creditors can punish defaulters by banishing them permanently from the credit market. At equilibrium, loan default is prevented by imposing a borrowing limit tied to the borrower's inheritance. The heterogeneity in inheritances translates into heterogeneity in borrowing limits: endogenously, some borrowers face a zero borrowing limit, and some are partly constrained, whereas others are unconstrained. Depending on the initial distribution of inheritances, it is possible that all lineages are attracted either to the zero-borrowing-limit steady state or to the unconstrained-borrowing steady state—long-run equality. It is also possible that some lineages end up in one steady state and the rest in the other—complete polarization.

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