Coördinatie tussen individuen en tussen teams: over het belang van inzicht in sociale dilemma's

2004 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marjolein de Best-Waldhober ◽  
Carsten K.W. De Dreu ◽  
Daan van Knippenberg

Coordination between individuals and between teams: the importance of insight in social dilemmas Coordination between individuals and between teams: the importance of insight in social dilemmas Marjolein de Best-Waldhober, Carsten K.W. De Dreu & Daan van Knippenberg, Gedrag & Organisatie, Volume 17, June 2004, nr. 3, pp. 187-203. In the context of a social dilemma, in which turn taking serves collective outcomes and only in the long run self-interest and personal outcomes, we studied long-term coordination, i.e. the alternation of sacrifice to achieve maximum joint outcomes. In particular, we studied the differences between individuals and dyads (two person groups) in coordination situations. Recent studies that compared individual with group negotiation seem to lead to opposite predictions. One paradigm predicts groups will perform better, because they outweigh individuals cognitively. The other paradigm predicts individuals will perform better, because they tend to have less fear and greed than groups. Results from the current study primarily support the first explanation. Dyads were less influenced by the complexity of the situation structure than individuals, because they have a better understanding of the long term structure of the situation.

2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (04) ◽  
pp. 491-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
William T. Lin ◽  
David S. Sun

Estimation of benchmark yield curve in developing markets is often influenced by liquidity concentration. Based on an affine term structure model, we develop a long run liquidity weighted fitting method to address the trading concentration phenomenon arising from horizon-induced clientele equilibrium as well as information discovery. Specifically, we employ arguments from models of liquidity concentration and benchmark security information. After examining time series behavior of price errors against our fitted model, we find results consistent with both the horizon and information hypotheses. Our evidence indicates that trading liquidity carries information effect in the long run, which cannot be fully captured in the short run. Trading liquidity plays a key role in long run term structure fitting. Markets for liquid benchmark government bond issues collectively form a long term equilibrium. Compared with previous studies, our results provide a robust and realistic characterization of the spot rate term structure and related price forecasting over time, which in turn help portfolio investment of fixed income and long run pricing of financial instruments.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferdinando Meacci

The aim of this paper is to focus, within Adam Smith’s system of thought, on the various aspects of the twofold link between the accumulation of capital and the demand for labor, on the one hand, and between an increasing population and increasing wages, on the other. This link is examined, first, in the light of the relationship between the principles of self-interest and competition; and, secondly, in support of the possibility (neglected by Smith) that the long-run supply of labor may fall short of the long-run demand for it. The paper’s main argument is that this possibility is peacefully implemented in advancing economies by the “uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition” which lies behind a continuous process of capital accumulation (including technical progress) along with the birth control techniques so widely used in our times.


2000 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Joseph Wallis

Government in America has gone through three distinct fiscal systems in the last two hundred years. Each system utilized a dominant revenue source, and had a distinctly active level of government. The changing structure of government by level seems to be related to changing revenue structures. When new taxes become important, the relative importance of each level of government changes. On the other hand, growth in the overall size of government is not directly related to the structure of revenues or the distribution of activity by level of government. Government growth is the result of long term commitments to provide education, transportation, social welfare services, old age security, and military forces.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara D’Arcangelo ◽  
Luciano Andreozzi ◽  
Marco Faillo

AbstractSocial dilemmas are mixed-motive games. Although the players have a common interest in maintaining cooperation, each may try to obtain a larger payoff by cooperating less than the other. This phenomenon received increased attention after Press and Dyson discovered a class of strategies for the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (extortionate strategies) that secure for themselves a payoff that is never smaller, but can be larger, than the opponent’s payoff. We conducted an experiment to test whether humans adopt extortionate strategies when playing a social dilemma. Our results reveal that human subjects do try to extort a larger payoff from their opponents. However, they are only successful when extortionate strategies are part of a Nash equilibrium. In settings where extortionate strategies do not appear in any Nash equilibrium, attempts at extortion only result in a breakdown of cooperation. Our subjects recognized the different incentives implied by the two settings, and they were ready to “extort” the opponent when allowed to do so. This suggests that deviations from mutually cooperative equilibria, which are usually attributed to players’ impatience, coordination problems, or lack of information, can instead be driven by subjects trying to reach more favorable outcomes.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yohsuke Murase ◽  
Seung Ki Baek

AbstractRepeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of neutral drift, and our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions.Author summaryHow to maintain cooperation among a number of self-interested individuals is a difficult problem, especially if they can sometimes commit error. In this work, we propose a strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game based on the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish others’ defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. These rules are not far from actual human behavior, and the resulting strategy guarantees three advantages: First, if everyone uses it, full cooperation is recovered even if error occurs with small probability. Second, the player of this strategy always never obtains a lower long-term payoff than any of the co-players. Third, if the co-players are unconditional cooperators, it obtains a strictly higher long-term payoff than theirs. Therefore, if everyone uses this strategy, no one has a reason to change it. Furthermore, our simulation shows that this strategy will become highly abundant over long time scales due to its robustness against the invasion of other strategies. In this sense, the repeated social dilemma is solved for an arbitrary number of players.


2007 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luis Oceja ◽  
Isabel Jiménez

In three experiments, participants were faced with a social dilemma in which they could benefit themselves, the group, or other group members as individuals. The results showed that participants who felt high empathy toward a certain individual allocated more resources to the target of empathy, but without reducing the collective good. Then, we adapted the measure of empathy developed by Batson and colleagues (Batson, Ahmad, et al., 1999; Batson, Batson, et al., 1995) to the Spanish context. The results of Experiment 3 supported the existence of a new process: awareness of other individuals present in the social dilemma. It is proposed that this process is independent of those typically studied in research of this field: self-interest, group identification, and the empathy for a specific individual.


2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 385-400
Author(s):  
Ferdinando Meacci

The aim of this paper is to focus, within Adam Smith’s system of thought, on the various aspects of the twofold link between the accumulation of capital and the demand for labor, on the one hand, and between an increasing population and increasing wages, on the other. This link is examined, first, in the light of the relationship between the principles of self-interest and competition; and, second, in support of the possibility that the long-run supply of labor may fall short of the long-run demand for it. The paper’s main argument is that this possibility is peacefully implemented in advancing economies by the “uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition,” which lies behind a continuous process of capital accumulation and technical progress along with the birth control techniques so widely used in our times.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
REZA ANGLINGKUSUMO ◽  
BERNARD NJINDAN IYKE

In this paper, we empirically examine the interdependency of uncertainties among ASEAN +3 countries as well as between these countries and the G6 countries. We collect the uncertainty data from the new World Uncertainty Index (WUI) database. The WUI captures uncertainty related to economic and political events in a country. We show that ASEAN + 3 countries as a group are weakly interdependent, in terms of the long-run relationships of uncertainties within the group. We demonstrate that, in the absence of outside influence, i.e., uncertainty shocks emanating from the G6, the [Formula: see text] and ASEAN countries are two independent group of countries with the former having its own dynamics and the latter neither affecting nor being affected by the former. We further demonstrate that outside influence strongly affects China but not the other [Formula: see text] and ASEAN countries. These findings survive robustness checks and suggest that the ASEAN + 3, as a region, may provide long-term diversification benefits to global investors and that the strengthening of the ASEAN + 3 regional cooperation framework may further buttress confidence in this region.


2005 ◽  
Vol 08 (04) ◽  
pp. 573-592 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francis In ◽  
Jonathan A. Batten

This paper examines the equilibrium implications of the Expectations Hypothesis of term structure to different maturities of high-grade Australian dollar denominated Eurobonds and Australian Government bonds (AGBs) using the Canonical Cointegrating Regression (CCR) technique developed by Econometrica 60 (1992) 119. Our findings provide evidence only for equilibrium relationships between each group of bonds based on credit class, but not between any of the subsets of AGBs and the Eurobonds. Furthermore, the error correction model supports theory with the most liquid, long-term 10-year AGB driving the AGB term structure, with short-term yields adjusting to movements in the long-run yields, though the opposite is true for Eurobonds. The lesson for markets is to simplify the risk management task. Managers are advised to treat portfolios of equivalent credit class separately for hedging and risk management.


2005 ◽  
Vol 44 (03) ◽  
pp. 107-117
Author(s):  
R. G. Meyer ◽  
W. Herr ◽  
A. Helisch ◽  
P. Bartenstein ◽  
I. Buchmann

SummaryThe prognosis of patients with acute myeloid leukaemia (AML) has improved considerably by introduction of aggressive consolidation chemotherapy and haematopoietic stem cell transplantation (SCT). Nevertheless, only 20-30% of patients with AML achieve long-term diseasefree survival after SCT. The most common cause of treatment failure is relapse. Additionally, mortality rates are significantly increased by therapy-related causes such as toxicity of chemotherapy and complications of SCT. Including radioimmunotherapies in the treatment of AML and myelodyplastic syndrome (MDS) allows for the achievement of a pronounced antileukaemic effect for the reduction of relapse rates on the one hand. On the other hand, no increase of acute toxicity and later complications should be induced. These effects are important for the primary reduction of tumour cells as well as for the myeloablative conditioning before SCT.This paper provides a systematic and critical review of the currently used radionuclides and immunoconjugates for the treatment of AML and MDS and summarizes the literature on primary tumour cell reductive radioimmunotherapies on the one hand and conditioning radioimmunotherapies before SCT on the other hand.


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