USING PARTICLE SWARM OPTIMIZATION TO EVOLVE COOPERATION IN MULTIPLE CHOICES ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

Author(s):  
XIAOYANG WANG ◽  
YANG YI ◽  
HUIYOU CHANG ◽  
YIBIN LIN

Mechanisms of promoting the evolution of cooperation in two-player, two-strategy evolutionary games have been discussed in great detail over the past decades. Understanding the effects of repeated interactions in n-player with n-choice is a formidable challenge. This paper presents and investigates the application of co-evolutionary training techniques based on particle swarm optimization (PSO) to evolve cooperation for the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game with multiple choices. Several issues will be addressed, which include the evolution of cooperation and the evolutionary stability in the presence of multiple choices and noise. First is using PSO approach to evolve cooperation. The second is the consideration of real-dilemma between social cohesion and individual profit. Experimental results show that the PSO approach evolves the cooperation. Agents with stronger social cognition choose higher levels of cooperation. Finally the impact of noise on the evolution of cooperation is examined. Experiments show the noise has a negative impact on the evolution of cooperation.

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.


1995 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Fogel

Evolutionary programming experiments are conducted to examine the relationship between the durations of encounters and the evolution of cooperative behavior in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A population of behavioral strategies represented by finite-state machines is evolved over successive generations, with selection made on the basis of individual fitness. Each finite-state machine is given an additional evolvable parameter corresponding to the maximum number of moves it will execute in any encounter. A series of Monte Carlo trials indicates distinct relationships between encounter length and cooperation; however, no causal relationship can be positively identified.


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