Effects of the Number of Opponents on the Evolution of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hisao Ishibuchi ◽  
Takahiko Sudo ◽  
Koichiro Hoshino ◽  
Yusuke Nojima
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

On the Relationship between the Duration of an Encounter and the Evolution of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

1995 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Fogel
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Individual Fitness ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Finite State ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Evolutionary programming experiments are conducted to examine the relationship between the durations of encounters and the evolution of cooperative behavior in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A population of behavioral strategies represented by finite-state machines is evolved over successive generations, with selection made on the basis of individual fitness. Each finite-state machine is given an additional evolvable parameter corresponding to the maximum number of moves it will execute in any encounter. A series of Monte Carlo trials indicates distinct relationships between encounter length and cooperation; however, no causal relationship can be positively identified.

Cooperation and Community Structure in Artificial Ecosystems

1993 ◽  
Vol 1 (1_2) ◽  
pp. 15-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristian Lindgren ◽  
Mats G. Nordahl
Keyword(s):  
Community Structure ◽  
Food Webs ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Resource Flow ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Spatial Games ◽  
Artificial Ecosystems ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

We review results on the evolution of cooperation based on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Coevolution of strategies is discussed both in situations where everyone plays against everyone, and for spatial games. Simple artificial ecologies are constructed by incorporating an explicit resource flow and predatory interactions into models of coevolving strategies. Properties of food webs are reviewed, and we discuss what artificial ecologies can teach us about community structure.

A Strategy with Novel Evolutionary Features for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 257-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiawei Li ◽  
Graham Kendall
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Features ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Identification Mechanism ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

In recent iterated prisoner's dilemma tournaments, the most successful strategies were those that had identification mechanisms. By playing a predetermined sequence of moves and learning from their opponents' responses, these strategies managed to identify their opponents. We believe that these identification mechanisms may be very useful in evolutionary games. In this paper one such strategy, which we call collective strategy, is analyzed. Collective strategies apply a simple but efficient identification mechanism (that just distinguishes themselves from other strategies), and this mechanism allows them to only cooperate with their group members and defect against any others. In this way, collective strategies are able to maintain a stable population in evolutionary iterated prisoner's dilemma. By means of an invasion barrier, this strategy is compared with other strategies in evolutionary dynamics in order to demonstrate its evolutionary features. We also find that this collective behavior assists the evolution of cooperation in specific evolutionary environments.

USING PARTICLE SWARM OPTIMIZATION TO EVOLVE COOPERATION IN MULTIPLE CHOICES ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (03) ◽  
pp. 1350013 ◽  
Author(s):  
XIAOYANG WANG ◽  
YANG YI ◽  
HUIYOU CHANG ◽  
YIBIN LIN
Keyword(s):  
Particle Swarm Optimization ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Particle Swarm ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Swarm Optimization ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Formidable Challenge ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Mechanisms of promoting the evolution of cooperation in two-player, two-strategy evolutionary games have been discussed in great detail over the past decades. Understanding the effects of repeated interactions in n-player with n-choice is a formidable challenge. This paper presents and investigates the application of co-evolutionary training techniques based on particle swarm optimization (PSO) to evolve cooperation for the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game with multiple choices. Several issues will be addressed, which include the evolution of cooperation and the evolutionary stability in the presence of multiple choices and noise. First is using PSO approach to evolve cooperation. The second is the consideration of real-dilemma between social cohesion and individual profit. Experimental results show that the PSO approach evolves the cooperation. Agents with stronger social cognition choose higher levels of cooperation. Finally the impact of noise on the evolution of cooperation is examined. Experiments show the noise has a negative impact on the evolution of cooperation.

On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory

2000 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Axelrod
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Networks ◽  
Information Sharing ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Learning Behavior ◽  
Interaction Information ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

AbstractThe symposium included in this issue of Analyse & Kritik extends the basis of Cooperation Theory as set forth in Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation (1984). This essay begins with an overview of Cooperation Theory in terms of the questions it asks, its relationship to game theory and rationality, and the principal methodologies used, namely deduction and simulation. This essay then addresses the issues raised in the symposium, including the consequences of extending the original paradigm of the two person iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma to take into account such factors as nonsimultaneous play, the ability to offer hostages for performance, social networks of interaction, information sharing that can support reputations, learning behavior, envy, misunderstanding, and an option to exit. The essay places the contributions of this symposium in the context of previous research on these and related issues.

When Do Psychopathic Traits Affect Cooperative Behavior?: An Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Experimental Study

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Selection Procedure ◽  
Psychopathic Traits ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.

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