On the Relationship between the Duration of an Encounter and the Evolution of Cooperation in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

1995 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 349-363 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Fogel
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Individual Fitness ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Finite State ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Evolutionary programming experiments are conducted to examine the relationship between the durations of encounters and the evolution of cooperative behavior in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A population of behavioral strategies represented by finite-state machines is evolved over successive generations, with selection made on the basis of individual fitness. Each finite-state machine is given an additional evolvable parameter corresponding to the maximum number of moves it will execute in any encounter. A series of Monte Carlo trials indicates distinct relationships between encounter length and cooperation; however, no causal relationship can be positively identified.

Evolving Behaviors in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

1993 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Fogel
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Selfish Behavior ◽  
Mutual Cooperation ◽  
Individual Fitness ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Successive Generations ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Evolutionary programming experiments are conducted to investigate the conditions that promote the evolution of cooperative behavior in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. A population of logical stimulus-response devices is maintained over successive generations with selection based on individual fitness. The reward for selfish behavior is varied across a series of trials. Simulations indicate three distinct patterns of behaviors in which mutual cooperation is inevitable, improbable, or apparently random. The ultimate behavior can be reliably predicted by examining the payoff matrix that defines the reward for alternative joint behaviors.

When Do Psychopathic Traits Affect Cooperative Behavior?: An Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Experimental Study

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
M Testori ◽  
M Kempf ◽  
RB Hoyle ◽  
Hedwig Eisenbarth
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Selection Procedure ◽  
Psychopathic Traits ◽  
Strong Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Human Decision ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

© 2019 Hogrefe Publishing. Personality traits have been long recognized to have a strong impact on human decision-making. In this study, a sample of 314 participants took part in an online game to investigate the impact of psychopathic traits on cooperative behavior in an iterated Prisoner's dilemma game. We found that disinhibition decreased the maintenance of cooperation in successive plays, but had no effect on moving toward cooperation after a previous defection or on the overall level of cooperation over rounds. Furthermore, our results underline the crucial importance of a good model selection procedure, showing how a poor choice of statistical model can provide misleading results.

EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS ON SPATIAL LOCALITY IN N-PERSON ITERATED PRISONER'S DILEMMA

2003 ◽  
Vol 03 (02) ◽  
pp. 177-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
REIJI SUZUKI ◽  
TAKAYA ARITA
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Dynamic Evolution ◽  
Evolutionary Analysis ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Spatial Locality ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

The purpose of this paper is to consider the effects of spatial locality on the evolution of cooperative behavior in the N-person iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (N-IPD) by focusing on two essentially distinct factors: the scale of interaction (which decides the neighboring members playing the N-person games) and the scale of reproduction (which decides the neighboring candidates for an offspring in each cell). We conducted evolutionary experiments of strategies for one-dimensional N-IPD game with various settings of these two factors. Experimental results revealed that these two factors bring qualitatively different effects to the emergence of cooperative behavior. Furthermore, we investigated the dynamics of the evolution of spatial locality in N-IPD. When we introduced the evolution of the scale of interaction into our model, the dynamic evolution of the scale of interaction through generation facilitated the emergence of global cooperation when the scale of reproduction was relatively small. Experiments with the evolution of the scale of reproduction are also discussed.

scholarly journals The interplay of emotion expressions and strategy in promoting cooperation in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma

2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Celso M. de Melo ◽  
Kazunori Terada
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Emotional Expressions ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Competitive Strategies ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract The iterated prisoner’s dilemma has been used to study human cooperation for decades. The recent discovery of extortion and generous strategies renewed interest on the role of strategy in shaping behavior in this dilemma. But what if players could perceive each other’s emotional expressions? Despite increasing evidence that emotion signals influence decision making, the effects of emotion in this dilemma have been mostly neglected. Here we show that emotion expressions moderate the effect of generous strategies, increasing or reducing cooperation according to the intention communicated by the signal; in contrast, expressions by extortionists had no effect on participants’ behavior, revealing a limitation of highly competitive strategies. We provide evidence that these effects are mediated mostly by inferences about other’s intentions made from strategy and emotion. These findings provide insight into the value, as well as the limits, of behavioral strategies and emotion signals for cooperation.

Cooperation and Community Structure in Artificial Ecosystems

1993 ◽  
Vol 1 (1_2) ◽  
pp. 15-37 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristian Lindgren ◽  
Mats G. Nordahl
Keyword(s):  
Community Structure ◽  
Food Webs ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Resource Flow ◽  
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Spatial Games ◽  
Artificial Ecosystems ◽  
Iterated Prisoner’S Dilemma

We review results on the evolution of cooperation based on the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Coevolution of strategies is discussed both in situations where everyone plays against everyone, and for spatial games. Simple artificial ecologies are constructed by incorporating an explicit resource flow and predatory interactions into models of coevolving strategies. Properties of food webs are reviewed, and we discuss what artificial ecologies can teach us about community structure.

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