scholarly journals A Pareto Optimal Auction Mechanism for Carbon Emission Rights

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingxi Wang ◽  
Mingrong Wang ◽  
Chuangyin Dang ◽  
Shouyang Wang

The carbon emission rights do not fit well into the framework of existing multi-item auction mechanisms because of their own unique features. This paper proposes a new auction mechanism which converges to a unique Pareto optimal equilibrium in a finite number of periods. In the proposed auction mechanism, the assignment outcome is Pareto efficient and the carbon emission rights’ resources are efficiently used. For commercial application and theoretical completeness, both discrete and continuous markets—represented by discrete and continuous bid prices, respectively—are examined, and the results show the existence of a Pareto optimal equilibrium under the constraint of individual rationality. With no ties, the Pareto optimal equilibrium can be further proven to be unique.

2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (1/2) ◽  
pp. 82
Author(s):  
Dongsheng Zhao ◽  
Yu Ma ◽  
Huaiwen Zhang ◽  
Xinyu Wang

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (11) ◽  
pp. 4380
Author(s):  
Xinyue Yang ◽  
Ye Song ◽  
Mingjun Sun ◽  
Hongjun Peng

We consider a capital constrained timber and carbon sink supply chain under the cap-and-trade scheme, where the forest company produces timber and carbon sink. We consider two subsidy modes: financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests and financing subsidy to the manufacturer’s emission reductions. We apply a Stackelberg model and mainly consider the impact of subsidies on the profits and the strategies of the supply chain members. The results show that when the government gives a financing subsidy to the carbon sink forests, it is conducive to promoting the expansion of carbon sink forests, as well as the enhancement of the forest company’s profit. However, a larger supply of carbon sinks generates a lower price, which leads to the manufacturer reducing the technical emission reduction level and purchasing more carbon emission rights instead. On the other hand, when the manufacturer receives a financing subsidy for the technical emission reduction costs, its production becomes cleaner than before, and the profits of the forest company and the manufacturer increase.


2019 ◽  
Vol 119 (8) ◽  
pp. 1734-1747 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bing Qing Tan ◽  
Su Xiu Xu ◽  
Ray Zhong ◽  
Meng Cheng ◽  
Kai Kang

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to design a parking space management platform to alleviate the parking problem and a two-stage solution for sharing and allocating parking spaces. Design/methodology/approach The market design mechanism and auction mechanism are integrated to solve the problem of parking space sharing and allocation. In the first stage, the market design mechanism with two rules is applied for making the good use of idle parking spaces. In the second stage, two sequential auction mechanisms are designed by extending first/second-price sealed bid auction mechanism to allocate both private and public parking spaces, which are received in previous stage and owned by the platform. Two stages are connected through a forecasted price which is calculated through the exponential smoothing method. Findings First, we prove three important properties of the proposed sequential auction mechanisms, namely, incentive compatibility, revenue equivalence and individual rationality. Second, a simulation study is used to verify the effectiveness of the mechanisms through numerical analysis. The impact of the system on three parts, namely, agents (private parking space suppliers), bidders (parking space customers) and the platform, is examined. Third, the results show that the sharing mechanism with monetrary incentive will attract a number of agents to join in the platform. The bidders are also able to obtain considerable utility, as compared with the (average) market parking fees. The platform can thus effectively allocate parking spaces with reasonable prices. Originality/value This paper combines the classical sequential auction mechanisms with the market design mechanism for the parking space sharing and allocation problem. The modeling and analysis method can also be used to address the similar allocation and pricing problems of other resources like bicycle sharing.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhengwei Ma ◽  
Yuxin Yan ◽  
Ruotong Wu ◽  
Feixiao Li

In recent years, the rapid increase in CO2 concentration has accelerated global warming. As a result, sea levels rise, glaciers melt, extreme weather occurs, and species become extinct. As the world’s largest CO2 emission rights trading market, EU Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS) has reached 1.855 billion tons of quotas by 2019, influencing the development of the global carbon emission market. Crude oil, as one of the major fossil energy sources in the world, its price fluctuation is bound to affect the price of carbon emission rights. Therefore, this paper aims to reveal the correlation between crude oil futures prices and carbon emission rights futures prices by studying the price fluctuation. In this paper, the linkage between West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil futures prices and European carbon futures prices was investigated. In addition, this paper selects continuous data of WTI crude oil futures prices and spot prices with European carbon futures prices from January 8, 2018 to November 27, 2020, and builds a smooth transformation regression (STR) model. The relationship between crude oil futures and carbon futures prices is studied in both forward and reversal linkage through empirical analysis. The results show that crude oil futures prices and carbon futures prices have a mutual effect on each other, and both linear and nonlinear correlations between the two prices exist. Based on the results of this research, some suggestions are provided.


资源科学 ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (10) ◽  
pp. 1801-1813
Author(s):  
Chao YANG ◽  
Lijun WU ◽  
Jiangfeng LI ◽  
Tianneng HUANG ◽  

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 4249 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jilin Zhang ◽  
Yukun Xu

This paper examines the price of carbon emission rights published by the China Emissions Exchange (Shenzhen), analyzes the statistical characteristics of the price series and uses a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model to describe the price fluctuation of carbon emission rights and risk formation mechanisms. The study shows the following results: since 2013, China’s carbon emission rights prices have become more stable. The fluctuation of yield has gradually decreased and the market has approached a more mature stage. However, after 2018, due to factors such as the economic downturn and insufficient market information, the amplitude of price fluctuations has started to rise while frequency is increasing, which shows an asymmetry trend. The market trading risk is accumulating constantly.


2001 ◽  
Vol 03 (04) ◽  
pp. 315-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHIH CHANG ◽  
YAN-AN HWANG

Two new axioms, additivity of additional bonus (AAB) and reduced game monotonicity (RGM), are introduced. AAB states that the players can gain an additional bonus after they achieved an agreement; on the other hand, if the bargaining fails then they get nothing. With its help, we characterise the lexicographic egalitarian solution by individual rationality (IR), AAB and consistency (CON). The other axiom, RGM, is a weaker axiom than CON and strong monotonicity (SMON), respectively. Using Pareto optimal (PO), IR, AAB and RGM, the second characterisation of the lexicographic egalitarian solution is presented.


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