scholarly journals Optimal Tag-Based Cooperation Control for the “Prisoner’s Dilemma”

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Rui Dong ◽  
Xinghong Jia ◽  
Xianjia Wang ◽  
Yonggang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Rate Control ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Optimal Timing ◽  
Terminal Time ◽  
Cooperation Rate

A long-standing problem in biology, economics, and social sciences is to understand the conditions required for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in evolving populations. This paper investigates how to promote the evolution of cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PDG). Differing from previous approaches, we not only propose a tag-based control (TBC) mechanism but also look at how the evolution of cooperation by TBC can be successfully promoted. The effect of TBC on the evolutionary process of cooperation shows that it can both reduce the payoff of defectors and inhibit defection; although when the cooperation rate is high, TBC will also reduce the payoff of cooperators unless the identified rate of the TBC is large enough. An optimal timing control (OTC) of switched replicator dynamics is designed to consider the control costs, the cooperation rate at terminal time, and the cooperator’s payoff. The results show that the switching control (SC) between an optimal identified rate control of the TBC and no TBC can properly not only maintain a high cooperation rate but also greatly enhance the payoff of the cooperators. Our results provide valuable insights for some clusters, for example, logistics parks and government, to regard the decision to promote cooperation.

scholarly journals Evolution of cooperation: The analysis of the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost

2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Shun Kurokawa
Keyword(s):  
Natural Selection ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Cost Ratio ◽  
Personal Cost ◽  
Model Setting

The existence of cooperation demands explanation in terms of natural selection. Prisoner’s dilemma is a framework often used when studying the evolution of cooperation. In prisoner’s dilemma, most previous studies consider the situation wherein an individual who cooperates will give an opponent an amount b at a personal cost of c, where b > c > 0 while an individual who defects will give nothing. This model setting is convenient; however, previous studies have not considered the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and different cost while in reality, it is natural to consider that a different player has a different benefit and different cost. Here, we raise the following question: Taking that a different individual has a different benefit and a different cost into consideration, what strategy is likely to evolve? In this paper, we focus on the direct reciprocity and analyze the case wherein a different player has a different benefit and a different cost. We obtain the condition for the evolution in the general case. And in addition, we have revealed that under a specific condition as the interaction repeats longer and the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger and the cooperating probability is more sensitive to the benefit the opponent provides, the establishment of cooperation is more likely.

The evolution of extortion strategy in the kagome lattice

2020 ◽  
Vol 31 (11) ◽  
pp. 2050162
Author(s):  
Qian Zhao ◽  
Yajun Mao ◽  
Zhihai Rong
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Living Environment ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Kagome Lattice ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Kagomé Lattice ◽  
Population Games ◽  
Cooperation Level ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The extortion strategy can let its surplus exceed its opponents by a fixed percentage, hence the influence of extortion strategy in a population games has drawn wide attention. In this paper, we study the evolution of extortion strategy with unconditional cooperation and unconditional defection strategies in the Kagome lattice with abundant triangles. Our investigation shows that the extortion strategy can act as catalysts to promote the evolution of cooperation in the networked Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Moreover, proper strength of extortion slope can improve the living environment of the cooperators, thus they enhance cooperation level in the network. Moreover, proper strength of extortion can not only enhance the cooperation level, but also delay the extinction of cooperation. The underlying overlapping triangles help individuals form cooperation cliques that play crucial roles for the evolution of cooperation in those lattices.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document