scholarly journals A Novel Algorithm for Profit Distribution of Sustainable Development Using E-Commerce Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Li Wei

E-commerce supply chain actually deals with the acquisition of the raw materials, their timely processing, and on-time delivery to the right place. It deals with a number of processes such as supply and demand, managing order entry, and inventory tracking. Now profit distribution models are actually stochastic models that are used to optimize the gains and profits in a particular business. They actually generate modern time solutions to the existing problems in a sustainable environment. However, in order to solve the problems existing in the traditional profit distribution algorithm of the e-commerce supply chain, such as low distribution accuracy and large time cost, a profit distribution algorithm of the e-commerce supply chain under the concept of sustainable development was designed. It was supported by the concept of sustainable development, and the coefficient of income distribution is calculated according to the equilibrium bidding strategy of supply chain alliance and its members, net present value of income distribution, total investment, minimum expected rate of return on investment, and other parameters. First, calculate the Shapley value of the profit distribution of the power supply chain, and obtain the correction coefficient through the correction matrix, dimensionless processing, and analytic hierarchy process. Use the correction coefficient to correct the Shapley value and the income distribution coefficient to realize the design of the profit distribution algorithm for the power supply chain. The experimental results show that the algorithm has low relative error rate, high precision, and short time cost of profit distribution coefficient calculation.

2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (7) ◽  
pp. 479-483 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiang-Yang Ren ◽  
Qiao-Qiao Feng ◽  
Shu Wang ◽  
Xue Wen

Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (6) ◽  
pp. 882
Author(s):  
Yanhua Du ◽  
Jun Fang ◽  
Jingxiao Zhang ◽  
Jun Hu

In recent years, China’s government has encouraged the adoption of the TOT (Transfer-Operate-Transfer) model to realize the marketization of China’s public service stock projects. The TOT model is a cooperation mechanism through sharing investment, revenue and risks between the government and private partner. Therefore, a fair and reasonable revenue sharing method (RSM) is the key to the success of the TOT project. This paper aims to provide a fair and reasonable RSM based on a modified Shapley value with a triangular symmetric fuzzy structure element, which has better motivation, flexibility, forecasting function and dynamic precise distribution function. According to the factors that affect revenue sharing, the Shapley value is improved with initial correction coefficient composed of investment ratio, risk-sharing ratio, execution degree, and fuzzy payment to achieve fairness and reasonableness. The methodology is illustrated by a case study of a TOT project selected from Laohekou city of Hubei province, China. The results testify that the revenue-sharing ratios of participants is positively correlated with the initial correction coefficient, which make the RSM more motivating; and the Shapley value with fuzzy payment by using triangular symmetric fuzzy element function make the RSM more flexible, and it has both forecasting function and precise dynamic distribution function under project revenue uncertainty.


2014 ◽  
Vol 543-547 ◽  
pp. 4404-4407
Author(s):  
Ran Tian ◽  
Lin Fu Sun ◽  
Bin Yong Li ◽  
Xiao Yu Mi

Under the premise of determined transportation tasks and determined collaboration tasks assigned, this paper defines four factors that influence the distribution of collaborative logistics profits: external logistics providers competing risks, uncertainty external transport risks and information sharing and collaboration satisfaction between internal collaboration logistics providers, established a profit distribution model uses an improved correction factor Shapley value. Finally, we use an example to prove the rationality and validity of the model, thereby protecting the smooth coordination of logistics and sustainable development.


2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (Special-Issue) ◽  
pp. 100-109
Author(s):  
Xiyan Lv ◽  
Suyan Zhao

Abstract With the development of software outsourcing industry, there is a growing trend to establish the software outsourcing alliances. Whether alliances’ profit distribution is reasonable affects directly and significantly alliances’ stability. This paper introduces the Shapley value method which is a common profit distribution method applicable to multiple people cooperation. Due to the weakness of the Shapley value method, AHP is used to analyze the influence factors and adjust the model. The anticipated outcome of the result is to provide a theoretical support for the profit distribution of the software outsourcing alliances in the future.


Author(s):  
Sanjith Gopalakrishnan ◽  
Daniel Granot ◽  
Frieda Granot ◽  
Greys Sošić ◽  
Hailong Cui

Because greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions from the supply chains of just the 2,500 largest global corporations account for more than 20% of global emissions, rationalizing emissions in supply chains could make an important contribution toward meeting the global CO2 emission-reduction targets agreed upon in the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Accordingly, in this paper, we consider supply chains with joint production of GHG emissions, operating under either a carbon-tax regime, wherein a regulator levies a penalty on the emissions generated by the firms in the supply chain, or an internal carbon-pricing scheme. Supply chain leaders, such as Walmart, are assumed to be environmentally motivated to induce their suppliers to abate their emissions. We adopt a cooperative game-theory methodology to derive a footprint-balanced scheme for reapportioning the total carbon emissions amongst the firms in the supply chain. This emission responsibility-allocation scheme, which is the Shapley value of an associated cooperative game, is shown to have several desirable characteristics. In particular, (i) it is transparent and easy to compute; (ii) when the abatement-cost functions of the firms are private information, it incentivizes suppliers to exert pollution-abatement efforts that, among all footprint-balanced allocation schemes, minimize the maximum deviation from the socially optimal pollution level; and (iii) the Shapley value is the unique allocation mechanism satisfying certain contextually desirable properties. This paper was accepted by Jayashankar Swaminathan, operations management.


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