Evolutionary Game Analysis of Knowledge Sharing in Low-Carbon Innovation Network

Low-carbon technological innovation is the main means to develop a low-carbon economy, and network knowledge sharing and collaborative innovation is an effective model for the development of low-carbon technologies. First of all, this article adopts a decision-making experiment and evaluation laboratory method and interpretation structure model, combines the two methods, extracts the advantages of the two, and discards the shortcomings of the two, thus constructing a new optimized and upgraded interpretation structure model. We give methods to explore the main influencing factors of collaborative innovation of low-carbon technologies for online knowledge sharing. Based on the industrial network knowledge sharing and cooperation network environment, the network evolution game model of network knowledge sharing knowledge collaboration is constructed to study the rewards and punishments, the profit distribution rate, the knowledge potential difference, and the parameter pairing of the network knowledge sharing cooperation network structure in the process of network knowledge sharing and collaborative knowledge innovation. The influence of the network knowledge sharing cooperation strategy is obtained through simulation to change the size of the relevant parameters so that the network knowledge sharing cooperation agent chooses the network evolution game of the sharing strategy to realize the optimal evolutionary stable strategy. According to the simulation results, this article proposes suggestions from the following aspects, aiming to improve the overall knowledge synergy effect of the network knowledge sharing and cooperation network.

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Simulating policy interventions in the interfirm diffusion of low-carbon technologies: An agent-based evolutionary game model

Journal of Cleaner Production ◽

10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.119449 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 250 ◽

pp. 119449 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Yingying Shi ◽

Botang Han ◽

Yongchao Zeng

Keyword(s):

Evolutionary Game ◽

Game Model ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Agent Based ◽

Policy Interventions ◽

Low Carbon Technologies

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Innovation cooperation network evolution about green building technology with government intervention: Based on evolutionary game theory

IEEE Access ◽

10.1109/access.2021.3119632 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-1

Author(s):

Yonghong Ma ◽

Lingkai Kong ◽

Xiaomeng Yang ◽

Chaoran Lin

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Evolutionary Game Theory ◽

Government Intervention ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Green Building ◽

Network Evolution ◽

Building Technology ◽

Cooperation Network ◽

Innovation Cooperation

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Research on evolution game of clothing enterprises’ carbon emission reduction investment considering free riding behavior

E3S Web of Conferences ◽

10.1051/e3sconf/202123701029 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 237 ◽

pp. 01029

Author(s):

Hangxin Guo ◽

Zheng Liu ◽

Mengmeng Zhao ◽

Huihui Wang

Keyword(s):

Supply Chain ◽

Emission Reduction ◽

Carbon Emission ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Free Riding ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Carbon Emission Reduction ◽

Low Carbon Economy ◽

The Cost ◽

Evolution Game

“low carbon economy” puts forward new requirements for carbon emission reduction in all links of the supply chain. This paper takes the three-level clothing supply chain composed of government, supplier and manufacturer as the research object, considering the “free riding behavior” of clothing supplier and manufacturer, by constructing the three-party evolutionary game model, using the replication dynamic equation to analyze the evolution process of the three actors, and studies the influence of parameter change on the strategy selection of each agent. Finally, the simulation is carried out by Matlab. The results show that the strategies are affected by the government’s punishment, the “free ride” revenue of suppliers and manufacturers, and the cost of carbon emission reduction investment. Finally, based on the analysis results, some suggestions are put forward for enterprises to invest in carbon emission reduction.

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Low-carbon technology collaborative innovation in industrial cluster with social exclusion: An evolutionary game theory perspective

Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science ◽

10.1063/5.0037956 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 31 (3) ◽

pp. 033124

Author(s):

Ke Zhou ◽

Tianyu Ren

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Social Exclusion ◽

Evolutionary Game Theory ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Industrial Cluster ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Collaborative Innovation

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Optimal approaches to manage power system decarbonation

International Journal of Applied Electromagnetics and Mechanics ◽

10.3233/jae-209464 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 64 (1-4) ◽

pp. 1447-1452

Author(s):

Vincent Mazauric ◽

Ariane Millot ◽

Claude Le Pape-Gardeux ◽

Nadia Maïzi

Keyword(s):

Free Energy ◽

Linear Programming ◽

Phase Transitions ◽

Power System ◽

Energy System ◽

Energy Sources ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Faraday’S Law ◽

Optimal Description ◽

Low Carbon Technologies

To overcome the negative environemental impact of the actual power system, an optimal description of quasi-static electromagnetics relying on a reversible interpretation of the Faraday’s law is given. Due to the overabundance of carbon-free energy sources, this description makes it possible to consider an evolution towards an energy system favoring low-carbon technologies. The management for changing is then explored through a simplified linear-programming problem and an analogy with phase transitions in physics is drawn.

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An evolutionary game theory analysis linking manufacturing, logistics, and the government in low-carbon development

Journal of the Operational Research Society ◽

10.1080/01605682.2021.1880294 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 1-19

Author(s):

Haojun Wang ◽

Lianghua Chen ◽

Jun Liu

Keyword(s):

Game Theory ◽

Evolutionary Game Theory ◽

Evolutionary Game ◽

Low Carbon ◽

Theory Analysis ◽

Low Carbon Development ◽

The Government

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Dynamic Evolution Model of a Collaborative Innovation Network from the Resource Perspective and an Application Considering Different Government Behaviors

Information ◽

10.3390/info10040138 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 10 (4) ◽

pp. 138 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Wu ◽

Shao ◽

Feng

Keyword(s):

Network Evolution ◽

Evolution Model ◽

Dynamic Evolution ◽

Innovation Network ◽

Transfer Policy ◽

Collaborative Innovation ◽

Innovation Output ◽

The Government ◽

Small Change ◽

Innovative Behaviors

The evolution of a collaborative innovation network depends on the interrelationships among the innovation subjects. Every single small change affects the network topology, which leads to different evolution results. A logical relationship exists between network evolution and innovative behaviors. An accurate understanding of the characteristics of the network structure can help the innovative subjects to adopt appropriate innovative behaviors. This paper summarizes the three characteristics of collaborative innovation networks, knowledge transfer, policy environment, and periodic cooperation, and it establishes a dynamic evolution model for a resource-priority connection mechanism based on innovation resource theory. The network subjects are not randomly testing all of the potential partners, but have a strong tendency to, which is, innovation resource. The evolution process of a collaborative innovation network is simulated with three different government behaviors as experimental objects. The evolution results show that the government should adopt the policy of supporting the enterprises that recently entered the network, which can maintain the innovation vitality of the network and benefit the innovation output. The results of this study also provide a reference for decision-making by the government and enterprises.

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