Rationality in International Relations

1998 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 919-941 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miles Kahler
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
International Competition ◽  
Structural Constraints ◽  
Level Playing Field ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Social Entities

Rationalist models have faced four persistent sets of critics as the research program of international relations has evolved. Under neorealism's structural constraints of international competition and selection, agents' rationality may appear superfluous. Psychological critics have presented neither a single theoretical alternative to rational choice nor contingent hypotheses that specify when psychological distortions of rational decision making are most likely. Both rational choice and psychological approaches must construct models of action for social entities that aggregate individuals. The rationality and individualism of beliefs is questioned by theorists who stress culture, identity, and norms as independent sources of action. Careful stipulation of scope, acknowledgment of methodological shortcomings, and precise definition of differences can serve to bridge the theoretical divide between rational choice models and their critics. Problem-centered research provides a level playing field on which theoretical competition can be established.

The emotive causes of recurrent international conflicts

2003 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
William J. Long ◽  
Peter Brecke
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
International Conflicts ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Constructivist Approaches

Many international conflicts are recurrent, and many of these are characterized by periods of violence, including wars, that are hard to describe as planned products of rational decision-making. Analysis of these conflicts according to rational-choice international-relations theory or constructivist approaches has been less revealing than might have been hoped. We consider the possibility that emotive causes could better explain, or at least improve the explanation of, observed patterns. We offer three emotive models of recurrent conflict and we outline a method by which the reliability of emotive explanations derived from these models could be tested prospectively.

The Moral Limitations of the Rational-Monistic Model

2015 ◽  
pp. 127-145
Author(s):  
Galit Berenstok ◽  
Ishak Saporta
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Model ◽  
Utility Value ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Decision Making Model ◽  
Range Of Values

This chapter proposes a rational-pluralistic model for decision making in organizations. The authors developed this model as a potential solution to the negative moral implications (such as alienation from the workplace) that the formal rational decision making model has on organization employees. The negative moral implications are due to the fact that the formal rational model is monistic, limited by the considerations of the organization's utility, and neglects moral values and non-utility values that are related to the employee. The rational-pluralistic model is based on a revision of the concept of rationality and rational action. The basic assumption of this model is that there is a range of values other than the utility value that are involved in rational decision making. The more extended definition of rationality makes it possible to avoid a situation in which employees are only the means for organization goals, rather than ends in themselves.

scholarly journals Enhancing Rationality: Heuristics, Biases, and The Critical Thinking Project

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Battersby
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Critical Thinking ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Critical Thinking Instruction

Abstract: This paper develops four related claims: 1. Critical thinking should focus more on decision making, 2. the heuristics and bias literature developed by cognitive psychologists and behavioral economists provides many insights into human irrationality which can be useful in critical thinking instruction, 3. unfortunately the “rational choice” norms used by behavioral economists to identify “biased” decision making narrowly equate rational decision making with the efficient pursuit of individual satisfaction; deviations from these norms should not be treated as an irrational bias, 4. a richer, procedural theory of rational decision making should be the basis for critical thinking instruction in decision making.

The Moral Limitations of the Rational-Monistic Model

2015 ◽  
pp. 1394-1413
Author(s):  
Galit Berenstok ◽  
Ishak Saporta
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Moral Values ◽  
Rational Action ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Model ◽  
Utility Value ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Decision Making Model ◽  
Range Of Values

This chapter proposes a rational-pluralistic model for decision making in organizations. The authors developed this model as a potential solution to the negative moral implications (such as alienation from the workplace) that the formal rational decision making model has on organization employees. The negative moral implications are due to the fact that the formal rational model is monistic, limited by the considerations of the organization's utility, and neglects moral values and non-utility values that are related to the employee. The rational-pluralistic model is based on a revision of the concept of rationality and rational action. The basic assumption of this model is that there is a range of values other than the utility value that are involved in rational decision making. The more extended definition of rationality makes it possible to avoid a situation in which employees are only the means for organization goals, rather than ends in themselves.

A Solution to the Predictor Paradox

1976 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 147-154
Author(s):  
Michael F. Stack
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Robert Nozick ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Available Information

William Newcomb and Robert Nozick have provided us with the following problem in rational decision-making. There are two boxes, A and B. A contains either a million dollars (M) or nothing (0). B contains a thousand dollars (T). I come into the room in which we have the boxes, closed. I must make one of two choices. Either I open A and take whatever money is present, M or O, or I open both and take whatever money is present, M + T or O + T. What is the rational choice for me to make?Nothing unusual is meant by “rational” in this context. We assume that a person making the choice desires as much money as possible. We assume that he will take into account all relevant available information as to what decision will lead to more money. If he believes that doing X will, or is likely to, lead to more money than doing not-X, then he will do X.In the above case, it would seem that the rational choice is both. T is there for the taking, whether or not I get M, and I might as well try for both.

scholarly journals International Competition Below the Threshold of War: Toward a Theory of Gray Zone Conflict

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Javier Jordan
Keyword(s):  
International Relations ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Relations Theory ◽  
International Competition ◽  
Gray Zone ◽  
Strategic Action ◽  
Characteristic Features ◽  
Definition Of

Drawing on existing literature, this research offers a theoretical delineation of the gray zone conflict, that is, conflict below the threshold of armed conflict. It begins by identifying the characteristic features attributed to the gray zone to propose a definition of the concept. It then situates gray zone conflict within the framework of the International Relations theory of Realism before setting out the main lines of strategic action used. Lastly, it examines the various levels of escalation that can arise in conflict of this nature.

Hobbes, Harsanyi and the Edge of the Abyss

1996 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-70 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gabriella Slomp ◽  
Manfredi M. A. La Manna
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Natural Conditions ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategy Game

AbstractThe authors present a new game-theoretic interpretation of Hobbes's state of nature that, unlike existing rational-choice models, questions the possibility of individually rational decision making. They provide a general formulation of the two-player two-strategy game applied to the state of nature and derive existing models as special cases. A nonstandard version of Chicken under incomplete information, that interprets “death” as infinitely bad, provides an explanation for important and hitherto unaccounted for claims by Hobbes. The authors suggest that rational choice in Hobbesian political philosophy ought to examine not so much the mechanics of rational action in natural conditions, but rather the means whereby citizens already living in civil associations can be persuaded of the irrationality of civil war.

EPISTEMIC TRANSFORMATION AND RATIONAL CHOICE

2017 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krister Bykvist ◽  
H. Orri Stefánsson
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Transformative Experience ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Cultural Paradigm ◽  
Conscious Decision ◽  
Influential Book

Most people at some point in their lives face transformative decisions that could result in experiences that are radically different from any that they have had, and that could radically change their personalities and preferences. For instance, most people make the conscious decision to either become or not become parents. In a recent but already influential book, L. A. Paul (2014) argues that transformative choices cannot be rational – or, more precisely, that they cannot be rational if one assumes what Paul sees as a cultural paradigm for rational decision-making. Paul arrives at this surprising conclusion due to her understanding of transformative experience as being both epistemically and personally transformative. An experience is epistemically transformative if it ‘teaches [a person] something she could not have learned without having that kind of experience’ (11), but it is personally transformative if it changes the person's point of view and her fundamental preferences (16).

Consequence and Utility Modeling in Rational Decision Making

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc A. Maes ◽  
Michael H. Faber ◽  
Sherif S. Abdelatif
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
Large Structures ◽  
Utility Optimization ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Cascade Effects

Offshore design and risk assessment are typically marked by far-reaching choices and important one-time decisions. Decision analysis involving large structures, sensitive environments, and difficult operations, requires a very careful formulation of utility and consequences. It is shown in this paper that one of the most important shortcomings of such analyses stems from an incomplete definition of the system, and from the failure to include various “follow-up” consequences. “Follow-up” consequences are, generally speaking, triggered by extreme losses, such as excessive business losses, consequences from unexpected cascade effects, collateral and indirect losses, or other intangible losses. The non-inclusion of such losses occurs either voluntarily or involuntarily. Often the identification and the valuation of follow-up consequences can be prohibitively difficult. For such cases, it is possible to use a simple model based on risk aversion to the consequences associated with extreme discrete hazards during the lifetime of a system. This model is developed in the framework of a lifecycle utility optimization. To add practical value to this model, we also introduce the concept of a Bayesian updating of utility functions. Since utility functions are all about expressing the preferences of expert decision makers, we refer to the Bayesian parameters as “preference” parameters. The paper shows that the approaches developed lead to better and more risk-consistent decision making. An illustrative example is given in the paper, highlighting the significance of the findings.

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