Comments by Masahiro Endoh, on The Role of Domestic Institutions and FDI on Innovation—Evidence from Chinese Firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 81-82
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Chinese Firms

scholarly journals The Role of Domestic Institutions and FDI on Innovation—Evidence from Chinese Firms

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yi Qu ◽  
Yingqi Wei
Keyword(s):  
Direct Investment ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Comparative Case Study ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Chinese Firms ◽  
Enabling Factors ◽  
Firm Innovation

This paper investigates the enabling factors of domestic institutions and foreign direct investment (FDI) on firm innovation in China. China has made significant institutional changes and has attracted substantial FDI, aiming to facilitate domestic innovation. Drawing on the institution-based view, we investigate how domestic institutions and FDI affect firm innovation. The results from a comparative case study of five Chinese firms and a large-sample econometric analysis based on Chinese firms reveal the positive impact of domestic institutions on innovation, but FDI is shown to have negligible effects. We argue that, given China's institutional setting, FDI may be a channel for technology transfer but this does not necessarily lead to innovation.

The Influence of the Two Covenants on States Parties Across Regions

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samantha Besson
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
International Human Rights Law ◽  
Human Rights Law ◽  
International Human Rights ◽  
The Third ◽  
International Human ◽  
Domestic Influence ◽  
Domestic Law

As a companion to the five regional reports in this volume, this chapter’s aim is a double one: first, to bring the comparison up to the regional level, and second, to analyse the international and domestic institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that affect how international human rights instruments influence domestic law. The chapter is therefore both a study in comparative international human rights law and a contribution to its methodology. Its structure is four-pronged. The first section clarifies the aim, object, and method of the comparison. The second section presents a comparative assessment of the Covenants’ domestic influence across regions and develops a grid of comparative analysis. The third section addresses the authority of the Committees’ interpretations of the Covenants, relying on a bottom-up comparative law argument. The fourth section discusses the role of human rights comparison and of regional human rights law in enhancing the legitimacy of the Committees’ future interpretations.

scholarly journals Role of big data management in enhancing big data decision-making capability and quality among Chinese firms: A dynamic capabilities view

2019 ◽  
Vol 56 (6) ◽  
pp. 103135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saqib Shamim ◽  
Jing Zeng ◽  
Syed Muhammad Shariq ◽  
Zaheer Khan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Big Data ◽  
Data Management ◽  
Dynamic Capabilities ◽  
Chinese Firms

Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games

1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (4) ◽  
pp. 914-924 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongryn Mo
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Foreign Country ◽  
Veto Power ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Veto Player ◽  
Domestic Constraints ◽  
International Bargaining ◽  
Informational Effect

Putnam's (1988) conjecture that negotiators can benefit from their domestic constraints implies that they may want to impose domestic constraints on themselves by granting veto power to an agent. I show that a negotiator's decision to employ an agent as veto player depends on the kinds of information available to the foreign country and the alignment of preferences between the negotiator and the agent. When the foreign country has incomplete information about the negotiator's preferences and the negotiator has preferences too divergent from those of the agent, the negotiator will not give veto power to the agent. However, this applies only to an agent with extreme preferences, and a surprisingly large number of agent types will receive veto power. The attractiveness of the agent veto to the negotiator is in part due to its informational effect. By granting veto power to an agent, the negotiator can transmit more information to the foreign country and capture informational gains that would be lost in the absence of the agent veto.

Catch-up in the IT Service Sector and the Role of the Government in China

2021 ◽  
pp. 156-171
Author(s):  
Keun Lee
Keyword(s):  
Chinese Firms ◽  
Foreign Companies ◽  
Security Software ◽  
Business Software ◽  
Catch Up ◽  
Barrier To Entry ◽  
The Government ◽  
Latecomer Firms ◽  
Role Of The Government

Chapter 7 analyzes the market and technological catch-up of indigenous Chinese firms in two information technology service sectors, namely, games and business software (enterprise resource planning (ERP) and security software) and focuses on two aspects. The first aspect is about how latecomer firms have been able to access and learn from foreign knowledge bases and acquire their innovation capabilities. The second aspect is the role of the government and regulation in the catch-up process. Indigenous firms in China have selected different learning and catch-up strategies in different technological regimes. For the online game sector, where imitation is easier and incremental innovation is more important than radical innovation, Chinese firms started with handling the publishing (or distribution) of games developed by foreign incumbents and later secured in-house game development capabilities by imitating the products of global leaders. In the business software sector, where imitation and creative innovation are difficult, Chinese firms acquired third-party technologies through mergers and acquisitions and then differentiated their products by taking advantage of local specificities. In general, intellectual property rights (IPRs) are critical in the business of these two segments. Despite the entry barrier effect of IPR protection by the foreign incumbents, the latecomer firms discussed in this chapter seem to have circumvented the barrier to entry and learning and to acquire their innovation capabilities. However, such learning and acquisition would not have led to commercial success without government regulation against foreign companies, such as business restrictions in online gaming and exclusive procurement of indigenous products in applied software (ERP and security software). Such restrictions against foreign companies were a critical constraining factor against their market share expansion in the Chinese market.

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