Has NCLB Encouraged Educational Triage? Accountability and the Distribution of Achievement Gains

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale Ballou ◽  
Matthew G. Springer
Keyword(s):  
No Child Left Behind ◽  
Mathematics Achievement ◽  
Adequate Yearly Progress ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Achievement Gains ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Closing The Gap ◽  
Reasonable Prospect ◽  
Identification Strategy

The No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) has been criticized for encouraging schools to neglect students whose performance exceeds the proficiency threshold or lies so far below it that there is no reasonable prospect of closing the gap during the current year. We examine this hypothesis using longitudinal data from 2002–03 through 2005–06. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that as NCLB was phased in, states had some latitude in designating which grades were to count for purposes of a school making adequate yearly progress. We compare the mathematics achievement distribution in a grade before and after it became a high-stakes grade. We find in general no evidence that gains were concentrated on students near the proficiency standard at the expense of students scoring much lower, though there are inconsistent signs of a trade-off with students at the upper end of the distribution.

Are Students Left Behind? The Distributional Effects of the No Child Left Behind Act

2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. Krieg
Keyword(s):  
No Child Left Behind ◽  
Public School ◽  
Panel Data ◽  
School Performance ◽  
Pass Rate ◽  
High Ability ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Distributional Effects ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
High Ability Students

The No Child Left Behind Act imposes sanctions on schools if the fraction of students demonstrating proficiency on a high-stakes test falls below a statewide pass rate. While the motivation behind this system is improved public school performance, it also provides incentives for schools to focus educational resources on the marginal student rather than those on the tails of the ability distribution. Using statewide, student-level panel data, students on the tails of the ability distribution, especially high-ability students, are demonstrated to score below expectations if their school is in danger from No Child Left Behind sanctions.

Assessing No Child Left Behind and the Rise of Neoliberal Education Policies

2007 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 493-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Hursh
Keyword(s):  
No Child Left Behind ◽  
High Stakes Testing ◽  
Education Reforms ◽  
Education Policies ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Social Democratic ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
Public Figures ◽  
Globalized Economy ◽  
To Receive

No Child Left Behind and other education reforms promoting high-stakes testing, accountability, and competitive markets continue to receive wide support from politicians and public figures. This support, the author suggests, has been achieved by situating education within neoliberal policies that argue that such reforms are necessary within an increasingly globalized economy, will increase academic achievement, and will close the achievement gap. However, the author offers preliminary data suggesting that the reforms are not achieving their stated goals. Consequently, educators need to question whether neoliberal approaches to education should replace the previously dominant social democratic approaches.

scholarly journals Cheating in the first, second, and third degree: Educators' responses to high-stakes testing

2010 ◽  
Vol 18 ◽  
pp. 14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey Amrein-Beardsley ◽  
David C. Berliner ◽  
Sharon Rideau
Keyword(s):  
No Child Left Behind ◽  
Focus Group ◽  
High Stakes Testing ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Convenience Sample ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
Policies And Procedures ◽  
Group Data ◽  
Focus Group Data ◽  
Testing Policies

Educators are under tremendous pressure to ensure that their students perform well on tests.  Unfortunately, this pressure has caused some educators to cheat.  The purpose of this study was to investigate the types of, and degrees to which, a sample of teachers in Arizona were aware of, or had themselves engaged in test-related cheating practices as a function of the high-stakes testing policies of No Child Left Behind. A near census sample of teachers was surveyed, with valid responses obtained from about 5 percent, totaling just over 3,000 teachers. In addition, one small convenience sample of teachers was interviewed, and another participated in a focus group. Data revealed that cheating occurs and that educators can be quite clever when doing so. But how one defines cheating makes it difficult to quantify the frequency with which educators engage in such practices. Our analysis thus required us to think about a taxonomy of cheating based on the definitions of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd degree offenses in the field of law. These categories were analyzed to help educators better define, and be more aware of others' and their own cheating practices, in an attempt to inform local testing policies and procedures.

scholarly journals Linking TIMSS and NAEP assessments to evaluate international trends in achievement

2017 ◽  
Vol 25 ◽  
pp. 11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hwanggyu Lim ◽  
Stephen G. Sireci
Keyword(s):  
No Child Left Behind ◽  
Mathematics Achievement ◽  
Eighth Grade ◽  
Advanced Mathematics ◽  
Achievement Level ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
International Trends ◽  
The Us ◽  
Eighth Grade Students ◽  
Mathematics And Science

The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) makes it possible to compare the performance of students in the US in Mathematics and Science to the performance of students in other countries. TIMSS uses four international benchmarks for describing student achievement: Low, Intermediate, High, and Advanced. In this study, we linked the eighth-grade Math TIMSS and NAEP scales using equipercentile equating to (a) help better interpret U.S. eighth-grade students’ performance on TIMSS, and (b) investigate the progress of eighth-grade U.S. students over time relative to the progress of students in other countries. Results indicated that relative to other countries, U.S. eighth-grade students increased with respect to the “At or Above Basic” NAEP Achievement level, but that other countries saw larger improvements in the higher achievement level categories, relative to the US. This finding may reflect the emphasis of No Child Left Behind on raising lower achievement to “proficient.” However, with respect to “Advanced” mathematics achievement, eighth-grade U.S. students showed less improvement than students in other countries. 

Under Pressure: Job Security, Resource Allocation, and Productivity in Schools under No Child Left Behind

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 207-241 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall Reback ◽  
Jonah Rockoff ◽  
Heather L. Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
No Child Left Behind ◽  
Job Security ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Teachers Perceptions ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
Passing Rates ◽  
Class Instruction ◽  
Specialist Teachers ◽  
Standardized Exams ◽  
Nclb Act

We conduct the first nationwide study of incentives under the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, which requires states to punish schools failing to meet target passing rates on students' standardized exams. States' idiosyncratic policies created variation in the risk of failure among very similar schools in different states, which we use to identify effects of accountability pressure. We find NCLB lowers teachers' perceptions of job security, shifts time towards specialist teachers in high-stakes subjects and away from whole-class instruction, and has positive or neutral effects on students' enjoyment of learning and achievement in reading, math, and science. (JEL H52, H75, I21, I28, J45)

scholarly journals Unscheduled School Closings and Student Performance

2008 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 316-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dave E. Marcotte ◽  
Steven W. Hemelt
Keyword(s):  
No Child Left Behind ◽  
Student Performance ◽  
Adequate Yearly Progress ◽  
Early Spring ◽  
Late Winter ◽  
School Closings ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
Instruction Time ◽  
Reading And Math ◽  
Using Data

Do students perform better on statewide assessments in years in which they have more school days to prepare? We explore this question using data on math and reading assessments taken by students in the third, fifth, and eighth grades since 1994 in Maryland. Our identification strategy is rooted in the fact that tests are administered on the same day(s) statewide in late winter or early spring, so any unscheduled closings due to snow reduce instruction time and are not made up until after the exams are over. We estimate that in academic years with an average number of unscheduled closures (five), the number of third graders performing satisfactorily on state reading and math assessments within a school is nearly 3 percent lower than in years with no school closings. The impacts of closure are smaller for students in fifth and eighth grades. Combining our estimates with actual patterns of unscheduled closings in the last three years, we find that more than half of schools failing to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) in third-grade math or reading, required under No Child Left Behind, would have met AYP if schools had been open on all scheduled days.

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