Nonalignment as Yugoslavia's Answer to Bloc Politics

2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 146-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Niebuhr

This article focuses on Tito's effort to use foreign policy actions on behalf of his domestic goals. After a bitter rift emerged with the Soviet Union in 1948, Tito moved closer to the West for several years but never proved willing to shift to democratic politics. Although he did carry out reforms of Yugoslavia's Stalinist system in the 1960s, he maintained an authoritarian Communist polity until the end of his life. The article examines how Tito sought to use Yugoslavia's nonaligned status to boost his domestic legitimacy in the eyes of key elites and even, to a degree, in the eyes of the wider population. Yugoslavia's central role in the Bandung conference in 1955 and its subsequent hosting of the summit that formally set up the Nonaligned Movement in 1961 were used by Tito to try to legitimize the polity over which he presided. Yugoslavia's strategy of nonalignment is a valuable illustration of the connection between domestic politics and foreign policy in Communist as well as non-Communist states.

1985 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 176-191
Author(s):  
Aaron Wildavsky

I wish to consider the possibility that a good part of the opposition to the main lines of American foreign policy is based on deep-seated objections to the political and economic systems of the United States. This is not to say that existing policy is necessarily wise or that there may not be good and sufficient reasons for wishing to change it. Indeed, at any time and place, the United States might well be overestimating the threat from the Soviet Union or using too much force. What I wish to suggest is that across-the-board criticism of American policy as inherently aggressive and repressive, regardless of circumstance – a litany of criticism so constant that it does not alert us to the need for explanation – has a structural basis in the rise of a political culture that is opposed to existing authority.To the extent that this criticism is structural, that is, inherent in domestic politics, the problem of fashioning foreign policies that can obtain widespread support is much more difficult than it is commonly perceived to be. For if the objection is to American ways of life and, therefore, “to the government for which it stands,” only a transformation of power relationships at home, together with a vast redistribution of economic resources, would satisfy these critics. If the objection is not only to what we do but, more fundamentally, to who we are, looking to changes in foreign policy to shore up domestic support is radically to confuse the causal connections and, therefore, the order of priorities.


1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Percival

‘King takes Queen’. This is how John Sweeney summed up his view of the state visit by Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu to Britain in June 1978, an event which marked the high point of what theTimesreferred to as ‘Britain's political romance with Romania’ in the 1970s. Sweeney's book, in common with other post-revolutionary writing on Romania, roundly condemns Britain's foreign policy-makers for supporting a repressive regime.1However, in the 1970s the situation was not viewed in such clear-cut terms. In the early part of the decade, books by British writers praised Ceausescu, and Romania often received favourable coverage in the British press.2It was almost universally seen as a country which, although internally rigidly communist, pursued an independent foreign policy and was consequently a thorn in the flesh of the Soviet Union. It was keen to industrialise and to expand its economic ties with the West in order to do so. Apologists for British policy would argue that it was therefore both politically and economically beneficial to support Ceausescu. Politically it would weaken Moscow's control over the Eastern Bloc, and economically it would benefit British industry. Indeed, the two were related – the more economic ties Ceausescu had with the West, the stronger his political independence from Moscow would become.


Author(s):  
Joseph M. Siracusa

By the 1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union found themselves caught up in an offensive and defensive arms race that threatened the stability of an embryonic nuclear deterrence system. ‘Star Wars and beyond’ looks at how domestic politics and the desire to stabilize the nuclear environment played a major role in American and Soviet anti-ballistic missile decisions after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Would rival nations fear that the United States might flaunt its strategic arsenal as a means of encouraging states to behave? Would US missile defences cause an opponent to feel compelled to strike first? Would this impede strategic arms-limitations efforts? Or would US missile defences renew the strategic arms race?


Author(s):  
Vladislav Zubok

This chapter examines the root motives behind the Soviet struggle against the West and the paradigm of Soviet international behavior related to the Cold War. It suggests that decolonization contributed to the Cold War because the decline of European colonial empires in the 1950s created irresistible temptations for Soviet leaders to intervene in parts of the globe previously beyond their reach. The chapter also suggests that the Soviet Cold War consensus began to crumble when the key tenets of the revolutionary-imperial paradigm became suspect in the 1960s and 1970s. These tenets held that the West was determined to destroy the Soviet Union and its “socialist empire” by force.


Author(s):  
Christopher S. Randolph, Jr.

Although previous scholarship indicates that foreign policy has only a minimal impact on voter behavior, contemporary research suggests voters do act upon their foreign policy preferences. Recognizing voters’ policy concerns, political leaders have frequently modified their foreign policy positions to mitigate electoral vulnerability. Ronald Reagan’s policies offer an example of such a shift. Reagan maintained hawkish positions toward Central America and the Soviet Union for most of his first term but, sensing public concern over such policies, adopted more conciliatory foreign policy positions, especially towards the Soviet Union, to reduce potential vulnerabilities in preparation for his 1984 reelection campaign. Notably, Reagan did not return to more aggressive policies following his reelection. Reagan’s foreign policy shift demonstrates the impact that public opinion and domestic politics may have on foreign relations.


Author(s):  
Sanaz Rostamjabri ◽  
Seyed Javad EmamJomehzadeh ◽  
Mahnaz Goodarzi

The Soviet Union emerged as a superpower in the Cold War, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, a new Russia was formed. To achieve the hegemony of power, Russia's security document was given priority. In the first term, Vladimir Putin focused on pragmatism and emphasized the power of domestic politics and the revival of the Russian economy. In his second term, Putin focused on the politics of realism to gain power on the international stage and return to what Moscow is interested in. In his second term, Putin pursued a political (power expansion), security (avoiding differences), and economic (strengthening Russia) view Middle East. Therefore, in this study, Russian foreign policy in the Middle East and its importance The question for this study is: what factors in Russian foreign policy made the Middle East region important for Russia? And the hypothesis for this question: Russia's concern about Islamic fundamentalism (security), economic and political reasons are among the most important factors in directing its foreign policy to the Middle East.


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