The Poznań Uprising of 1956 as Viewed by French and Italian Communists

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 160-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona Haig

The Poznań uprising of June 1956, coming just a few months after Nikita Khrushchev's landmark “secret speech” at the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress, constituted the first real test of de-Stalinization. The uprising was a turning point in postwar Polish history and the precursor to subsequent bouts of unrest in Poland. Yet, the episode itself and its repercussions that year were overshadowed by more pressing and dramatic developments, especially the revolution in Hungary four months later. The responses of the leaders of the two largest non-ruling Communist parties to the Poznań rebellion have been well documented, but much less is known about how ordinary Communist Party members in Italy and France viewed the unrest. This article draws for the first time on the personal testimonies of more than fifty people who in 1956 were rank-and-file Communists from the federations of Var and Gorizia. The article looks in detail at the contemporary reactions to the anti-Communist rebellion. In so doing, it reveals much about ordinary Communists’ priorities, degrees of critical detachment, and level of commitment to the Soviet Union and the Communist cause.

Author(s):  
A. James McAdams

This book is a sweeping history of one of the most significant political institutions of the modern world. The communist party was a revolutionary idea long before its supporters came to power. The book argues that the rise and fall of communism can be understood only by taking into account the origins and evolution of this compelling idea. It shows how the leaders of parties in countries as diverse as the Soviet Union, China, Germany, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and North Korea adapted the original ideas of revolutionaries like Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin to profoundly different social and cultural settings. The book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand world communism and the captivating idea that gave it life.


Author(s):  
Dina Rezk

In July 1958, an unknown nationalist, General Abdul Karim Qasim, came to the helm of power in Iraq. Chapter 3 reveals how analysts reacted to the brutal murder of his predecessor Nuri al Said, as Britain’s most important ally in the Middle East seemed to contract the Nasser ‘virus’ spreading through the region. Qasim quickly demonstrated that he was no Nasserist stooge however. Whilst British policymakers hoped in vain that the new Iraqi leader could be cultivated as a counterweight to Nasser, the intelligence community rapidly realised that Qasim had neither the charisma nor the popularity to compete with his Egyptian counterpart in the Arab Cold War. Qasim reliance on Iraqi Communists to counteract the influence of local Nasserites led to widespread fears that Iraq was on the brink of acquiring Soviet satellite status. This chapter brings to light for the first time the JIC’s nuanced analysis of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), suggesting to policy-makers that in fact the Soviet Union was acting as a restraining influence on the Iraqi communists. Qasim came to be increasingly depicted as ‘paranoid’ and ‘irrational’, whilst assessments of Nasser took on a new and more complimentary light as a ‘moderate’ potential ally in the quest to prevent Communist penetration of the Middle East.


1929 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 956-971 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel N. Harper

A salient feature of the Soviet order set up in Russia by the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 is the provision for a single, mobilized political center, striving to organize all social processes to conform with its particular ideology and program. The Communist party is this political center of the Soviet Union, enjoying a monopoly of legality in respect of organization. Only an outline of the methods by which this political machine exercises its leadership is possible within the limits of the present note. The emphasis will be on the structure which the Communists have given to their party, in order more effectively to carry the responsibility of leadership assumed by them. The word “party” is used, but one has here an organization which differs sharply from political parties of parliamentary systems. Also in its relations to the formal governmental bodies the Communist party presents several features which differentiate it from the party systems of other countries.The special methods of organization adopted and the peculiar position enjoyed by the Communist party in the Soviet Union permit of several theoretical interpretations. One of these is that the Revolution contemplated by the Communists has three distinct stages, of which only the second has as yet been reached. There was the successful seizure of power, finally consolidated after some three years of civil war. Then came the present period of transition, the length of which will depend upon the success of the party in the exercise of its leadership. Only the successful achievement of the present party leadership will bring the final triumph of the Revolution as the third and last period.


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 74-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihua Shen ◽  
Yafeng Xia

The Conference of World Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in November 1957 was the largest gathering of world Communists since the birth of Marxism. Scholars have long assumed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) dominated the conference. Newly declassified archival records and memoirs indicate that the idea of convening a conference and issuing a joint declaration was proposed by both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the CPSU. During the conference the CCP leader, Mao Zedong, played an important role. Mao's extemporaneous remarks at the conference shocked the leaders of the CPSU. His comments on the Soviet intraparty struggle, his blunt remarks about nuclear war, and his declaration that China would overtake Great Britain within fifteen years created doubts and dissatisfactions in the minds of the delegates and cast a cloud over the conference. The Moscow Declaration also revealed incipient Sino-Soviet disagreements, portending Beijing's challenge to Soviet leadership in the socialist bloc. Thus, the Moscow Conference was a turning point for Sino-Soviet relations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
pp. 606-638 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Burds

Historians have long assumed that Germany closely followed a take-no-prisoners policy in dealing with captured communists in the East. That was the direct conclusion to be drawn from Hitler’s notorious Commissar Order issued on the eve of the Barbarossa invasion, which prescribed summary execution of all communists and communist officials. Data published in the Soviet Union largely confirmed this impression, reflecting a dramatic reduction in Communist Party members during the first six months of the war in the East. New data suggest, however, that far from annihilating communist cadres as part of the so-called “Jewish-Communist” threat, the German occupation authorities instead recruited many former communists for service in occupation governmental work, as spies, or in other roles vital to German authorities in eastern zones. Post-Soviet archives offer profound insights into the development of Stalin’s special policy towards these suspected communist turncoats.


1973 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 617-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roderick MacFarquhar

The eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met on 15 September 1956 in an atmosphere of some triumph. In the 11 years that had elapsed since the seventh Congress, the Communists had defeated the Kuomintang, taken over the country and set up a strong administration that had given the country the peace and unity so desperately lacking over the previous century. They had restored and developed the economy, substantially collectivized agriculture – without the drastic consequences suffered by the Soviet Union – and they had nationalized or semi-nationalized private industry and commerce. The People's Liberation Army had fought impressively in Korea, engendering a healthy respect abroad for the new Chinese regime. More recently, especially since the 1955 Bandung Conference, Chinese diplomacy had won new friends in Asia. China had stood up, Mao had said in 1949, and by 1956 it was clear to all that it had.


1973 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 617-646 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roderick MacFarquhar

The eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) met on 15 September 1956 in an atmosphere of some triumph. In the 11 years that had elapsed since the seventh Congress, the Communists had defeated the Kuomintang, taken over the country and set up a strong administration that had given the country the peace and unity so desperately lacking over the previous century. They had restored and developed the economy, substantially collectivized agriculture – without the drastic consequences suffered by the Soviet Union – and they had nationalized or semi-nationalized private industry and commerce. The People's Liberation Army had fought impressively in Korea, engendering a healthy respect abroad for the new Chinese regime. More recently, especially since the 1955 Bandung Conference, Chinese diplomacy had won new friends in Asia. China had stood up, Mao had said in 1949, and by 1956 it was clear to all that it had.


1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen White ◽  
Ian Mcallister

Once dominant and unchallenged throughout the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union rapidly lost authority in the last two years of Soviet rule. Banned by Russian presidential decree after the failure of the attempted coup of August 1991, it was re-established in February 1993 and soon became the largest of the postcommunist parties. A 1992 survey of current and former party members as well as other Russians found that members were characterized by a relatively high degree of activism. They were disproportionately male, more affluent than non-members, and better provided with consumer goods. Younger respondents and religious believers were more likely to have left the party than their older colleagues. Those who still regarded themselves as party members were the most likely to oppose economic reform and support the collectivist principles of the communist era, particularly if they were activists; but the differences between members and non-members were not substantial, and both were found to hold generally pessimistic views on the postcommunist system. These findings suggest that, although former members will continue to be influential, CPSU membership is by itself likely to play a limited part in shaping the political direction of postcommunist Russia.


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